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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on the relevant factors that influence people’s perceived levels of
democracy in their country. Using World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014) I demonstrate that
an interactive-effect between individuals’ confidence in the courts and their beliefs about the
possibility of equitable economic growth account for the greatest effect on their perceived levels
of democracy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction & Inspiration on Democracy
Throughout the world, political scientists and politicians alike strive to find the perfect
type of government, that regime style that not only aids the population of a given country, but
sustainably preserves the sovereignty of the state apparatus itself. Since the great wars of the
20th century, democracy in its many forms flourishes as a regime type and constitutes the
majority of country-government styles across the globe. Freedom House’s Freedom in the
World 2019 report tells us that 44% of the 210 ranked countries and territories worldwide
received a rating of free, 30% partly free, and 26% not free (Freedom House 2019). Democracy,
in its minimalist form, allows citizens to rule themselves in one fashion or another,
contemporarily via electing representatives that govern on the public’s behalf (Schumpeter
1950).
The relevance of most countries being at least minimalist-democracies becomes
paramount when coupled with democratic peace theory. Democratic peace theory states that
democracies do not go to war with other democracies (Mousseau 2000). Although the exact
nature of why this takes place remains debated in the political science literature, as well as in the
political realm, the theory brings to mind an important question across the globe. If all countries
are democracies, will we witness a worldwide peace?
If we subscribe to such beliefs and possibilities, then we quickly turn our attention to two
additional questions: (1) how do we democratize countries and (2) how do we keep democracies
democratic? In this research, I focus on how to keep democracies democratic, or put another
way, how to prevent democratic backsliding. I believe that maintaining democratic values in a
country requires the interaction of political and economic development.
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In this research I define political development as creating a stable democracy. I do
however, realize that defining political development as creating a stable democracy arguably
represents a Western perspective on political development (Payne and Nassar 2012). Therefore,
it is also important to realize that political development may constitute creating political stability
regardless of regime type. No matter which definition one chooses to use, in the context of this
research when I discuss political development, I mean further developing democratic institutions
that will inevitably create a more sustainable state apparatus which will use its power to govern
on behalf of the citizenry. The democratic institution I focus on is an independent judiciary and
the effect it has on decreasing the risk of democratic backsliding. Additionally, in my research I
address economic development and how it affects democratic backsliding. However, there are
several ways one can define economic development.
Defining economic development, or rather measuring it, also remains elusive, and our
choice of measurement contains strong implications that may bias our research. Common
measures include GDP, logged GDP, GDP per capita, or GDP per capita with PPP. Increases in
economic development (using the above measures) are indicated by increases in GDP over time.
In this dissertation I concentrate on equitable or more equal economic development, meaning
that growth in the economy is not focused in one segment of the population but rather distributed
among different socioeconomic levels in the country, and the effect it has on decreasing the risk
of democratic backsliding. While I do believe that equitable economic growth or more equally
distributed economic growth will produce decreases in the probability of a country experiencing
democratic reversal, I do not believe that it is an independent effect but rather an interactive
effect combined with the creation and strengthening of an independent judiciary. This
interaction between an independent judiciary and equitable/equal economic growth represents a
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new contribution to the literature on democratic backsliding. Furthermore, I realize that in many
cases democratic backsliding begins because of “the people’s” view on how well democracy
works “for them.” As such, I believe measuring the citizens’ confidence in the judiciary, and
their view of how the distribution of wealth in the country takes place, provides a unique and
promising predictive indicator of their overall view of democracy in the country, and by
extension, their probability to rise up against the regime itself.
In this research I hypothesize the following:
As confidence in the courts increases, plus people’s belief that wealth grows and there’s
enough for everyone increases, people’s belief their government is undemocratic
decreases; all else equal.
I believe the interaction between my two independent variables begins with the notion of
equality. One important tenant of democracy is that equality exists among the citizenry and
those who govern (Dahl 1973; Kopstein and Lichback 2005). Strictly speaking, this means
political equality and respect for the rule of law, that all individuals are equal before the law and
that the governors are not exempt (Dahl 1973; Payne and Nassar 2012). An independent
judiciary in a democracy serves many purposes: protection of the law and people, penalizing law
breakers, interpreting laws, and arbitrating disputes among individual vs. individual, individual
vs. state, as well as state vs. state (Curtis 1977). Therefore, it falls to the judiciary to secure
accountability and equality between the ruled and the rulers. I believe that as a judiciary
becomes more independent and equality is spread throughout the population politically, that this
creates pressure on government to also provide some sense of equality in the economy of the
country as well. At this point, if the government is able to provide an economic environment of
growth coupled with more equitable distribution of that growth than before, then we will begin to
see decreases in the risk of democratic backsliding. However, I further believe that this theory
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remains dependent on the actual views of the people, not necessarily what takes place at the
aggregate level. Inevitably this brings in media consumption and education levels in a country
which I consider as well in this research. For these reasons I choose to focus on individual level
data.
Although my research does not focus on democratic peace theory, I am inspired by it.
Through determining how best to keep democratic countries democratic, as new democracies
continue to emerge, the possibility exists that conflict on the global level will decrease. In this
dissertation I begin chapter 2 with a review of the literature on democracy, democratization and
consolidation, democratic survivability, and democratic backsliding. In chapter 3 I layout the
methods and models of this research. This includes the hypotheses of each chapter, detailing
how I operationalize my main theoretical variables, the control variables, and a discussion on the
data set used to test my hypotheses. Chapter 4 focuses on confidence in the courts and the
public’s view on democracy. In chapter 5 I test people’s belief that wealth grows and there’s
enough for everyone versus an income scale (a more traditional variable of economic status),
demonstrating that the main theoretical independent variable of this research outperforms
previous economic indicators when it comes to the public’s view on democracy in the country.
Chapter 6 represents the main theoretical argument and contribution to the literature. I
demonstrate that the interactive effect between confidence in the courts and people’s belief that
wealth grows and there’s enough for everyone significantly and positively affects the public’s
view of democratic performance in the country. Chapter 7 provides a conclusion to the
dissertation, discussing an overview of results, implications of the research, real world
applications of the findings, and a path for future research. At this point I move to a discussion
on what is democracy.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review on Dependent Variable
What is Democracy?
In this section, I discuss the evolution of the definition of democracy. I begin with the
origins of the word and then transition to more contemporary times beginning in the 1950s with
Schumpeter’s minimalist definition of democracy. From this point, I proceed by presenting
Dahl’s seminal work Polyarchy and demonstrate how the definition of democracy further
evolves by the 1970s. Following this, I go over Huntington’s addition to the definition in the
1990s and continue with several other scholars’ work ending with Moller and Skaaning’s (2013)
division of democratic countries into four different subtypes of democracy. At the end of this
section, I provide a table that summarizes the progression and evolution of the definition of
democracy.
The term 'democracy' is derived from the ancient Greek word 'demokratia', with demos
meaning ‘people’ and kratos meaning ‘rule.’ The two roots of this word combine to define a
form of government that was ‘ruled by the people’ (Dahl, Robert A. “Democracy.”). While in
the past those who governed defined the people or citizens in a limited capacity, today we take
this to mean the entire population of a country. In the mid-20th century, Joseph Schumpeter
provided us with a working definition of democracy that scholars still use today. “The
democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at the political decisions in
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the
people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1950; 260). While this entails the Greek version of ‘rule by the
people,’ it also adds the important dimension of voting and individuals’ ability to compete for the
people’s vote. This implies that democracy, in its simplest form, begins with the public's
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election of decision-makers in competitive elections; those elected officials decide political
matters. However, we see that scholars find this definition lacking in many ways.
Robert Dahl in his seminal work Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition goes beyond
Schumpeter and states that in order for a government to be considered truly democratic, the state
and the people must be political equals and the state must be responsive to the public’s
preferences. He provides us with three necessary conditions for democracy: (1) the public
possesses the ability to formulate preferences, (2) the public possesses the ability to signify those
preferences to each other as well as to the state via individual-action and collective-action, and
(3) the government weighs the preferences of the public equally and without discrimination of
the source or content (Dahl 1973; 2). The author further states that in order to fulfill these
conditions, government must provide eight guarantees in the form of civil liberties and civil
rights: the freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, the right to vote,
universal eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support,
freedom of the press and alternative information, free and fair elections, and institutions for
making government policies must depend on votes and other expressions of preferences (Dahl
1973; 3). Dahl's comprehensive list of criteria looks much like the democracy we see today;
however, political scientists continue to add to this definition of democracy in an effort to better
define what democracy truly is.
Some scholars, especially those whose work focuses on the qualitative side, prefer a more
simplistic definition, arguing that adding and subtracting to a never-ending list of requirements
for democracy achieves little. Huntington (1991; 7-8) states that a country is democratic if “its
most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections
in which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all the adult population is
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eligible to vote.” While this definition appears more simplistic, insomuch as the entire definition
fits into one sentence, Huntington still suggests two new components of democracy: periodic
elections and near universal suffrage.
Schmitter and Karl (1991) broadly define democracy as a regime type that holds
government accountable for their actions by the public who elect the governors. Here the
authors introduce the concept of accountability into the definition, as well as put forth two
additional conditions for democracy to add to Dahl’s list: (1) popularly elected officials possess
the ability to function without unelected officials impeding, and (2) there exists no overarching
political system that keeps the state from self-governing (Schmitter and Karl 1991). In these
authors’ opinion, a broad definition of democracy remains important; however, in quantitative
work, political scientists encounter the issue of operationalizing democracy. In such cases, lists
of necessary conditions for democracy become paramount in an effort to quantify theories.
By the end of the 1990s, political scientists observed a vast growth in the definition of
democracy for both quantitative and qualitative work. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world
witnessed a large wave of democratization as the Soviet Union dissolved (Huntington 1991). At
this point some scholars began focusing on the ‘greatness of democracy,’ and in particular the
importance of human rights in democratic countries. Sen (1999) argues that democracy is a
universal value not restricted by region, culture, or type of civilization. Furthermore, he adds to
the literature by stating that ‘democracy includes its intrinsic importance in human life,’ the
importance that the democratic process plays in not only securing citizens’ rights and duties, but
also in meeting their needs (Sen 1999). However, citizens’ needs vary greatly from group to
group, considering that most nation-states are not homogenous societies as far as race, ethnicity,
culture, or ideology. Diamond (2003) acknowledges this point when he adds to our working
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definition by saying that not only do must democracies possess free and fair election, but these
elections must contain multiple political parties. By adding this dimension of multipartyism,
Diamond tells us that due to diversity in populations in any given state, the state must also
contain diversity in its political party system. Without this diversity, and representation of all
segments of the population, a country risks democracy via tyranny of the majority or tyranny of a
plurality.
Payne and Nassar (2012; 170) follow the same path as Diamond by explicitly stating that
democracy is “a system of government in which the majority rules but minority rights are
protected.” In this definition the authors state that while majority rules in democracy, minority
rights, and thereby human rights, cannot be denied simply due to the mass’s preferences. This
represents an important addition to what is democracy that falls in line with Sen (1999), that
democracy is not simply a list of conditions and requirements, but a type of government that
provides liberties and rights to its citizens, while also protecting citizens from each other as well
as from the state.

Kopstein and Lichbach (2005) include free and fair elections in a multiparty

system as democratic while also focusing on protecting citizens from government and the
importance of the rule of law. Though Schmitter and Karl (1991) put forth the issue of
accountability in governance, Kopstein and Lichbach (2005) go further by describing the
importance of the rule of law in holding the government accountable. The authors state that the
rule of law means citizens hold the state accountable for its actions and judgement of
government officials must be equal to every other citizen under the law (Kopstein and Lichbach
2005). Accountability could be defined as electing a new official to office if the previous
officeholder does not abide by the public’s preferences; however, the rule of law explicitly states
that officeholders face the same legal ramifications for breaking the rules as ordinary citizens.
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Whether creating a list of conditions for democracy, or making a broad all-encompassing
definition, scholars have come to agree that although democracy may have a finite definition,
there are nonetheless several different types of democracies that exist throughout the world.
Moller and Skaaning (2013) use a four-stage typology of how to characterize the democracies of
the world today. By using the Polity IV data set, as well as Freedom House, the authors tell us
that there are four types of democracies: minimalists, electoral, polyarchy, and liberal. In
minimalist democracies, the sole requirement is that regular elections take place with uncertain
outcomes. The electoral democracy builds on that criteria but adds a higher level of integrity to
the election. Polyarchy takes both of the previous democracies and adds to them the freedoms of
association and speech. Finally, the liberal democracy includes ‘equality before and under the
law,’ meaning the addition of the rule of law in government (Moller and Skaaning 2013; 98). By
creating this typology, the authors are able to utilize both qualitative definitions and quantitative
lists of democracy in order to see variation across the globe; this illuminates our understanding
that while democracy may have one definition, it manifests in the real world in at least four
different and distinct regime subtypes.
By looking at the literature presented in this section, we see that democracy, with all its
qualifications, still represents the Greek meaning of ‘rule of the people.’ However, we also
witness the extent of the evolution of the word into what it means today. Table 2.1 provides a
summary of this evolution, from Schumpeter in 1950 with his minimalist definition of
democracy, to Moller and Skaaning in 2013 with their four regime subtypes of democracy.
Table 2.1: Defining and Expanding Democracy

Schumpeter (1950) – Democracy defined

“Institutional arrangement for arriving at the
political decisions in which individuals
acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people’s vote”
(pg. 260)
9

Dahl (1972) - Three necessary conditions for
democracy

1. The public possesses the ability to
formulate preferences
2. The public possesses the ability to
signify those preferences to each other
as well as to the state via individualaction and collective-action
3. The government weighs the
preferences of the public equally and
without discrimination of the source
of content (pg. 2)

Dahl (1972) – Eight guarantees needed to
fulfill conditions for
democracy

1. Freedom to form and join
organizations
2. Freedom of expression
3. Right to vote
4. Universal eligibility for public office
5. Right of political leaders to compete
for support
6. Freedom of the press and alternative
information
7. Free and fair elections
8. Institutions for making government
policies must depend on votes and
other expressions of preferences (pg.
3)

Huntington (1991) – Democracy defined

Country is democratic if “its most powerful
collective decision-makers are selected
through fair, honest and periodic elections in
which candidates freely compete for votes,
and in which virtually all the adult population
is eligible to vote” (pg. 7-8)

Schmitter and Karl (1991) – Three additional
conditions

1. Democracy as a regime type that holds
government accountable for their
actions by the public who elect the
governors
2. Popularly elected officials possess the
ability to function without unelected
officials impeding
3. There exists no overarching political
system that keeps the state from selfgoverning
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Sen (1999) – Democracy broadened

A universal value, not restricted by region,
culture or type of civilization; that includes an
intrinsic importance of human life

Diamond (2003) – Democracy broadened

Must possess free and fair elections but must
also contain multiple political parties

Kopstein and Lichbach (2005) – Democracy
broadened

Rule of law must be implemented whereby
citizens can hold the state accountable and
government officials are equal under the law
as every other citizen

Payne and Nassar (2012) – Democracy
broadened

“A system of government in which the
majority rules but minority rights are
protected” (pg. 170)

Moller and Skaaning (2013) - Democracy
quantified

1. Minimalists -regular elections take
place with uncertain outcomes
2. Electoral - minimalist with a high
level of electoral integrity
3. Polyarchy – previous two plus
freedom of association and press
4. Liberal – previous three plus equality
before and under the law

Beginning with Schumpeter’s definition of democracy as government via competitive
elections, Dahl builds from this and includes his three necessary conditions: that the public must
possess the ability to formulate preferences, be able to express these preferences to citizens and
the state, and these preferences must be weighed equally without discrimination based on the
source. Furthermore, he states that in order for this to take place individuals must be free to
form/join organizations, have freedom of expression, the right to vote, and eligibility for public
office; the following must also occur: political leaders are able to compete for support, media has
freedom of voice, elections are free and fair, and institutions for making government policies
must depend on votes and other expressions of preferences (Dahl 1972; 3). From this point
Huntington (1991) further adds that elections must also be frequent, and that suffrage must be
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near universal. Schmitter and Karl (1991) also apply more conditions, stating that democratic
governments must be accountable to their publics, elected officials must possess the ability to
function without unelected officials impeding, and there can be no overarching political system
that keeps the state from self-governing. Beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s, we
witness more of a broadening of the definition of democracy rather than any new additions of
conditions. Such broadening includes seeing democracy as a universal human-right and a
multiparty system that is guided by majority rules while still protecting minority rights (Diamond
2003; Payne and Nassar 2012; Sen 1999). Recently we see through the work of Moller and
Skaaning (2013) that the authors no longer spend time on trying to redefine or add to the
definition of democracy, but rather use existing literature to create their four regime subtypes of
democracy: minimalist, electoral, polyarchy and liberal.
Understanding the evolution of democracy discussed above is of paramount importance
to the research topic presented in this paper. As my argument centers on how to decrease the
probability of democratic backsliding, and how people view democracy in their country, we must
understand what democracy is in order to know when backsliding actually occurs. While the
proposed research in this paper does deal specifically with democracy, it remains equally
important to understand what democratization is and what affects the process of becoming a full
or consolidated democracy. Theoretically, it stands to reason that through understanding the
democratization and consolidation processes, we gain further knowledge of variables that could
affect my research interest of democratic backsliding. With this in mind, in the next part of the
paper I begin a discussion on democratization and democratic consolidation.
Democratization & Consolidation
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In this section I begin by defining democratization. Afterward I define and discuss democratic
consolidation and how it relates to the democratization process. Furthermore, I present some
proposed ways in the literature to determine if a country can be considered a consolidated
democracy. At the end of this section I provide a table to summarize what has been stated as
well as a critique of the material with the idea that democratization remains an unfinished
process everywhere.
Countries and governments experience many things that can lead toward the transition of
regime type (war, poverty, economic crisis, loss of government legitimacy, etc.). Whatever
reason that may be, scholars frequently pose the question ‘when do we know if a country is truly
a democracy?’ Ishiyama (2012; 30) explains that democratization is “the process by which the
rule of law, elections and leadership accountability is established, and where civil society
develops.” During this process, Diamond (1994) states that in becoming a consolidated
democracy, the most important objective is political institutionalization. By consolidated
democracy the author means when “democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate
among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down,” and that “this normalization requires
the expansion of citizens’ access, development of democratic citizenship and culture, broadening
of leadership recruitment and training, and other functions that civil society performs” (Diamond
1994; 15). Institutionalization, normalization and habituation of democratic norms and values
such as free and fair elections, civil liberties and civil rights, government accountability and the
rule of law, signify the marker for when a country meets these requirements and may be called a
consolidated democracy. While these things occurring on a regular basis seemingly qualifies a
country as democratic, this approach also represents a qualitative method for characterizing
regime type.
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Beetham (1994) provides a more quantitative test of democratic consolidation. The
transfer of power test dictates that in order for a democracy to be considered consolidated the
first free and fairly elected government must lose in an election, and willingly give up power to
the new free and fairly elected government (Beetham 1994). This test adds two conditions for
consolidation that were previously overlooked in new democracies. The first comes in the form
of the starting point. Beetham does not consider the ‘transitional government’ as the starting
point for the transfer of power test. He reasons that only after the first democratically elected
government loses in a subsequent election can the country be said to have passed the transfer of
power test and labeled a consolidated democracy, because this signifies a departure from
authoritarian tendencies to hold on to power even after a government loses in an election.
However, we have seen in several cases around the world where these first
democratically elected regimes continuously win election after election (Japan and the Liberal
Democratic Party, Mexico and the Institutional Revolutionary Party, South Africa and the
African National Congress). Does this mean that Japan, Mexico, and South Africa were not
democracies? Beetham (1994) provides us with the simple longevity test, which considers a
country to be a democracy if free and fair elections continue to take place for an elongated
amount of time, such as 20 years, regardless of the electoral outcomes. Using this test, the
previously mentioned cases would then be considered to have consolidated, regardless of the
transfer of power test. However, Beetham quickly states that the longer any political party stays
in power, the harder it becomes to distinguish the party from the state apparatus, thereby making
it difficult to determine if the elections are truly free and fair. The author reconciles the issues
with both tests by saying that a combination of the transfer of power test and the simple
longevity test should be used when determining if a country is democratically consolidated.

14

Finally, Beetham further states that democratization is always and everywhere a continuing
process. By this he means that even if a country is a consolidated democracy, that does not mean
that democratization is over. This is due to the fact that we often witness fluctuations in
countries’ civil rights and liberties being either expanded, or in some cases retracted from
specific groups in the population. Since democracy is based off of the will of the people,
citizens’ voting behaviors change and evolve and can thereby create such fluctuations that will
continue to affect the country’s democratization even after consolidation has taken place. This
indicates that consolidation is a goal in democratization, but it is not the end point.
Democratization and democratic consolidation represent two concepts in the literature
that scholars generally agree on: the process of becoming a democracy and the deepening of
democratic institutions and values, coupled with a combination of quantifiable tests. Provided
below in Table 2.2 is a summary of the concepts and definitions from this section of the paper.
Table 2.2: Democratization and Consolidation

Ishiyama (2012) – Democratization

Democratization is “the process by which the
rule of law, elections and leadership
accountability is established, and where civil
society develops” (pg. 30)

Diamond (1994) – Democratic consolidation
and determining consolidation

Consolidated democracy is when “democracy
becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate
among its citizens that it is very unlikely to
break down” and that “this normalization
requires the expansion of citizens’ access,
development of democratic citizenship and
culture, broadening of leadership recruitment
and training, and other functions that civil
society performs” (pg. 15)

Beetham (1994) – Determining consolidation

Transfer of power test – when the first
democratically elected government loses in
the following election and gives power to the
new democratically elected government
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Simple longevity test – when free and fair
elections continue to take place for an
elongated period of time (i.e. 20 years)
Democratization is always and everywhere a
continuing process

As we are told by Ishiyama, democratization is the process of institutionalizing the rule
of law, elections, leader accountability, and civil society. Diamond states that this process of
institutionalization, once successful and finished, allows a country to be considered a
consolidated democracy. Furthermore, he states that once a country is consolidated, and
democratic norms, values, and institutions have all been engrained in the citizens, consolidated
democracies are unlikely to breakdown. Finally, Beetham offers the transfer of power test and
the simple longevity test to aid in determining if a country is consolidated. According to
Beetham, the two tests should be used in conjunction with one another, signaling that a country
has seen a departure from their authoritarian past by the government giving up power to a new
democratically elected government, and that free and fair elections have continued for an
elongated period of time without reverting to authoritarianism. The author further notes that
even once consolidation has been reached in a country, the democratization process continues
and is never truly ended due to fluctuation in civil liberties and civil rights in any given country
over time.
Due to these fluctuations in civil liberties and rights, many political scientists have moved
beyond studying democratization and instead focus on democratic sustainability. This is in part
due to a general agreement in the literature on what democratization and democratic
consolidation are, while at the same time there exists less agreement on how best to keep a
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democracy democratic. In the following part of this paper I look at the literature that focuses on
democratic survival.
Democratic Survival
Scholars throughout the years have suggested several variables that add to the rate of
survival of democratic regimes that range from the onset of wars, the speed at which
consolidation takes place, whether or not market economies are put in place, the presence of
foreign aid, or if the democracy has a presidential vs. parliamentary type of government. Below
I touch on each of these variables and then provide a table to summarize the theories and
findings on democratic survival.
Huntington (1991) famously developed the idea of waves of democratization. In his text
he describes three waves of democratization: the first beginning in the 1820s after the
Napoleonic Wars and ending between WWI and WWII, the second beginning after WWII and
fading out in the 1960s and 70s, and the third wave beginning in 1974/5 and continuing into the
1990s onward (Huntington 1991). An important characteristic noted about the beginning and
end of some of the waves is the ending and beginning of war. Huntington highlights the
importance that war played in the duration of both the first and second wave of democratization.
International war in the past stood as one of the greatest threats to the survival of democratic
countries. However, in contemporary times we have not witnessed the onset of conflict at such a
massive scale as to compare with either the Napoleonic Wars or WWI and WWII. Since the
1990s and the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, political scientists aim to understand
democratic sustainability via variables other than war.
Bunce’s (2003) research concentrates on the democratic survival of post-communist
countries and the factors leading to consolidation and sustainability. She discusses how the
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process of democratization varies greatly among cases. In terms of the post-communist states of
Eastern Europe, the author discusses how mass mobilization, and in some cases rapid
mobilization, played a role in bringing about democracy and consolidation. Furthermore, Bunce
explains how rapid democratic consolidation improves the likelihood of democratic
sustainability going forward. Her hypothesis states that rapid mass mobilization for democracy
inevitably leads, when successful, to a large portion of the population already being dedicated to
democracy as a type of government. In such cases, consolidation takes place at a quicker rate
with popular support, and thereby the chance of a sustained democracy increases due to the fact
that the regime in power was placed there and receives its legitimacy directly from the majority
of the population. Svolik (2008) also supports the hypothesis that consolidated democracies
possess a greater survivability rate and compares such democracies to countries that remain in a
transitional period rather than consolidate quickly. He further discusses how the following three
characteristics can impact the survival of a democracy: age of the democracy, levels of economic
development, and whether the government uses a presidential vs. parliamentary system.
Svolik’s (2008) research concentrates on finding what important variables affect
democratic survival across the globe. While the author provides support for Bunce’s argument
that rapid consolidation aids in democratic sustainability due to mass support for democracy,
Svolik further argues that other variables are vital in determining whether a democracy survives.
He tells us that as the age of a democracy increases, the likelihood of survival increases as well.
Additionally, Svolik finds that the following features of a country lead to a lower likelihood of
consolidation, and thus, a decreased chance of survival: low economic development, presidential
systems of government, and countries with past experiences in military-authoritarian regimes.
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Svolik’s finding that countries with presidential executives possess a lower likelihood of
consolidation adds to the debate between which is better for democratic sustainability, a
presidential or parliamentary system. Beetham (1994) agrees that presidential systems do not
possess the durability that parliamentary systems do. He tells us that presidents typically possess
more power than prime ministers, and since they are not dependent on legislative majorities like
prime ministers are, presidents can be tempted to use ‘executive power extra-legally’ to
implement their own desired policy regardless of the legislature (Beetham 1994). But the
question remains, what about the presidential system tends to make it less amicable to
consolidation?
In his work on explaining democratic survival, Sing (2010) argues that while more
democratic breakdowns take place in presidential systems than in parliamentary ones, this
phenomenon is not based on the fact that the country has a presidential system. Sing looks at
democracies across the world and finds that presidential systems do not possess an ‘intrinsically’
higher likelihood of dissolving than parliamentary systems, but rather ineffective legislatures
pose the greatest threat. This suggests that the issue with presidential systems that do not survive
as democracies lies in that the legislatures were not created as strong enough or do not operate
efficiently enough to act as a legitimate check on the power of the executive branch. These
findings further imply that strong and efficient legislatures, who find their legitimacy throughout
the entire population, aid in democratic survival. One additional factor that Sing finds significant
in explaining democratic survival is whether or not a country has favorable ties to the United
States. This is explained in terms of aid that the United States gives to countries, whereby this
aid can help a new democracy survive through low levels of economic development, which Sing
states possesses a direct link to survivability.
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Providing further support to this explanation, Gazibo (2005) looks at how foreign aid
affects democratization in Benin and Niger from 1989 to 1999. The author used a comparative
case study of the two countries to see how fluctuations in foreign aid, especially at ‘critical’
moments in the democratization process, affects regime sustainability. Gazibo’s findings show
that at times of economic difficulty Benin was able to obtain the continued financial support of
foreign donors that led to the survival of the regime. The author compares this to the case of
Niger, where continued financial support from foreign donors did not take place. As a result,
Gazibo tells us that Niger experienced economic crisis without economic support from outside
the country, and during the time period that the research covers Niger experienced military coups
in 1996 and 1999. The findings in this study do add further support to Sing’s research that
foreign aid does in fact increase democratic survivability. But is it merely the injection of
foreign aid at critical economic moments that increases the sustainability of the regime? Some
scholars suggest that the economic and political reforms tied to foreign aid could possess just as
powerful of an effect on reducing the likelihood of democratic backsliding.
Rustow (1970) outlines three potential factors that create stable democracies: (1)
politicians protecting democratic norms and values, (2) social and political structures (i.e.
conflict resolution procedures), and (3) favorable economic conditions. By democratic norms
and values the author references equality among citizens. Conflict resolution procedures are
viewed as a judiciary acting as the arbiter of disputes as well as implementing the rule of law.
Favorable economic conditions equal positive economic growth. In particular (as I further
discuss later) Rustow tells us that economic growth tends to lend itself to democratic survival.
But in the particular case of economic growth via foreign donors, many times this foreign aid
comes with strings attached in the form of market liberalization as well as political liberalization.
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In order to receive aid from certain donors, recipient countries are required to adopt more
democratic norms and values.
Furthermore, some authors argue that the very essence of market economies also acts as a
reinforcing agent of democracy, and thereby increase regime survival. Mousseau (2000)
discusses the division of labor in prosperous market economies. In such economies, the division
of labor makes cooperation among individuals necessary. Citizens must modify their behavior,
cooperate, and learn tolerance in order to obtain contracts for goods and services that they
require (Mousseau 2000). However, in less developed economies and in non-market economies,
the mode of production is less developed and individuals do not have to cooperate or tolerate
other individuals, being that citizens do not seek contracts from other citizens for goods and
services but rather consume the products that they produce (Mousseau 2000). In this instance we
see that the division of labor in a market economy instills tolerance and cooperation in the
public, both of which are democratic values which may lead to a belief of equality among people
and cooperation is seen as the bases for democratic governance. By looking at countries across
the globe, Mousseau finds support for his hypothesis that market economies produce values and
norms that reinforce democratic norms and values. This evidence suggests that in Gazibo’s
research of Benin and Niger, foreign aid at critical moments as well as foreign donors’
requirements for economic liberalization played a role in increasing democratic sustainability by
further spreading democratic norms and values.
The above literature discusses the many variables that increase a democratic country’s
chance for remaining a democracy. In Table 2.3, I provide a summary of these theories and
findings; following the table, I further discuss the importance of these variables.
Table 2.3: Democratic Survival
Huntington (1991)

Lack of international wars (i.e. WWI/II)
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Bunce (2003)

Rapid mass mobilization leads to rapid
democratic consolidation which increases the
chance of democratic survival

Svolik (2008)

Consolidated democracies possess a greater
survivability rate than transitional
democracies; increasing age of democracy
increases survivability.
Low economic development, presidential
systems, and countries with experiences in
military-authoritarian regimes possess a lower
likelihood of consolidation, and thereby the
chance for survival decreases.

Sing (2010)

Ineffective legislatures threaten democratic
survival

Gazibo (2005)

Foreign aid during economic crisis increases
survivability

Rustow (1970)

Politicians protecting democratic norms and
values, social and political structures (i.e.
conflict resolution procedures), favorable
economic conditions

Mousseau (2000)

Market economy produces values and norms
that reinforce democratic norms and values

Huntington concludes is his waves of democratization that international wars exerted
negative pressure on democratic survivability. However, with no international wars in
contemporary times comparable to the Napoleonic War or WWI and WWII, political scientists
turned their attention to other variables affecting democratic survival. Bunce (2003) and Svolik
(2008) both state that consolidated democracies possess a higher survivability rate than countries
that are not yet consolidated but are transitioning toward democracy. Svolik also tells us that low
levels of economic development, a country having a presidential type of democracy, and a
country's experience of military-authoritarianism all produce an effect of decreasing the chance
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for democratic survival. However, Sing (2010) counters Svolik’s argument about presidential
systems by providing evidence that shows ineffective legislatures are the real threat to a
democracy’s survival rate; country's possession of a presidential vs. a parliamentary system does
not matter. Sing and Gazibo (2005) both describe the importance of foreign aid, especially in
countries with low levels of economic development, stating that increases in foreign aid bolster
the probability that a country will not revert to authoritarianism. Rustow (1970) also states that
favorable economic conditions aid in democratic survival; furthering regime stability are the
possession of institutions that guide conflict resolution as well as politicians who protect
democratic norms and values. Mousseau (2000) brings together the ideas of foreign aid,
favorable economic conditions, and democratic norms and values. His findings show that
market liberalization in the economy can improve economic conditions; furthermore, market
liberalization produces conditions that reinforce democratic norms and values. In such cases,
economic growth increases democratic survival; democratic norms are reinforced by the new
economic norms.
While democratic survival remains paramount, my research focuses on the perspective of
democratic reversals. Although one could argue that the two are simply inverses with the same
implications, many scholars have chosen to take the route of looking specifically at political
instability and regime reversals. In the following portion of the paper, I shift my focus to
literature on democratic backsliding.
Democratic Backsliding
In this section I cover variables from the literature that directly and indirectly affect
democratic reversals. I begin with a discussion on international organizations’ ability to stop
democratic backsliding. Following this, I look at how the very nature of some cultures may not
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be amicable to democracy and, thus, a democratic country inclusive of these cultures is presented
with an increased chance of democratic collapse. Afterward, I present several scholars’ findings
on the role that weak political institutions play in democratic backsliding. Finally, I provide a
table that summarizes the theories and findings from the literature and discuss them in total.
Now I turn to the state of democracy in the world and how international organizations are
affecting it, in particular the African Union.
In 2015, Freedom House released their annual report stating that of the 195 countries in
the world that 89 were free, 55 partly free, and 51 not free (Freedom House 2015). Freedom
House shows how North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa suffer from a lack of democracy as well
as continued setbacks in democratization. Tieku (2009) provides research on democracy
promotion by the African Union. One of the major purposes of the African Union is to promote
democracy, support countries that are transitioning to democracy, and potentially punish
violators of democracy (Tieku 2009). This research represents an interesting take on stopping
democratic backsliding through the use of international and regional political organizations to aid
democratizing countries. Tieku informs us that the African Union has mixed results in its efforts
to stop backsliding. In general, the union has been unable to prevent African leaders from taking
advantage of executive offices and consolidating power in themselves. Therefore, the author
tells us that gradual democratic reversals via consolidating executive power in one person still
takes place. However, when it comes to ‘dealing with coup-makers,’ the union has seen some
success. Tieku states that the number of coups in the 2000s have decreased in Africa compared
to previous decades. This can potentially be attributed to the distribution of African Union
peacekeeping forces throughout conflict prone areas on the continent. This suggests that
international and regional organizations possess the power to effectively aid in stopping
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democratic backsliding, dependent on how much power the organization directly has over
participating countries. However, specifically in North Africa where some of the lowest ranking
countries on Freedom House’s scale exist, the African Union has not seen any success.
Huntington (1996) provides a potential (and controversial) explanation as to why North
Africa and other regions in the world experience the lowest freedom scores. In Huntington’s
work Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, he puts forth four cultural
zones that represent the entire globe: Western Christian, Orthodox Christian, Confucian, and
Islamic. According to Huntington, due to a long history of cultural beliefs rooted in the
difference in equality among men, women, and individuals of different religions, the Confucian
and Islamic culture zones are not compatible with democracy and particularly the democratic
norms and values of equality and tolerance. The author argues that the two Christian zones both
hold more open views in regard to equality amongst men, women, and individuals of different
faiths; based on this demonstration of tolerance, the Christian zones are the only ones that have
democratic values instilled into their culture (Huntington 1996). In his view, due to cultural
differences, some states will never possess the ability to become democracies due to lack of
tolerance and beliefs in equality.
However, there are several cases of countries with Confucian/Asian based religions or
beliefs that have become flourishing democracies (i.e. Japan and India), as well as countries with
Muslim beliefs that have become democratic (i.e. Senegal and Tunisia). To make the
generalization that an entire region/zone is not conducive to democracy is quite the assumption;
we should not presume that every country attempting to democratize in one of these regions is
destined to fail based solely on geographic placement or cultural heritage.

25

Several scholars argue that the key to overcoming long-term cultural beliefs that might
not be conducive to democracy is via strong representative institutions that promote cooperation
and tolerance. Lijphart (1991) argues that representation of a country lies mostly in the
legislature. Furthermore, the author explains that in parliamentary systems we tend to find that
the executives are not in a position to become ‘all powerful’ over the entire government. Due to
the prime minister in a parliamentary system having their position tied to legislative support, the
legislature can remove the prime minister more easily if abuse of powers begins to take place.
This becomes increasingly important during instances in which an executive attempts to
consolidate power within themselves, thereby heading down the path of democratic backsliding.
Goldstone et al. (2010) further justify Lijphart’s analysis of the power of institutions
while at the same time discrediting Huntington’s theory on culture and ‘zones.’ The authors
analyze countries across the globe to predict the onset of political instability in the way of violent
civil war as well as nonviolent democratic reversals. Their key contributions to the literature are
that demography, economic conditions, and geography are not significant predictors of
instability; rather, political institutions that are created specifically for each democratic case
possess significance in predicting democratic backsliding. Kapstein and Converse (2008) find
similar results as far as the importance of political institutions in preventing democratic failure;
however, the authors are more specific, aligning especially with Lijphart’s thoughts on the power
of the executive.
Kapstein and Converse (2008) look at countries throughout the world to determine what
variables impact democratic backsliding the most. Their findings indicate that in comparison to
other variables analyzed, the key variable is effective constraints on executive power. In many
cases, the fact that the executive was able to effectively begin the consolidation of power in their
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office led to a snowball effect of increased democratic backsliding. The authors state that in
many instances this led to complete democratic reversals.
The above discussion provides an overview of several important variables that can lead to
democratic backsliding in a country. In Table 2.4, I present a summary of these theories and
findings followed by further discussion of the literature.
Table 2.4: Democratic Backsliding

Tieku (2009) – International organizations

African Union promotes democracy,
however, mixed record of success. Unable to
prevent/stop leaders from taking advantage of
executive offices and consolidating power in
themselves; some success in dealing with
coup-makers. Ability of international
organization to deal with authoritarianism
depends on the power the organization has
over member countries.

Huntington (1996) – Culture matters

Confucian and Islamic cultures around the
globe do not possess the norms of tolerance
and equality that the Christian cultures do,
thus, Confucian and Islamic countries are
more likely to backslide

Lijphart (1991) – Strength of political
institutions

Weak legislature allows for executives to
consolidate power and slide away from
democracy; parliamentary systems better
protect against this because the executive is
tied to legislature

Goldstone et al. (2010) – Power of institutions Demography, economic conditions, and
geography do not predict political instability,
rather, it is strength and design of political
institutions that gives stability.
Kapstein and Converse (2008) – Power of
Ineffective constraints on executive power
institutions leads to democratic backsliding

Tieku (2009) tells us of the success and failures of the African Union (AU) in attempting
to stop democratic backsliding. While the author states that the AU has seen success in dealing
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with coup-makers, he also says that the union has not been able to prevent executive leaders in
countries from consolidating power in themselves and producing a gradual democratic reversal.
Huntington (1996) provides a partial explanation for those cases in Northern Africa. He states
that countries in his zones of Confucian or Islamic countries do not possess the cultural norms of
tolerance and equality that countries in Christian cultures do. In order for a country to resist
backsliding, democratic norms represented by tolerance and equality of citizens must be present.
However, Goldstone et al. (2010) provide evidence that neither demography and geography or
economic conditions can predict the collapse of democratic governments; rather, the strength and
design of political institutions are the key to keeping a democracy strong. Lijphart (1991) and
Kapstein and Converse (2008) agree that institutions are the key but narrow down this idea to the
importance of executive constraints. The authors tell us that democratic backsliding is likely due
to a lack of checks and balances in countries where leaders do not have executive constraints
imposed on them by other branches of government.
An uneven distribution of power among the branches of government in a democracy with
power favoring the executive appears to be a combination that will likely end in democratic
backsliding. My research focuses partially on the judiciary, and in the specific case above, how
it can constrain executive power and create an even distribution of power among the branches of
government. I argue that independent judiciaries play a large role in achieving this goal.
Summary of Literature Review
The literature above provides us with a working understanding of what is democracy and
what the democratization process looks like. Furthermore, we have seen how variables such as
weak political institutions, international organizations, culture, and varying economic conditions
affect both democratic survival and democratic backsliding.
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While a transitioning democracy establishes its independent judiciary, it remains
susceptible to democratic reversal. However, if economic growth takes place, and in particular
equitable economic growth, this aids in reducing the probability of democratic backsliding.
Furthermore, as the literature on market liberalization and democratization states, the norms and
values of cooperation and tolerance that come with a market economy help to reinforce the
democratic norms that the government is already attempting to institutionalize. Therefore, I
argue:
As confidence in the courts increases, plus people’s belief that wealth grows and there is
enough for everyone increases, people’s belief their government is undemocratic
decreases; all else equal.
In the following methods chapter, I further explain the causal mechanism behind why my
two main theoretical variables have an interactive effect, rather than two separate independent
effects on the dependent variable.
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Chapter 3: Methods and Models
Introduction
The research presented above demonstrates the importance of multiple variables as far as
influencing democratic backsliding. In this section I begin by explaining the causal mechanisms
behind the two main independent variables of this dissertation influencing views on democracy.
As I present my hypothesis, I further provide Figure 3.1: How Judicial Independence and
Equitable Economic Growth Affect Democratic Backsliding to aid in illustrating the expected
relationship and effects of the variables. Afterward I give a detailed explanation of why I believe
these two variables are not only important in democratic backsliding, but also why the two are
interactive. I do this by providing Figure 3.2: Explaining the Interaction between Judicial
Independence and Equitable Economic Growth and discussing the cycle of the interaction.
Following this discussion, I list my hypotheses, define and operationalize my main theoretical
independent variables. Additionally, I define and operationalize my control variables and give
expected results and directions of effects. I now turn to a discussion on the causal mechanisms of
my argument.
Causal Mechanisms behind Judicial Independence and Equitable Economic Growth
I argue that as confidence in the courts increases, plus people's belief equitable economic
growth is possible increases, people’s belief their government is undemocratic decreases; all
else equal. While I focus strictly on individual-level data in this research, the implication from
this research is the probability of aggregate-level change (i.e. regime change). Governments are
made of groupings of people. Therefore, it stands to theoretically reason, that people’s views on
government institutions and the state of the economy should and do shape what the actual
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government looks like. But what is it about these two variables that cause democratic
backsliding to decrease? Below I discuss the causal mechanisms behind judicial independence.
Judicial independence creates and protects the rule of law, which fosters accountability of
government officials to the citizenry as well as equality between the ruled and the rulers.
Accountability and equality are the causal mechanisms that foster decreases in the probability of
democratic backsliding. This is because as individuals see that government is working ‘for the
people,’ rather than politicians working ‘for themselves,’ citizens begin to have more supportive
feelings for the democratic government. Furthermore, as the population of the country begins to
see the rule of law implemented and that citizens are protected by the government from other
citizens as well as the government itself, people’s positive sentiments toward government will
further increase. Additionally, as equality between citizens and political leaders increases,
individuals will notice that government is no longer above the people, but rather the people are
part of a democratic government and are protected by it and from it. Finally, accountability and
equality will demonstrate to the citizens that politicians are responsible for their actions while in
office and can face the same penalty for breaking the law as any other citizen. An overall
increase in judicial independence leads to increased accountability and equality in a democratic
country. This in turn increases citizens’ support for the democratic regime, and thereby
decreases the probability of democratic backsliding. On the other hand, if other branches of
government intervene in judicial affairs, and thereby decrease judicial independence, the courts
will not be effective in upholding the rule of law. This means that the judicial branch will likely
not be able to hold other government officials accountable for their actions. As a byproduct of
this, the equality between the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’ disappears and democratic backsliding
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begins. However, the question remains, what about equitable economic growth in particular
affects people’s beliefs that their government is undemocratic or not?
Equitable economic growth means individuals’ economic situations are improving across
socio-economic levels in a country. This means that the benefits of economic growth are not
centered on only elites, but rather all citizens across income levels receive some of the benefits
of economic growth. Equitable economic growth begins to create equality across the population
in the economic system insomuch that non-political and non-economic elites are also benefiting
from economic growth in the country. Although some segments of a population may benefit
more than others, as equitable economic growth increases, more and more segments of the
population become benefactors of the growth. Furthermore, as equitable economic growth
increases, this begins to spur positive sentiments for the current economic system in place. This
support for the economic system is the causal mechanism for why equitable economic growth
leads to a decreased probability of democratic backsliding. As people’s belief that equitable
economic growth is possible and increasing, this leads to increased support for the government
and its economic policies because the system is working for a larger and larger portion of the
population. Since the government and economic system are working for the people, meaning the
population is benefiting from equitable economic growth, the citizens have no incentive to want
to change the system, thereby decreasing the probability of democratic backsliding.
In sum, increases in accountability and equality in the judicial and economic systems
created by judicial independence and equitable economic growth cause decreases in the
probability in democratic backsliding because the citizens in the country have no incentives to
change a political or economic system that is working in their interest. The people’s beliefs on
judicial and economic institutions informs their beliefs on how democratic the country remains,
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and that belief directly affects the probability of regime reversal, though I am not testing regime
reversal directly in this study. I am testing what variables affect citizens’ beliefs in the level of
democracy in their country. Furthermore, whether the interactive effect of my two main
independent variables exert the strongest force of any variables controlled for here. This is my
contribution to the literature on democratic survivability. Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship
between the two variables and their predicted effect on democratic backsliding.

Figure 3.1: How Judicial Independence and Equitable Economic Growth Affect Democratic Backsliding

As shown in Figure 3.1, I argue that higher levels of equitable economic growth
combined with higher levels of judicial independence provide for the least likely possibility of
backsliding. Additionally, as you move either variable into the low-level category while holding
the remaining variable in the high-level category, we begin to witness an increased probability of
backsliding. Furthermore, when both variables have low levels, we observe the greatest
likelihood of democratic backsliding. However, I must note that there remains a multitude of
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possibilities when combing different levels between the two variables (i.e. medium levels of each
variable will produce a smaller chance of backsliding than the variables both being at low
levels). I decided to provide this simplistic version of my argument to illustrate the basic
relationship between my variables and democratic backsliding in an effort not to create an
unnecessarily complex diagram. At this point however, we can see from Figure 1 how my
argument works; that increases in judicial independence and equitable economic growth lead to a
decreased probability of democratic backsliding. In the following section I delve into the causal
mechanism behind why my two independent variables are interactive rather than two separate
effects.
Causal Mechanisms Behind the Interactive effect of Judicial Independence and Equitable
Economic Growth
Above I presented the causal mechanisms behind why judicial independence and
equitable economic growth lead to decreases in democratic backsliding. In this section I present
the causal mechanisms that act to make these two variables an interactive effect. I begin with a
discussion on the relationship between the two variables and then provide Figure 2 and a
continued discussion on the interaction.
I argue that judicial independence and equitable economic growth interact in a tit-for-tat
relationship, that as one increases it also applies pressure to the other to increase as well and vice
versa. I begin with judicial independence. As judicial independence increases, the
accountability of government officials and equality among citizens and between citizens and the
state increases as well. As mentioned previously in the paper, this effect will cause citizens to be
supportive of the government and thereby decrease the probability of democratic backsliding.
Additionally, as individuals’ political equality increases it provides the availability and access to
political institutions that one may use to protect their economic interests without fear of
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retribution. This is caused by the judiciary being independent enough to act as an unbiased
arbiter in personal disputes dealing with economic issues.
Furthermore, the increase of equality in the political realm will lead/cause citizens to
apply pressure on the government for equality in the economic realm as well. I believe this
pressure on the government from citizens will manifest itself in the form of government
producing economic policies that create economic growth that is more equitable. These initial
steps represent the beginning of the interactive effect of the variables. Figure 3.2 illustrates this
interaction. I begin discussing it in detail in the figure below, starting with circle #1 in the lower
left-hand corner.
Figure 3.2: Explaining the Interactive Effect between Judicial Independence and Equitable Economic
Growth

In Figure 3.2 we see the two independent variables, judicial independence, and equitable
economic growth. Each vertical line represents a scale indicating levels of each variable ranging
from high at the top of the line, to low at the bottom of the line. I begin my explanation of the
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interaction in the lower left-hand corner with circle #1. As we can see judicial independence
starts off low but then rises as the country begins to democratize. As circle #1 shows, the rise in
the level of judicial independence leads to a rise in equality between citizens as well as between
citizens and that state, and increased citizens’ access to political institutions. The increased
access to political institutions is a byproduct of the equality of citizens and leaders created by
democratization and judicial independence. Following the line/arrow from circle #1, we see that
circle #2 expresses how increases in political equality lead to citizens applying pressure on
government to provide for an increased level of equality in the economic realm as well. This
pressure from the citizens, on the new democratic government, leads to circle #3 where
government enacts new economic policies to create more equality in the economic system of the
country. The new democratic government has the incentive to be responsive to the people for
two reasons: (1) a democratic government by nature is responsive to and representative of the
people, and (2) the new government will wish to remain in office as long as possible and thereby
wants to satisfy the people to gain popular support.
As new economic policies are put in place, we continue to the right on our figure to circle
#4, where we witness a rise in equitable economic growth in the country. As equitable economic
growth increases, individuals throughout the population are experiencing increases in their
personal economic situations. As such, citizens will want more political equality and further
increased access to political institutions that can protect their newfound economic interests,
meaning greater access to the courts. In the figure, this leads us now to the middle of the picture
and circle #5. Circle #5 shows us that increases in economic equality lead to citizens applying
pressure on government to provide more political equality and more access to political
institutions. Once again, since a democratic government has the incentive to be responsive to its
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citizens, we then follow our figure to the left and to circle #6 where we witness a rise in judicial
independence. From this rise in judicial independence, we then move further to the left to circle
#7 where we see that the increase in judicial independence creates a new rise in equality and
access to political institutions. At this point, the increases in political equality and access to
political institutions will again lead to citizens pushing for more economic equality to match their
new level of political equality, and thereby the interactive cycle begins again.
Theoretically, this cycle could continue until a fully functioning and purely independent
judiciary is realized and until a perfectly equitable economic system exists in a country.
However, realistically this is not likely nor desirable in many cases. A judiciary acts as an
important check on other branches of government and represents an important staple in keeping a
democracy democratic. However, the possibility exists that if a judiciary becomes too powerful,
the system of government would switch from a democracy to a system whereby the judiciary
holds most of the power of government. As far as a purely equitable economic system, this
would be symbolized by a true socialist economy, where the distribution of wealth is evenly
distributed throughout the population. In situations such as this, citizens would not have the
incentive for profit making and increased growth because the system would provide for the needs
of all.
Due to the two previously mentioned reasons I believe theoretically this cycle between
judicial independence and equitable economic growth only rises so high before finding an
equilibrium that represents the best fit for citizens and government in a democracy. However, I
do not believe that this point of equilibrium will be quickly met in new democracies, nor that
developed democracies have reached this point either. Looking at global GINI Index scores we
can see that economic inequality is still high even in developed democratic economies (though
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this is outside of the scope of this research) indicating that there is still room for this effect to
take place.
In this section I have provided my causal mechanisms for why judicial independence and
equitable economic growth decrease the probability of democratic backsliding (accountability,
equality, and the creation of a positive sentiment among the population supporting the
government and economic system). Following this I mapped out the expected outcomes for my
argument depending on different values of the independent variable. Afterward I presented the
causal mechanisms for the interactive effect (political equality and access to political institutions
leading to pressure on the government for more economic equality, and vice versa).
While the research I present here uses quantitative analysis to provide support for these
effects, in chapter 6 I additionally use the case study of the Arab Spring to demonstrate how
citizens’ views on these variables directly affected their views on the level of democracy and
representation they had in their country, and how this in several cases manifested into regime
change and large people’s power movements. In the next section I list my three hypotheses
going forward in my research and define the independent and dependent variables as well as
operationalize the variables and describe the data used to test my arguments.
Hypotheses and Data Set
In this dissertation I create three separate models, all using OLS regression analysis. The
first model in chapter 4 focuses on confidence in the courts and the public’s view on democracy.
H1: As confidence in the courts increases, people’s belief their government is
undemocratic decreases; all else equal.
In chapter 5, I add the equitable economic growth variable to the model and argue:
H2: As people’s belief that equitable economic growth is possible increases, people’s
belief their government is undemocratic decreases; all else equal.
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Chapter 6 represents the main theoretical argument and contribution to the literature. I
show that the two main independent variables are in fact not independent of each other. Rather, I
demonstrate that there is an interactive effect between confidence in the courts and people’s
belief in equitable economic growth affecting individuals’ beliefs on democracy.
H3: As confidence in the courts increases, plus people’s belief that equitable economic
growth is possible increases, people’s belief their government is undemocratic decreases;
all else equal.
The survey data for this research come from the World Values Survey Wave 6 2010-2014
(Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P.
Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014). The survey covers 60 countries (listed in the
Appendix with Figure 3.3). Below in Figure 3.3 is a map provided by World Values Survey
(WVS) showing the geographic location of these 60 countries.
Figure 3.3: Countries Included in Wave 6

Operationalizing the Variables
Beginning with my two main independent variables, followed by my dependent variable,
and then control variables, below I provide the survey questions asked to respondents and how
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each variable was coded by WVS. All questions and coding come directly from the survey
Codebook and Questionnaire (Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J.
Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014). Following this
outlining of variables, I also provide a table of summary for the coding.
The independent variable of people’s belief that wealth grows and there’s enough for
everyone is measured first by asking respondents: “Now I'd like you to tell me your views on
various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely
with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right;
and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.” The
statement coded as 1 = “people can only get rich at the expense of others”, and the statement
coded as 10 = “wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone.”
The independent variable of confidence in the courts is measured by asking respondents:
“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very
much confidence or none at all?” At this point the surveyor states, “the courts” and 1= “a great
deal” and 4= “none at all”.
My dependent variable how democratic is your country is measured by asking: “And how
democratically is this country being governed today? Again, using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1
means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what
position would you choose?”
The five control variables for the models include: age, education, sex, interest in politics,
and confidence in the press. I include age in the model because it theoretically stands to reason
that as people get older, they increase their understanding of what the word democracy actually
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means through experience using the institutions in their country, rather simply that of what they
are taught in school or what is written in the constitution. I include education as a control
because it is likely that individuals with higher levels of education are likely to know more about
actual levels of democracy as well as consume news about what’s going on in their country. Sex
I add to the model because in many developing countries (as well as developed countries)
individuals’ access to education is discriminated by gender, and therefore it may be a significant
influence on the dependent variable as well. Interest in politics likely influences the dependent
variable in a similar fashion as education. Any person, regardless of education, that is interested
in politics will likely know more about what is going on in their country and consume more news
about government actions. The last control of confidence in the press I add because in many
ways this asks people “does your country have a free and independent media system?”. If
individuals believe their media are free (a characteristic of democracy) then it is likely they will
believe that their country is more democratic.
Age is measured by asking “Can you tell me your year of birth, please? 19____ (write in
last two digits)This means you are ____ years old (write in age in two digits).” Sex is coded as
1=male and 2=female based on surveyor’s observation (due to that fact that in many countries
asking such a question could be considered inappropriate or offensive).
Education is measured by asking: “What is the highest educational level that you have
attained?”, and is coded as “1.- No formal education 2.- Incomplete primary school 3.- Complete
primary school 4.- Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type 5.- Complete
secondary school: technical/ vocational type 6.- Incomplete secondary school: universitypreparatory type 7.- Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type 8.- Some
university-level education, without degree 9.- University - level education, with degree.” Interest
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in politics is measured by asking respondents “How interested would you say you are in politics?
Are you (read out and code one answer): 1.- Very interested 2.- Somewhat interested 3.- Not
very interested 4.- Not at all interested.”
Confidence in the press is measured by asking respondents “I am going to name a
number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in
them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none
at all? (Read out and code one answer for each): 1.- A great deal 2.- Quite a lot 3.- Not very
much 4.- None at all.” Below in Table 3.1 I provide a summarized version of the coding of each
variable for this research.
Table 3.1: Coding of Variables by WVS

How democratic is your country
(dependent variable)
Confidence in the courts
(independent variable)
People’s belief that wealth grows and there’s
enough for everyone
(independent variable)
Age
(control variable)
Sex
(control variable)
Education
(control variable)

Interest in politics
(control variable)

a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is
“not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is
“completely democratic”
1 is a great deal of confidence, 2 quite a lot of
confidence, 3 not very much confidence, or 4
none at all
coded as 1 = “people can only get rich at the
expense of others”, and the statement coded
as 10 = “wealth can grow so there’s enough
for everyone.”
number of years
coded as 1=male and 2=female; based on
surveyor’s observation
1.- No formal education 2.- Incomplete
primary school 3.- Complete primary school
4.- Incomplete secondary school: technical/
vocational type 5.- Complete secondary
school: technical/ vocational type 6.Incomplete secondary school: universitypreparatory type 7.- Complete secondary
school: university-preparatory type 8.- Some
university-level education, without degree 9.University - level education, with degree
1.- Very interested 2.- Somewhat interested
3.- Not very interested 4.- Not at all interested
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Confidence in the press
(control variable)

1.- A great deal 2.- Quite a lot 3.- Not very
much 4.- None at all.”

Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P.
Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014.

At this point in the dissertation I have outlined my hypotheses, the causal mechanisms,
and expectations, described the data set and operationalized all relevant variables. In chapter 4 I
begin my statistical analysis and test hypothesis 1, dealing with the citizens’ confidence in the
courts, and how that affects their belief in the quality of democracy in their country.
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Chapter 4: People’s Confidence in the Courts Matter
Introduction
In all democracies, the idea of an independent and impartial judiciary remains paramount
to keeping a high quality of democracy. This is true at the aggregate level and should also be
reflected at the individual level. This chapter demonstrates that:
H1: As people’s confidence in the courts increase, the people’s belief their government is
undemocratic decrease; all else equal.
The implication from positive and statistically significant results in this research is the
potential to predict aggregate level change (i.e. civil unrest/regime change). Governments are
made of groupings of people. Therefore, it stands to theoretically reason, that people’s views on
government institutions should and do shape people’s actions for or against the government.
However, Kuran (1991) tells us that while citizens of a country may grow in their
discontent for their government, in many cases (particularly in the 1989 revolutions of Eastern
Europe) these sentiments remained hidden until either the government was viewed weak enough
to force change or the opposition was viewed strong enough to impose change. Taking this into
consideration, if a judiciary does not remain independent and impartial in its objective of
arbitrating disputes between citizens versus citizens, citizens versus the state, and even state
institutions versus each other, it stands to reason that citizens observe this and discontent with
government will grow. From this point, once a lynchpin for change is pulled, the number of
people activated to protest should be greater. While this dissertation does not focus directly on
civil unrest or regime change, I zero in on the step before, people’s view of how democratically
their country is being run, and how the courts are either supporting the rule of law or not, and
how that affects people’s views.
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I begin with a review of the literature on judiciaries and the impact and importance to
democracies. Next, I restate the hypothesis, provide an overview of the type of regression
analysis used, present the data, the time period of the data, and the cases used in this research.
Following this I operationalize the dependent, independent, and control variables used in the
model and present my results of the OLS regression. Afterward, I interpret the results,
graphically display the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, and discuss
the implications of my findings. Finally, I discuss possible alternative explanations and conclude
the chapter on the relevance of the courts. At this point I turn to a review of the literature on
judiciaries and democracies.
Judiciaries Affecting Democracy
In this section I review literature on the judiciary in a democracy. I begin by stating the
purpose of the judicial system in a democratic country and define judicial independence.
Following this I discuss the function of the courts, the responsibilities of the courts, and the rule
of law in democracies. Afterward I look at research focusing on how an independent judiciary
can stop democratic backsliding. At the end of this section I provide a table summarizing the
theories and findings of the literature presented here along with a discussion of how it all ties
together. At this point I begin by discussing the purpose of the courts.
A democratic judiciary serves several purposes: interpreting laws, imposing proper
penalties to individuals who break those laws, securing citizens’ civil rights and civil liberties,
and making sure that citizens do not use their rights and liberties to take away those of their
fellow citizens. Additionally, judiciaries settle disputes between citizens, between citizens and
the state, and between state institutions (Curtis 1977). An important aspect to notice here, in
referencing the previous discussion on constraints on the executive, Curtis tells us that the
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judiciary holds the responsibility to deal with disputes between state institutions. This becomes
paramount in the example of an executive attempting to seize control of government by taking
other government branches’ constitutionally delegated powers. However, in order for a court to
play such an important role in a democracy, the court and the justices must possess
independence. In defining judicial independence, I use Ishiyama’s definition, “the extent to
which the judicial authorities are shielded and independent from other political actors” (Ishiyama
2012; 203). For example, if the judiciary is heavily influenced by an executive, even if the
courts possess an incentive to stop the executive from seizing power they do not possess the
ability to do so, and therefore the process of democratic backsliding begins.
Shapiro (1981) goes a step further by listing the three primary functions that courts serve
in democracies. The author agrees with Curtis insomuch that Shapiro believes the number one
function of the courts is conflict resolution, but goes on to tell us that social control is the second
function and the making of laws the third function of a judiciary in a democracy. According to
Shapiro (1981) the judiciary does not simply interpret laws as Curtis suggests, but also can and
does make laws via judicial review and ruling on whether previously passed laws are
constitutional or not. By ruling that a law is unconstitutional, the judiciary effectively dictates
what law is constitutional, and thereby enforced throughout the country. The ability of judicial
review holds formidable power over the executive or the legislature insomuch that if either of the
two attempt to create laws that would consolidate power in themselves, leading to a potential
democratic reversal, the judiciary could rule those laws unconstitutional and serve to protect the
integrity of a democratic state.
However, the power of judicial review is most certainly tied to if the judiciary that exists
in the country possesses independence from political influence. Just as mentioned before, if the
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executive or the legislature holds influence over the judiciary, then the courts will not possess the
ability to stop democratic backsliding. This makes an independent judiciary paramount in the
protection of a democratic state. As Payne and Nassar (2012; 175) tell us judicial systems “have
the responsibility for ensuring that the laws are fair and that individuals’ rights are protected,”
but also that the rule of law is enforced. If the rule of law is enforced, then no executive will be
able to be above the law, but rather will be ‘treated equally under the law.’ This becomes even
more relevant in the cases of developing countries that are just starting to democratize. In many
instances, once executives have reached their term’s end and their term limit has expired, leaders
in these developing countries sometimes attempt to use extra-legal means to increase the
longevity of their rule and increase their executive power with the reasoning that ‘they’ are the
only individuals capable of truly seeing the country through the path of development. However,
in transitioning democracies often institutions are not yet fully developed in order to keep
executives in check from power-grabs.
Ishiyama (2012) tells us that in newly democratizing countries, where the process itself
remains fragile and delicate while democratic institutions are in the process of being formed and
turned into followed norms and rules, the imposition of the rule of law via an independent
judiciary remains paramount to the furthering of the democratization process itself. The author
provides us with two main reasons why governments must follow their own rules during
democratization: (1) following the law signifies a clear break from their authoritarian past and
demonstrates to the populace the transition of regime type and the government’s dedication to
democracy and (2) it begins the development of democratic political norms and values that teach
government officials that ‘the legal bounds of the [political] system cannot be ignored’ for
individual, family, friend, or partisan political gains (Ishiyama 2012; 206). Here we see that not
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only does an independent judiciary put a check on power for other branches of government, but
it also begins the important teaching of democratic norms and values. Just as the government
following the rule of law would demonstrate to the public their dedication to the regime type,
following new democratic norms and values would also teach the public more about what a true
democracy looks like. Kapstein and Converse (2008) find in their analyses that constraints on
executive power remains one of the best ways to stop democracies from failing, but they further
indicate that the best way to limit excessive executive powers is through judicial independence.
Kapstein and Converse (2008) concentrate on how important an independent judiciary is
in stopping democratic backsliding across the globe. They find that this variable is crucial in a
government’s ability to stop executives from power grabbing and thus beginning the path of
democratic reversal. However, the authors note that setting up an independent judiciary does not
happen overnight. In order for a judiciary to make an honest break from the authoritarian post,
which likely had a judiciary that was completely controlled by the executive, government must
in many cases build a completely new judiciary. This means the need to find qualified justices,
build a democratic constitution for the justices to preside over and protect, and ensure that the
justices and the constitution are protected from political intrusion (Kapstein and Converse 2008).
Creating a new democratic constitution in many cases can take years. Furthermore, finding
qualified justices that are willing to preside over the constitutions can also prove difficult,
especially if many of those who are qualified were previously associated with the authoritarian
regime. Using the same justices as the previous regime risks the possibility that the public will
not think the judicial system is fair and democratic, and will symbolize a continuation of the past,
not a march forward in democratization.
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Considering all of the above; the need for an independent judiciary to be set up quickly in
order to keep from democratic backsliding by applying checks on other branches of government,
the fact that setting up an independent judiciary in a democracy can literally take years, and the
additional point that setting up an independent judiciary may require political choices that appear
nondemocratic in the eyes of the public, all demonstrate just how important the judiciary is in the
democratization process and furthermore just how fragile that process remains. Gibler and
Randazzo (2012) agree with Kapstein and Converse, that the key to preventing regime reversals
rests on an independent judiciary, and forming such a judicial branch of government takes time.
Gibler and Randazzo (2012) research the predictive power of established independent
judiciaries on reducing democratic backsliding and find that one of the main predictors of
backsliding was the existence of a newly formed court. Additionally, the authors tell us that this
finding was not only the case in democracies, but rather in all regimes. They found that newly
formed courts were associated with an overall higher probability of regime failure across all
cases and regime types. Gibler and Randazzo further determine that while established
independent judiciaries do in fact decrease the probability of democratic backsliding, they also
find that established independent judiciaries decrease the probability of regime reversals in any
type of government across their cases.
The duality of their findings demonstrates just how powerful judiciaries can be in
government, and how detrimental weak judiciaries are when it comes to the probability of
regime survival. The authors caution, just as Kapstein and Converse, that although the power of
the judiciary remains great that judicial institutions take time to develop.
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The literature on judiciaries in democracies in this section ranges from the purpose of the
judiciary to its ability to stop democratic backsliding. Table 4.1 below presents a summary of
the theories and findings previously mentioned and is followed by further discussion.
Table 4.1: The Judiciary and Democracy: Concepts, Theories and Findings
Curtis (1977) – Purpose of judiciary
Interpreting laws, imposing proper penalties
to individuals who break those laws, securing
citizens civil rights and civil liberties, making
sure that citizens do not use their rights and
liberties to take away those of their fellow
citizens, and to settle disputes among citizens,
citizens and the state, and state institutions
against other state institutions
Ishiyama (2012) – Judicial independence

“the extent to which the judicial authorities
are shielded and independent from other
political actors” (pg. 203)

Shapiro (1981) – Functions of the courts

1) Conflict resolution
2) Social control
3) The making of laws

Payne and Nassar (2012) – Responsibilities of “ensuring that the laws are fair and that
courts
individuals’ rights are protected” and that the
rule of law is enforced and all are “treated
equally under the law” (pg. 175)
Ishiyama (2012) – Rule of law in new
democracies

Kapstein and Converse (2008) – Judiciary
and executive
interaction

1) Following the law signifies a clear
break from the authoritarian past and
demonstrates to the populace the
transition of regime and the
government’s dedication to democracy
2) It begins the development of
democratic political norms and values
that teach government officials that
‘the legal bounds of the political
system cannot be ignored’ for
individual, family, friend, or partisan
political gains (pg. 206)
The best way to limit democratic backsliding
is through constraints on the executive, and
the best way to limit executive power is
through judicial independence
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Gibler and Randazzo (2012) – Stopping
backsliding

Newly formed courts increase chance of
regime change, but established independent
judiciaries decrease the probability of
democratic backsliding

Curtis (1977) begins by providing us with the purpose of a judiciary in democracies. He
states that the courts are responsible for interpreting laws, imposing penalties on rule breakers,
securing citizens’ civil liberties and rights, and settling disputes among citizens and/or state
institutions. Shapiro (1981) adds to this by providing his three primary functions of the courts:
conflict resolution, social control, and the making of laws. The idea of the courts making laws
adds an important dimension to Curtis’s description because it illustrates the courts’ ability to
create new laws via judicial review. Payne and Nassar (2012) further add the importance the
courts play in protecting the rule of law, meaning the courts are responsible for making sure that
citizens and political leaders are equal before the law. Demonstrating that political leaders in a
democracy are equal and accountable to citizens is paramount according to Ishiyama (2012).
The author states that by following the rule of law it demonstrates to the public a clear break
from the country’s authoritarian past as well as teaches political leaders that the bounds of the
legal system cannot be ignored for personal gain. However, Ishiyama tells us that the protection
of the rule of law rests with the judiciary, which must be independent from other branches of
government in order to operate properly in a democracy. Finally, Kapstein and Converse (2008)
as well as Gibler and Randazzo (2012) find support for the hypothesis that independent
judiciaries do in fact decrease the likelihood of democratic reversals. However, the authors
caution that setting up an independent judiciary takes time (perhaps years) and during this time a
democratizing country remains fragile and susceptible to democratic backsliding.
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As I am inspired by the findings of this literature at the aggregate level, I believe these
theories further hold true at the individual level as well. In the following section I restate my
hypothesis and describe the data used to test this idea as well as operationalize the variables of
the model.
Hypothesis
In this chapter I argue:
H1: As people’s confidence in the courts increases, the people’s belief their government is undemocratic
decreases; all else equals.

I use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis to test the relationship between
these variables. The survey data for this research comes from the World Values Survey Wave 6
2010-2014 (Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M.
Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014). The survey data cover 60 countries (a
full list of the countries can be found in the appendix under Figure 4.1). Below in Figure 4.1 is a
map provided by World Values Survey (WVS) showing the geographic location of these 60
countries.
Figure 4.1: Countries Included in Wave 6
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Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E.
Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014

Operationalizing Model Variables
Beginning with my main independent variables, followed by my dependent variable, and
then control variables, below I provide the survey questions asked to respondents and how each
variable was coded by WVS. All questions and coding come directly from the survey Codebook
and Questionnaire (Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. DiezMedrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014). Following this outlining of
variables, I also provide a table of summary for the coding/recoding used for my model.
The independent variable of confidence in the courts is measured by asking respondents:
“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very
much confidence or none at all?” At this point the surveyor states, “the courts” and 1= “a great
deal” and 4= “none at all”. In order to show positive a relationship in my models I recoded the
direction of the variable to 4= “a great deal” and 1= “none at all”.
My dependent variable how democratic is your country is measured by asking: “And how
democratically is this country being governed today? Again, using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1
means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what
position would you choose?” This coding remains the same in my model as it is in the
codebook.
The five control variables for the model include: age, sex, education, interest in politics,
and confidence in the press (I additionally considered income and media consumption rates but
further discuss why these controls were thrown out of the model in the implications and
alternative explanation sections).
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Age is measured by asking “Can you tell me your year of birth, please? 19____ (write in
last two digits)This means you are ____ years old (write in age in two digits).”
Education is measured by asking: “What is the highest educational level that you have
attained?”, and is coded as “1.- No formal education 2.- Incomplete primary school 3.- Complete
primary school 4.- Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type 5.- Complete
secondary school: technical/ vocational type 6.- Incomplete secondary school: universitypreparatory type 7.- Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type 8.- Some
university-level education, without degree 9.- University - level education, with degree.”
Interest in politics is measured by asking respondents “How interested would you say
you are in politics? Are you (read out and code one answer): 1.- Very interested 2.- Somewhat
interested 3.- Not very interested 4.- Not at all interested.” The direction of this variable was
recoded to show a positive relationship within my model (1= “not at all interested”; 4= “very
interested”).
Sex is coded as 1=male and 2=female, based on surveyor’s observation (as asking a
person’s gender could be considered offensive or inappropriate in some cultures and countries).
Confidence in the press is measured by asking respondents: “I am going to name a
number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in
them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none
at all?” At this point the surveyor states, “the press” and 1= “a great deal” and 4= “none at all”.
(Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P.
Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014). In order to show a positive relationship in my
model I recoded the direction of the variable to 4= “a great deal” and 1= “none at all”.
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Below in Table 4.2 I provide a summarized version of the coding of each variable for this
research. Directly following this is Table 4.3 and the results of the OLS regression. The results
are based off of 77,974 observations from 60 countries between 2010 to 2014.
Table 4.2: Coding of Variables

How democratic is your country
(dependent variable)
Confidence in the courts
(independent variable)

Age
(control variable)
Sex
(control variable)
Education
(control variable)

Interest in politics
(control variable)

Confidence in the press
(control variable)

scale 1 to 10;
1 means that it is “not at all democratic”
10 means that it is “completely democratic”
4 is a great deal of confidence
3 quite a lot of confidence
2 not very much confidence
1 none at all
number of years
1=male
2=female
based on surveyor’s observation
1. No formal education
2. Incomplete primary school
3. Complete primary school
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/
vocational type
5. Complete secondary school: technical/
vocational type
6. Incomplete secondary school: universitypreparatory type
7. Complete secondary school: universitypreparatory type
8. Some university-level education, without
degree
9. University - level education, with degree
4. Very interested
3. Somewhat interested
2. Not very interested
1. Not at all interested
4. A great deal
3. Quite a lot
2. Not very much
1. None at all

Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E.
Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014.
Note: confidence in courts, confidence in press, & interest in politics were recoded in the opposite directions to
illustrate positive relationships in my models.
Summary statistics and tabulations of each variable appear in the appendix under Table 4.2.
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Table 4.3: People’s Confidence in Courts affecting views on how Democratic the Country is being Run

(OLS Regression Analysis)
Coefficients

p-values

Standardized
Beta Coefficients

Confidence in
Courts

.501***

.001

.185

Age

.006***

.001

.037

Sex

.052***

.001

.01

Education

.01***

.001

.01

Interest in Politics

.084***

.001

.032

Confidence in Press

.283***

.001

.097

Constant

3.47***

.001

N

77,974

R-squared

.0609

Adjusted R-squared

.0608

***=99%, **=95%,
*=90%

Interpreting Results
As we can see from the regression results in Table 4.3, the coefficient for confidence in
the courts is positive and significant, indicating support for H1 that as people’s confidence in the
courts increase, the people’s belief their government is undemocratic decreases; all else equals.
Furthermore, confidence in courts is statistically significant with a p-value=.001. Additionally,
all of our control variables are statistically significant with a p-value=.001, which I will focus on
after interpreting the results of the regression analysis.
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The coefficient for confidence in courts is .501. This indicates that as you move 1-unit in
the positive direction on the scale of confidence in courts (coding scale= 1-4) this then moves
.501-units on the how democratic is your country being governed scale (coding scale= 1-10).
Table 4.4 illustrates this effect if we start with each variable at the beginning of its scale; value=
1.

Table 4.4: Effect of 1-unit rise in Confidence of Courts on Belief Country is Democratic
Variables
Beginning of
1-unit change in 2nd-unit change
3rd-unit change
coding scale
Confidence in
in Confidence in in Confidence in
Courts
Courts
Courts
Confidence in
courts
1→
2→
3→
4
OLS Coefficient
(.501)
Std. Err.
(.0101)

Belief country is
democratic

1

1.501

2.002

2.503

Table 4.4 shows how increasing 1-unit at a time for confidence in courts has an additive
effect on belief country is democratic by .501 each unit change. Moving from no confidence in
courts (coded as 1) to a great deal of confidence in courts (coded as 4) represents a 3-unit change
in total which moves a person’s belief that their country is democratic by 1.503 units of the
democracy scale (scale= 1-10).
While at first glance this appears as a minor change, even though it remains statistically
significant, when we plot this change in belief’s about democracy starting at the mean-value, and
then also moving -1 and +1 standard deviations from the mean of how democratic is your
country being run, we begin to see just how significant this effect can be. Below in Figure 4.2 I
plot the data from Table 4.4 starting at the mean of level of democracy scale, +1 standard
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deviation, and -1 standard deviation. Presented right afterward is Table 4.5 which provides the
descriptive statistics on how democratic is your government being governed. Table 4.6 shows the
data of Figure 4.2 in table format.
Figure 4.2:

1-Unit Change in Confidence in Courts on Belief Country is
Democratic
Democracy Mean

Mean -1 Std.Dev.

Mean +1 Std.Dev.

12

Democracy Scale

10
8
6
4
2
0
1

2

3

4

Confidence in Courts

Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics on How Democratic is Your Country Being Governed
Democracy Variable
Means Value
Standard Deviation Value
Scale 1-10
5.997
2.536

Table 4.6: 1-Unit Change in Confidence in Courts on Belief Country is Democratic
Confidence
Starting at -1 Starting at Mean Starting at +1
in
Standard
Value of
Standard
Courts
Deviation of
Democracy
Deviation of
Democracy
Democracy
Mean
Mean
1
3.467
5.997
8.533
2
3.968
6.498
9.034
3
4.469
6.999
9.535
4
4.97
7.5
10.036
(democracy scale
maxes out at 10)
Note: This is the data/table format of Figure 4.2. Coefficient of Confidence in Courts=.501.
Democracy scale= 1-10.
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The mean value of how democratic is your country being governed is 5.997. This indicates, on
average, of those individuals surveyed, a majority of the people had a positive view that their
country was in fact operating in a democratic direction. That being said, we begin our discussion
of the above figures/tables at -1 standard deviation from the mean.
The standard deviation of how democratic is your country being governed is 2.536.
Subtracting this value from the mean gives us the starting point of 3.467 on the democracy scale
(3.467 means that individuals do not believe their country is being run democratically). At this
point we introduce our 1-unit increase on the confidence in courts scale, which pushes the level
of democracy up by .501-units, to 3.968. If we continue doing this all the way to 4 on the courts
scale, meaning a 3-unit increase, this gives us the additive effect of 1.503-units of change in total
on the democracy scale (ending at 4.97 on the democracy scale). This is important because it
indicates that even within the sample of individuals taken that may fall -1 standard deviations
from the mean, after increasing their confidence in courts all the way to 4-units, those individuals
are on the margin of having a medium view of how democratic their country is being run; 4.97
out of 10.
When we go through this same process, but start at the mean value of how democratic a
country is being run (mean= 5.997), we see the additive effect of increasing by a 3-unit change
on the courts scale brings us to 7.5 on the democracy scale (adding 1.503-units to democracy
over a 3-unit change in courts). This indicates that the average person in this sample will go
from having mediocre views on how their country is being run democratically, to have quite
positive views about the level of democracy in the country, with a 7.5 out of 10 on the
democracy scale.
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Finally, when we begin our plot at +1 standard deviation from the mean at 8.533 on the
democracy scale, we witness a ‘maxed-out’ effect. When we increase the courts scale by 3-units
change, and apply the additive effect of 1.503-units change to the democracy scale, this brings us
to 10.036, which is outside of the coding scale of 1-10. In other words, those individuals in the
sample that fall +1 standard deviation of the mean value for how democratic is your country
being run, when applying the effect of our main independent variable, these individuals ‘maxout’ their views and believe there country is fully democratic.
In summary, when looking at the effect of the independent variable of confidence in
courts on the dependent variable how democratic is your country being run, ranging from -1
standard deviation of the mean to +1 standard deviation of the mean for our democracy scale, the
effect of our independent variable increases individuals in our sample from the very margin of
having positive views, to having completely ‘maxed-out’ views that their country is being run
democratically. This implies that for the majority of our sample, if we are able to increase their
confidence in the courts, they will have a stronger belief that their country is being run
democratically. Hence, I find support for my hypothesis that:
H1: As people’s confidence in the courts increases, the people’s belief their government is
undemocratic decreases; all else equals.

Effects and directions of control variables
All five of my control variables are significant with p-values=.001, and in a positive
direction, though the magnitude of the effects is generally marginal in comparison to the main
independent variable. As age increases, an individual believes their country is being run more
democratically. Theoretically this is likely the case because as people get older, they increase
their understanding of what the word democracy actually means through experience using the
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institutions in their country, rather simply that of what they are taught in school or what is
written in the constitution.
As the control variable sex moves from 1 to 2, being male to being female, this exerts a
.051-unit increase on individuals’ beliefs of how democratic their country is being run. While
this effect is statistically significant in our sample, the magnitude of the effect is small. Even if
we were to start on the democracy scale at +1 standard deviation of the mean (8.533) and
increase it by .051-units (the coefficient of sex), this would only increase an individual’s views to
8.584, from 8.533. This implies that while gender is a relevant factor, the difference between
genders is quite small when it comes to how individuals view their country being run.
Education as a control variable exerts a statistically significant and positive force on our
dependent variable. As education rises, a person’s belief their country is being run
democratically increases. This is likely the case because individuals with higher levels of
education are more likely to know what democracy is and consume news about what their
government is actually doing. The control variable interest in politics is both positive and
significant, and likely has the same causal mechanisms behind the effect that education does.
My last control variable, confidence in the press, has the largest effect of any control
variable in the model. In Table 4.3 we can see the standardized beta coefficients of all the
control variables (confidence in press=.097; interest in politics=.032; education=.01; sex=.01;
age=.037). Looking at the betas, we see that the confidence in press variable exerts almost 3times as much influence on the dependent variable than any other controls. As confidence in the
press increases, individuals’ beliefs on how democratic their government is being run increases.
As mentioned with previous control variables and causal mechanisms, people need to know
what’s going on in their government in order to have an opinion on it to begin with. This implies
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consuming some amount of news. However, the confidence in the press variable not only
considers if people consume news, but also, do they trust that news to be true. This is important
because we would theoretically assume that if individuals did not trust their news to be true, they
would not believe their country to be democratic either. However, when we compare the
standardized beta coefficient of confidence in the press (beta=.097) against the confidence in the
courts variable (beta=.185) we see that the main theoretical variable of the model has almost
double the effect on the dependent variable than that of the strongest control variable.
Overall this chapter has not only demonstrated the importance of the judiciary to
democracy at the aggregate-level in the literature review, but I have demonstrated how at the
individual-level confidence in the courts exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on
how democratically people view their country. However, it remains paramount to examine other
potential alternative explanations for my results, which I move to in the next section.
Alternative Explanations
Multi-collinearity and endogeneity represent two of the more difficult issues political
scientists face when using quantitative analysis and creating large-N studies. One alternative
explanation for my results could be that confidence in courts and how democratically is your
country governed are correlated or have endogenous relationship, meaning they are picking up
on the same/similar phenomena or measuring the same/similar things in the sample. In order to
test for this I ran a Pearson Correlation Test with the two variables in the data set, having 80,269
observations, the result of 0.2213 correlation indicates a very low level/acceptable level of
correlation between the two, and therefore I can reject this alternative explanation (Pearson Test
also in appendix).
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An additional alternative explanation for my results could be that my model suffers from
omitted variable bias, in particular, income. When reviewing statistical analysis at the individual
or aggregate level we regularly see some form of an income variable. However, I ran a Pearson
Correlation Test on income and education which provided the result of .2642 (see appendix).
This value indicates that the two variables could very well be correlated enough to introduce the
issue of multi-collinearity if I kept both in the model, hence I dropped income to avoid multicollinearity.
When comparing the Pearson Correlation Tests of my main independent variable to the
dependent variable, against the test on the income variable to the education variable, I realize the
two values are not far apart (.2214 versus .2642). My reasoning for dropping income could be
labeled as a judgement call methodologically speaking. My thoughts are as you approach the .3
mark on the correlation test you should begin to be concerned about multi-collinearity (although
again a judgement call). The value .2642 is closer to that .3 mark, while .2214 is closer to the .2
mark. Education, which I include in the model, is regularly correlated with income in data sets.
Seeing as I am adding my own economic/income variable in the next chapter, I decided to go
ahead and drop income out of this model in an effort to simplify the model, and sided with
education as a more appropriate variable. Regardless of the methodological judgement call and
theoretical reasoning, I ran an OLS regression for this chapter’s model with income as a control
variable along with the correlated education variable in the model. All other aspects of the
model remain the same except for the introduction of the income variable (full results in
Appendix Chapter 4). The inclusion of income only marginally affected coefficients of the
variables with one notable exception, education. Adding the correlated income variable caused
education to flip signs, though keeping a p-value=.001. We would interpret this flip of direction
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as, as education decreases, people’s belief that their country is democratic increases. This runs
counter to my predictions and theoretical reasoning for the education variable, and further
supports my decision to drop income from the model due to multi-collinearity with education
and wanting to avoid inaccurate results. Again, seeing as I am adding my own economic/income
variable in the next chapter, I decided to side with education as a more appropriate variable.
Another potential omitted variable biases my model may suffer from is that of media
consumption rates. During the implications portion of this chapter I brought up media
consumption and news as causal mechanisms for several of my control variables. It could very
well be that media consumption matters, and should therefore be included. The reasoning here is
that consuming news provides viewers with an overview of government actions which can be
used as an indicator for the level of democracy in the country. As such I ran an OLS regression
including four media consumption variables (newspapers, TV, radio, and the internet [see
Appendix Chapter 4 for full results]). Including these four variables changed very little about the
model and the effect of my main independent variable. In fact, the coefficient for confidence in
courts does not change, and the strength of the media consumption variables are all marginal and
lower than my confidence in the press variable. This implies that the confidence in press
variable is superior and omitted variable bias from media consumption rates not being included
in the model, is not a factor.
Issues of multi-collinearity, endogeneity, reverse causality, as well as others, are always
significant factors that impede quantitative research. The math can only tell us so much if our
theories are not sound. While I argue that the confidence in the courts variable has an effect on
the dependent variable of views of democracy, and I tested for correlation between the variables,
I find it important to lay out my argument theoretically as to why the dependent variable does not
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affect my independent variable. Democracy is an idea, a state of being in a country contingent
on many factors. How democratic a country is remains connected to institutions like: freedom to
form and join organizations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, the right to run for office,
the right to compete for votes when running for office, a free press, free and fair elections, and
institutions for making government policies being dependent on votes and other expressions of
preferences (Dahl 1972). These elements are the groundwork for making a country a democracy.
It remains theoretically impossible to have a democracy without them, and as such, impossible
for a “true” democracy to create them. If a “democracy” has to “create” these elements for the
country, then that country is not a democracy at all, but rather an authoritarian regime on the path
of democratization. Due to this I believe my argument remains theoretically sound that the
independent variable affects the dependent variable, and not vice versa. Furthermore, the result
of the education variable being significant and positive suggests that higher levels of education
in the population leads to more critical thinking about how democratic the people’s country is
viewed. This supports the idea that individuals see that specific elements in a country make the
country a democracy, and a democracy does not make these elements.
Implications & Conclusion
In this chapter I have demonstrated the importance of the judiciary and confidence in the courts
affecting views on democracy at the individual level, in comparison to previous literature
focusing on the aggregate level. Additionally, I tested this argument in 60 different countries
over a 5-year period between 2010 and 2014. This not only adds to the literature by extending
aggregate-level arguments to the individual level, but it expands this argument in scope by
testing it across almost 1/3 of the entire planet’s countries. Furthermore, the fact that this study
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is over time, rather than simply a ‘snap-shot’ in-time regression analysis, implies that these
effects are enduring, and not merely a phenomenon of one specific time/event.
The citizens of countries will always have views about how democratic their countries
are being run. We now know that increasing their confidence in the judicial system will help
decrease their negative views about the government. This is important when thinking about civil
unrest, people’s power movements, and even regime change like that of the Arab Spring (which I
will address directly in chapter 6). However, this is not the only piece of the puzzle to
understanding why/when the people of a country may “take to the streets”. In the following
chapter I introduce my economic/income variable, although revised from previous literature and
therefore not correlated to other variables in the model. In chapter 5 I look at people’s views on
if there is enough wealth to go around and how growth in the economy is taking place in their
countries.
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Chapter 5: People’s View on Equitable Economic Growth Matters
Introduction
In political science it appears impossible to have a discussion on politics without bringing
economics into the conversation. Last chapter I discussed the relevance of people’s views of the
courts and how that affects their opinion of the level of democracy that exists in their country.
Additionally, in my models I decided to leave out the more traditional economic indicator of
income-scale and used education as a more appropriate variable. In this chapter I introduce
another contribution to the literature on democracy and economics, the idea of equitable
economic growth as a significant influence on people’s views of democracy in their country.
Here I test my second hypothesis of the dissertation:
H2: As people’s belief that equitable economic growth is possible increases, people’s belief their
government is undemocratic decreases; all else equal.
The implications from a positive and significant result here is that previous research on
democracy suffers from an incomplete view of why economics matters in the democratization
process. My theory behind this contribution as stated in the methodology chapter maintains that
equitable economic growth means individuals’ economic situations are improving across socioeconomic levels in a country. This means that the benefits of economic growth are not centered
only on elites, but rather all citizens across income levels receive some of the benefits of
economic growth. Equitable economic growth begins to create equality across the population in
the economic system insomuch that non-political and non-economic elites are also benefiting
from economic growth in the country. Although some segments of a population may benefit
more than others, as equitable economic growth increases, more and more segments of the
population become benefactors of the growth. When we put these things together, equitable
economic growth means that more and more segments of the population are seeing an increase in
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their living standards, rather than just that of elites. Furthermore, as equitable economic growth
increases, this begins to spur positive sentiments for the current economic system in place. This
support for the economic system is the causal mechanism for why equitable economic growth
leads to a decreased probability of democratic backsliding. As people’s belief that equitable
economic growth is possible and increasing, this leads to increased support for the government
and its economic policies because the system is working for a larger and larger portion of the
population. Since the government and economic system are working for the people, meaning the
population is benefiting from equitable economic growth, the citizens have no incentive to
change the system, thereby decreasing the probability of democratic backsliding.
I begin with a review of the literature on economics affecting democracy. Following this
I restate my hypothesis, provide an overview of the type of regression analysis used, present the
data, the time period of the data, and the cases used in this research. Afterward, I operationalize
the dependent, independent, and control variables used in the model and present my results of the
OLS regression analysis. Next, I interpret the results, graphically display the effects of the
independent variable on the dependent variable and discuss the implications of my findings.
Finally, I discuss possible alternative explanations and conclude the chapter on economics
affecting democracy. From here I turn to a review of the literature on democracy and economics.
Economics Affecting Democracy
As was stated in the previous chapter’s literature review, in the time that it takes courts to
develop as independent institutions, there appears a need to provide a safeguard against
democratic backsliding. The following portion of the paper on economics and democracy
focuses on the literature that suggests increased economic growth aids in democratic survival,
and thereby may potentially offer regime sustainability while the courts are still developing.
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In this section I cover literature that concentrates on economic conditions affecting democracy in
a country. This literature spans from democratization in wealthier states vs. poorer states,
economic development leading to political development and democratization, how economic
crisis affects democratization, how economic growth aids in democratic survival, and finally how
equitable economic growth decreases the likelihood of democratic backsliding. Here I begin
with a discussion on how democratization is affected in wealthier countries vs. poorer countries.
There is a great deal of literature dealing with the positive effects of good economic
conditions and democratization. Ishiyama (2012) tells us that states that are wealthier in
comparison to poorer and developing states have a far easier road to democracy. However, this
does not suggest that wealth in a country will increase the chances of a country democratizing.
Beetham (1994) states that economic development greatly aids in the sustainability of
democracy, even though admitting that there are examples of underdeveloped states
democratizing as well as states that are quite economically developed but have never
democratized. Furthermore, Diamond (1990) tells us that economic development can also lead
to economic inclusion, and in some cases, this inclusion has led to political inclusion and further
democratization. Epstein et al. (2006) test the effects of economic development on the likelihood
of countries transitioning to democracy as well as how it affects democratic backsliding.
Epstein et al. (2006) analyze countries across the world and find that increases in
GDP/economic growth were related to an increased probability of the country becoming a
democracy. Furthermore, the authors find that increases in economic growth led to a decrease in
democratic backsliding. However, we must also wonder about the effects of negative economic
conditions on democracy. It stands to reason that if increased economic growth leads to
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democratization and decreases in democratic backsliding, that decreases in economic growth
lead to democratic reversals.
Bergesen (1992) explains that economic shocks have been known to topple governments.
He states that this is especially true in countries that are just beginning the democratization
process and have low levels of economic development. Transitioning democracies already
possess a low level of legitimacy in many cases, but when added with economic recession/crisis
or simply poor economic growth, the weak regimes are among the most likely to undergo
democratic backsliding. Svolik (2008) goes a step further in his analysis and finds that even
those countries that are considered consolidated democracies risk regime reversals in the face of
economic recessions. Maeda (2010) also finds support that lower levels of economic
development and economic growth rates are related to a greater risk of both military coups and
democratic leaders suspending democracy in countries. The literature up to this point
particularly draws out the effects of positive economic growth and negative economic growth on
democratization. However, it does not specify the particulars of positive economic growth. As
we will see, not all positive economic growth is necessarily good for democracy.
Burke and Leigh (2010) investigate whether or not more rapid economic growth
possesses the same positive effect on democratization that gradual economic growth does. The
authors find that more rapid economic growth decreases the likelihood of regime change toward
democratization in the short run. Theoretically, the authors believe that this remains quite
possible because if a current nondemocratic regime possesses high levels of economic legitimacy
via rapid economic growth, the government is likely to have the support of elites, the military,
and the people alike. Nondemocratic countries with large amounts of growth and wealth possess
the money and means to distribute that wealth in a way to ‘buyoff’ opposition, thereby
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decreasing the likelihood of democratization. This is supported by the work of Robinson, Rorvik
and Verdier (2006) that focus on the resource course as it pertains to countries’ development of
institutions. They find that in countries that have institutions of accountability (democratic
institutions) resource booms reinforce those institutions, whereas in countries without institutions
of accountability (nondemocratic countries) these places do in fact suffer from a resource curse
as suggested by Burke and Leigh (2010).
Kapstein and Converse (2008) also believe that increased economic growth may not
always improve the chances that a country will choose democracy as its next form of
government. In their analysis they find that when the democratization process has occurred in
countries and not reversed, on average those countries had a per capita income of $2,618 or more
(Kapstein and Converse 2008). Furthermore, the authors looked at poverty rates and infant
mortality rates in countries as a proxy to measure the level of equitable economic growth in some
of these countries. They believe that even though some of the cases witnessed economic growth
and democratic reversal, perhaps this had to do with a lack of economic opportunity and
equality, which GDP per capita does not account for. Kapstein and Converse found that in
several cases where economic growth had occurred and democratic backsliding took place, these
places also had relatively higher rates of infant mortality and higher poverty rates, indicating that
unequitable economic growth may be an additional cause for regime reversals and that not all
economic growth is good economic growth. Tilly (2003) explains that this phenomenon may in
part be because democracy is built on the premise of equality. He explains that when citizens
witness regular economic inequality in a country that individuals are supposed to be equal, this
threatens democratic regimes.
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Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek (2007) test this hypothesis by looking at how higher levels
of basic needs deprivation (individuals in poverty that do not possess basic needs such as food,
clothing and shelter) in a country that is experiencing enhanced economic development interact
to affect democratic survival. They refer to this unequal distribution of enhanced economic
development as regressive socio-economic distribution. Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek (2007)
find that in countries where regressive socio-economic distribution takes place that the likelihood
of democratic backsliding and regime reversal increases. This finding provides further evidence
that while economic growth in specific situations may improve democratization, that in truth the
type of economic growth is just as important (if not more important) in reducing the likelihood of
democratic backsliding.
The above research focuses on the varying effects that economic conditions exert on
democracy in a country. Table 5.1 below summarizes the theories and findings presented in this
section. After the table I discuss further how this literature ties together to affect democratic
backsliding.
Table 5.1: Economics Affecting Democracy: Summary of Theories and Findings
Ishiyama (2012)
Wealthier states in comparison to poorer and
developing states have a far easier road to
democracy
Beetham (1994)

Economic development greatly aids in the
sustainability of democracy, though we see
cases of rich countries not democratizing and
poor countries democratizing

Diamond (1990)

Economic development can lead to economic
inclusion, and in some cases this inclusion has
led to political inclusion and further
democratization

Epstein et al. (2006)

Increases in GDP/economic growth were
related to an increased probability in
becoming a democracy, and increases in
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economic growth led to a decrease in
democratic backsliding
Bergesen (1992)

New/transitional democracies that are
economically developing are severally
susceptible to economic crisis that can greatly
increase the chance for democratic
backsliding

Svolik (2008)

New democracies that are considered
consolidated are still susceptible to
democratic backsliding during economic
recession/crisis

Maeda (2010)

New democracies that experience economic
hardships are at greater risk of military coups
and democratic leaders suspending democracy
in a country

Burke and Leigh (2010)

More rapid economic growth decreases the
likelihood of regime change toward
democratization in the short run

Robinson, Rorvik and Verdier (2006)

Countries that have institutions of
accountability (democratic institutions)
resource booms reinforce those institutions,
whereas in countries without institutions of
accountability (nondemocratic countries)
these places do in fact suffer from a resource
curse and authoritarian institutions are
reinforced
Most democratic transitions that have not
suffered setbacks happen in countries with per
capita income of $2,618 US dollars or more;
in places where economic growth took place
and backsliding occurred the country had
relatively higher rates of infant mortality and
higher poverty rates

Kapstein and Converse (2008)

Tilly (2003)

Democracy is built on equality, and when
citizens see unequal distribution of economic
growth, this threatens the democratic regime

Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek (2007)

Countries where regressive socio-economic
distribution takes place possess a higher
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likelihood of democratic backsliding and
regime reversal

This section began with Ishiyama (2012) stating that wealthier countries in comparison to
poorer countries have an easier path toward democratization. However, Beetham (1994) tells us
that there are examples of poor countries becoming democracies as well as rich countries never
democratizing. Regardless of there being cases of both types of countries becoming
democracies, Diamond (1990) points out that in many cases economic development leads to
economic inclusion, and in some of those cases this led to political inclusion and
democratization. Epstein et al. (2006) test this argument and find that economic growth does
lead to a country transitioning to democracy, as well as economic growth decreasing the
probability of democratic backsliding. While economic growth may lead a country toward
democracy and keep it democratic, Bergesen (1992) as well as Maeda (2010) warn that new
democracies that experience economic crisis/recession are increasingly at risk for democratic
backsliding. Svolik (2008) adds to this point by stating that even new democracies that are
consolidated are at an increased risk of democratic reversal in the face of serious economic crisis.
At this point in the literature, it appears as though economic conditions play two roles in
democratization: (1) economic growth decreases the probability of democratic backsliding, and
(2) economic recession increases the probability of democratic backsliding. However not all
scholars agree that the influence of economic conditions on democracy is so straightforward.
In regard to economic growth aiding democratization in a country, Burke and Leigh
(2010) find that more rapid economic growth in fact decreases the likelihood that a regime will
democratize in the short run. This may in part be due to the availability of lots of new wealth in
a government that now has the means to ‘buyoff’ any opposition to authoritarianism. This is
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supported by the work of Robinson, Rorvik and Verdier (2006) that focus on the resource course
as it pertains to countries’ development of institutions, as they find that in countries without
institutions of accountability (nondemocratic countries) these places do in fact suffer from a
resource curse and authoritarian institutions are reinforced. However, Tilly (2003) does not look
at government possessing the means to buyoff opposition, but rather at how new wealth via
economic growth is distributed in the country and how this affects democracy. The author states
that one of the important values that a democratic country is built on is equality, and when
citizens see an unequal distribution of economic growth that this threatens the democratic
regime. Kapstein and Converse (2008) as well as Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek (2007) all find
that in cases where economic growth takes place and democratic backsliding occurs, there exists
higher levels of unequitable economic growth. This finding is paramount when considering that
economic growth alone has not been able to always predict democratization. This implies that
previous literature on democratization as well as democratic backsliding both suffer from
omitted variable bias, in this case the exclusion of equitable economic growth as an independent
variable. For this reason, I chose to focus on the people’s view of judicial independence and
equitable economic growth. I believe these theories should also hold true at the individual level
as well as the aggregate level. Additionally, Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek (2007) only look at
cases that are experiencing enhanced economic development, whereas my cases range in levels
of economic development. In the following section I restate my hypothesis and describe the data
used to test this idea as well as operationalize the variables of the model.
Hypothesis
In this chapter I argue:
H2: As people’s belief that wealth grows and there’s enough for everyone increases, people’s
beliefs their government is undemocratic decrease; all else equal.
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H2: As people’s belief that equitable economic growth is possible increases, people’s belief their
government is undemocratic decreases; all else equal.
As I did in chapter 4, I use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis to test
the relationship between these variables. The survey data for this chapter’s model is the same
data used for analysis in chapter 4, coming from the World Values Survey Wave 6 2010-2014
(Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P.
Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014). The survey data cover 60 countries (a full list of
the countries can be found in Appendix Chapter 5 under Figure 5.1). Below in Figure 5.1 is a
map provided by World Values Survey (WVS) showing the geographic location of these 60
countries (Figure 5.1 is the same as Figures 3.3; 4.1). My reasoning for using the same data and
cases for each of my hypotheses/chapters is that it allows me the ability to compare and contrast
results throughout the dissertation.
Figure 5.1: Countries Included in Wave 6

Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E.
Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014.

Operationalizing Model Variables
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As I am using the same data set throughout this dissertation, the operationalization of my
variables does not change from chapter to chapter. The distinction between this current chapter
and the previous is the introduction of my second main independent variable. I begin this section
by providing the survey questions asked to respondents and how each variable was coded by
WVS including my new economic variable. All questions and coding come directly from the
survey Codebook and Questionnaire (Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K.
Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014).
Following this outlining of variables, I also provide a table of summary for the coding/recoding
used for my model.
My new independent variable this chapter is people’s belief that wealth grows and
there’s enough for everyone, which is measured first by asking respondents: “Now I'd like you to
tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means
you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the
statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number
in between.” The statement coded as 1 = “people can only get rich at the expense of others”, and
the statement coded as 10 = “wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone.”
The independent variable of confidence in the courts is measured by asking respondents:
“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very
much confidence or none at all?” At this point the surveyor states, “the courts” and 1= “a great
deal” and 4= “none at all”. In order to show positive a relationship in my models I recoded the
direction of the variable to 4= “a great deal” and 1= “none at all”.
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My dependent variable how democratic is your country is measured by asking: “And how
democratically is this country being governed today? Again, using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1
means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what
position would you choose?” This coding remains the same in my model as it is in the
codebook.
The five control variables for the model include: age, sex, education, interest in politics,
and confidence in the press (I additionally considered income and media consumption rates but
further discuss why these controls were thrown out of the model in the implications and
alternative explanation sections).
Age is measured by asking “Can you tell me your year of birth, please? 19____ (write in
last two digits)This means you are ____ years old (write in age in two digits).”
Education is measured by asking: “What is the highest educational level that you have
attained?”, and is coded as “1.- No formal education 2.- Incomplete primary school 3.- Complete
primary school 4.- Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type 5.- Complete
secondary school: technical/ vocational type 6.- Incomplete secondary school: universitypreparatory type 7.- Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type 8.- Some
university-level education, without degree 9.- University - level education, with degree.”
Interest in politics is measured by asking respondents “How interested would you say
you are in politics? Are you (read out and code one answer): 1.- Very interested 2.- Somewhat
interested 3.- Not very interested 4.- Not at all interested.” The direction of this variable was
recoded to show a positive relationship within my model (1= “not at all interested”; 4= “very
interested”).
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Sex is coded as 1=male and 2=female, based on surveyor’s observation (as asking a
person’s gender could be considered offensive or inappropriate in some cultures and countries).
Confidence in the press is measured by asking respondents: “I am going to name a
number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in
them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none
at all?” At this point the surveyor states, “the press” and 1= “a great deal” and 4= “none at all”.
(Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P.
Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014). In order to show a positive relationship in my
model I recoded the direction of the variable to 4= “a great deal” and 1= “none at all”.
Below in Table 5.2 I provide a summarized version of the coding of each variable for this
research. Directly following this is Table 5.3 and the results of the OLS regression. The results
are based off of 75,533 observations from 60 countries between 2010 to 2014.
Table 5.2: Coding of Variables

How democratic is your country
(dependent variable)
People’s belief that wealth grows and there’s
enough for everyone
(independent variable)
Confidence in the courts
(independent variable)

Age
(control variable)
Sex
(control variable)
Education
(control variable)

scale 1 to 10;
1 means that it is “not at all democratic”
10 means that it is “completely democratic”
coded as 1 = “people can only get rich at the
expense of others”, and the statement coded
as 10 = “wealth can grow so there’s enough
for everyone.”
4 is a great deal of confidence
3 quite a lot of confidence
2 not very much confidence
1 none at all
number of years
1=male
2=female
based on surveyor’s observation
1. No formal education
2. Incomplete primary school
3. Complete primary school
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/
vocational type
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5. Complete secondary school: technical/
vocational type
6. Incomplete secondary school: universitypreparatory type
7. Complete secondary school: universitypreparatory type
8. Some university-level education, without
degree
9. University - level education, with degree
4. Very interested
3. Somewhat interested
2. Not very interested
1. Not at all interested
4. A great deal
3. Quite a lot
2. Not very much
1. None at all

Interest in politics
(control variable)

Confidence in the press
(control variable)

Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E.
Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014.
Note: confidence in courts, confidence in press, & interest in politics were recoded in the opposite directions to
illustrate positive relationships in my models.
Summary statistics and tabulations of each variable appear in Appendix Chapter 5 under Table 5.2.

Table 5.3: People’s Belief about Equitable Economic Growth Affecting Views on How
Democratic the Country is being Run
(OLS Regression Analysis)
Coefficients

p-values

People’s Belief about
Equitable Economic Growth

.071***

Confidence in Courts

.486***

Age

.005***

Sex

.039**

Education

.004

Interest in Politics

.082***

Confidence in Press

.283***

Constant

3.16***

N

75,533
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Standardized Beta
Coefficients

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared

.0660
.0659

***=99%, **=95%, *=90%
Results and Interpretation
I begin this section by covering the new results of the model displayed in Table 5.3. After
providing a graphical demonstration of the effects of the new independent variable on the
dependent variable and discussing the implications of the complete model, I further discuss the
differences between the model of this chapter and the model of chapter 4.
My new variable to the model of people’s belief about equitable economic growth has a positive
and significant coefficient, providing support for H2 that as people’s belief that equitable
economic growth is possible increases, people’s belief their government is undemocratic
decreases; all else equal. Additionally, the independent variable is statistically significant at the
99% confidence interval. Furthermore, we see that the confidence in court variable (my other
main independent variable) is also positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence
interval. This demonstrates continued support for H1 that as people’s confidence in the courts
increase, the people’s belief their government is undemocratic decreases; all else equals, even
after adding the new economic variable to the model. Finally, the control variables of age,
interest in politics, and confidence in press are all positive and statistically significant at the 99%
criteria. The variable of sex is positive and significant at the 95% confidence interval.
Education as a control variable is in a positive direction though is not statistically significant.
The coefficient for people’s belief about equitable economic growth is .071. This
indicates that as you move 1-unit in the positive direction on the scale of people’s belief about
equitable economic growth (coding scale= 1-10) this then moves .071-units on the how
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democratic is your country being governed scale (coding scale= 1-10). Table 5.4 illustrates this
effect if we start with each variable at the beginning of its scale; value=1.
Table 5.4: Effect of 1-Unit Rise in People’s Belief about Equitable Economic Growth on Belief Country is
Democratic

Variables
People’s
believe
about
equitable
economic
change

Beginning 1-unit 2ndunit
of Coding change change
Scale

1→

2→

3→

1

1.071

1.142

3rd

4th

5th

6th

7th

8th

9th

4→

5→

6→

7→

8→

9→

10

OLS
Coefficient
(.071)
Std. Err.
(.003)

Belief
country is
democratic

1.213 1.284 1.355 1.426 1.497 1.568 1.639

Table 5.4 shows how increasing 1-unit at a time for people’s belief about equitable
economic growth has an additive effect on belief country is democratic by .071 each unit change.
Moving from no belief about the possibility for equitable economic change (coded as 1) to a
complete belief about the possibility for equitable economic change (coded as 10) represents a 9unit change in total, which moves a person’s belief that their country is democratic by .639 units
on the democracy scale (scale= 1-10).
In order to provide a more complete view of the independent variable’s effect on the
dependent variable I plot this change in beliefs about democracy starting at the mean-value, and
then also move -1 and +1 standard deviations from the mean of how democratic is your country
being run. Below in Figure 5.2 I plot the data points from Table 5.4 starting at the mean of level
of democracy scale, +1 standard deviation, and -1 standard deviation. Presented right afterward
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in Table 5.5 are the descriptive statistics on how democratic is your government being governed.
Table 5.6 shows the data of Figure 5.2 in table format.
Figure 5.2:

DEMOCRACHY SCALE

1-Unit Change in People's Beliefs in Equitable
Economic Growth on Belief Country is Democratic
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PEOPLE'S BELIEFS IN EQUITABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH
Mean -1 Std. Dev

Democracy Mean

Mean +1 Std. Dev.

Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics on How Democratic is Your Country Being Governed
Democracy Variable
Means Value
Standard Deviation Value
Scale 1-10
5.997
2.536
Table 5.6: 1-Unit Change in People’s Beliefs in Equitable Economic Growth on Belief Country
is Democratic
Belief in
Mean -1 Democracy Mean +1
Equitable Std. Dev
Mean
Std. Dev.
Economic
Growth
1
3.467
5.997
8.533
2
3.538
6.068
8.604
3
3.609
6.139
8.675
4
3.68
6.21
8.746
5
3.751
6.281
8.817
6
3.822
6.352
8.888
7
3.893
6.423
8.959
8
3.964
6.494
9.03
9
4.035
6.565
9.101
10
4.106
6.639
9.172
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Note: This is the data/table format of Figure 5.2. Coefficient of
People’s Beliefs on Equitable Economic Growth=.071.
Democracy scale= 1-10.

The mean value of how democratic is your country being governed is 5.997. This tells
us, on average, of those individuals surveyed, a majority of the people had a positive view that
their country was in fact operating in a democratic direction. We shall begin our discussion on
the figures and tables above at -1 standard deviation from the mean, then move to the mean
value, and then discuss at the +1 standard deviation from the mean.
Our standard deviation of how democratic is your country being governed is 2.536. When
we subtract this from the mean our starting point of -1 standard deviation is 3.467 on the
democracy scale, indicating at this point on the scale a person does not believe their country is
being run democratically. From here we begin adding our .071 effect of people’s belief on
equitable economic growth. For every 1-unit increase of our independent variable we move .071
on the democracy scale. Starting at 3.467 on the democracy scale (-1 standard deviation from
the mean) this 1-unit increase of the independent variable moves us to 3.538 on the democracy
scale. If we continue doing this all the way to 10 on the economic beliefs scale, it yields a 9-unit
change, equaling a total increase on the democracy scale of .639-units (9-unit change multiplied
by the effect change of .071= .639). This movement brings us to an ending point of 4.106 on the
democracy scale when starting from -1 standard deviations from the mean.
When we go through this process again, but start at the mean value on the democracy
scale (mean= 5.997), the additive effect of the 9-unit change in the independent variable brings
us to 6.639 on the democracy scale (adding .639-untis to belief in democracy over a 9-unit
change in beliefs in equitable economic growth). Finally, when we begin our process at +1
standard deviation from the mean of democracy at 8.533, and increase the economic scale by 9units, while exerting the .639 additive effect to democracy, we have an ending point of 9.172.
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When reviewing the above three plots the results are not as strong as the previous main
theoretical independent variable in chapter 4 (confidence in the courts) although I will compare
those results after full analysis of the present model. While these results for people’s belief in
equitable economic growth on the dependent variable how democrat is your country appear
small (yielding just over a ½-unit change in the democracy scale when we increase the entire
range of the economic scale) the important contribution here is that the variable is in the correct
direction (positive) and statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. Furthermore, the
main argument of my dissertation is not the strength of this independent variable by itself, but
rather the interactive effect of my two independent variables on the dependent variable.
Additionally, this weak effect could be a direct result of the cases included in the dataset
(a conversation I go more in depth within the following chapter). While the data include 60
countries from across the globe. When looking at which cases those are, we see that China for
instance is included, however cases like the U.K. and France are not included. China has the
second largest economy in the world; however, it is not all democratic and economic growth in
the past 2-decades has not led to China democratizing. Furthermore, the fact that the U.K. and
France are both major economic powers in the world and democracies, but not included in the
dataset in comparison to China being included, could be decreasing the magnitude of the effect
of the economic variable in my model. That being said, it theoretically stands to reason that if
the U.K. and France were included in the data set, that my results would be strengthened. The
fact that I find statistical significance, although with a weak effect, despite the U.K. and France
not being present in the data further strengthens my theoretical argument. Therefore, I do find
support for H2: as people’s belief that equitable economic growth is possible increases, people’s
belief their government is undemocratic decreases; all else equal. This reaffirms my belief that

85

aggregate level effects that were captured in the literature presented earlier in this chapter, are
seen at the individual level data.
Effects of Confidence in Courts and Control Variables
When I carried over my previous main independent variable of confidence in the courts
into this model, I find that it remains statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval and
in the correct direction again. This reaffirms that H1: as people’s confidence in the courts
increases, the people’s beliefs their government is undemocratic decreases; all else equals, holds
true even when I introduced the new economic variable into the model. This fact further
strengthens my belief of the importance of the courts, and the citizens’ views on them, in
forming opinions about democracies in the country.
Four out of five of the control variables are significant in H2’s model. The education
variable fails the significance test though its direction is still correct. The variable age is
significant at the 99% criteria, and as it increases, an individual believes their country is being
run more democratically. As previously stated in chapter 4, I believe this is likely the case
because as individuals get older they personally experience using more and more government
institutions, and thereby can better define how democratically their government actually works,
rather than simply knowing if the country has laws that are considered democratic.
Interest in politics is both positive and significant at the 99% mark, meaning that as
individuals are more interested in politics, they are more likely to view their government is run
democratically. This is likely the case because individuals who are interested in politics are
probably more likely to know what democracy “truly” is as well as likely consume more news
about what their government is actually doing.
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Confidence in the press is also positive and significant at the 99% confidence interval,
and again has the largest effect of any control variable in the model. As confidence in the press
increases, people’s belief on how democratic their government is being run increases. I believe
the causal mechanisms here is that people need to know what is going on in their government in
order to have an opinion on it. While this would mean people must consume news in one
fashion or another in order to know this information, the confidence in the press variable takes
this idea a step further by truly asking people if their press is trust worthy, e.g. “do you have an
independent/free press”. It theoretically makes sense that as people believe they have a free
press, so too would their belief that the country is run democratically increase.
The final control variable of sex is positive, though only statistically significant at the
95% confidence interval. As mentioned in the previous chapter’s model, the effect change
moving from male to female was quite small, though it previously was statistically significant at
the 99% criteria. In this model the significance drops to 95% as well as the size of that effect
decreases further. This indicates that gender is not a strong indicator for people’s beliefs in how
democratic their government is run across those individuals sampled in the data.
Comparing Models and the Effects of My Independent Variables
While my first independent variable from chapter 4 (confidence in the court) remains
statistically significant at the 99% criteria in both chapters, and in the positive direction, it is
worth noting that once I add my economic variable in this chapter to the model, the strength of
the effect of confidence in the courts on the dependent variable decreases from .501 to a .486 (a
difference of 0.015 in the coefficients between the two models). This is a marginal decrease, and
theoretically makes sense considering I added a statistically significant variable to the model.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that in this chapter’s model, confidence in the court outperforms
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beliefs about equitable economic growth. Moving from the minimum to maximum on the
courts-scale yields a 1.449-unit increase on the democracy-scale, while moving from the
minimum to maximum on the economic-scale yields a .639-unit increase on the democracyscale. This suggests that the strength of the effect for the courts’ variable is more than double
that of the economic variable in this chapter’s model.
Overall I have shown in this chapter that both H1 and H2 are supported, and that both
beliefs in the courts and beliefs about equitable economic growth are significant variables in the
democracy literature not only at the aggregate level as previous literature suggests, but also at the
individual level. However, I must also consider other potential reasonings for my results, which
I address in the following section.
Alternative Explanations
In chapter 4’s alternative explanation’s section, I addressed how multi-collinearity,
endogeneity, and reverse causality, were all potential problems for the confidence in the courts
variable. Additionally, I discussed the potential for omitted variable bias due to relying on
education as a variable instead of a more traditional income-scale variable. And finally, I ran an
additional model (referenced in chapter 4 alternative explanations section as well as appearing in
the appendix) checking to see if I should include media consumption rates instead of/in addition
to my confidence in the press model. I believe those same reasonings stand in this chapter’s
model just as they did in chapter 4’s model. Therefore, in this section I concentrate entirely on
alternative explanations connected to my new variable in the model, people’s belief in the
possibility for equitable economic growth.
Economic indicators of varying types regularly appear in political science literature,
especially when discussing democracy. Kapstein and Converse (2008), Tilly (2003), as well as
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Reenock, Bernard and Sobek (2007), all use different types of economic indicators at the
aggregate level to show how equitable economic growth in one form or another affect
democracy. Tilly specifically brings up a relevant point in his conclusion that I find directly
related to my individual level research. This is the idea that democracy is based on the concept
of equality of citizenship. In his view, it stands to reason that if citizens in a democracy view
that economic growth is not distributed equally, then they will believe that citizenship is not
distributed equally as well, and thereby it calls into question the truly quality of their democracy
and could threaten the regime.
While this argument actually supports my hypothesis, that as people believe equitable
economic growth is possible and increases, that they will believe their country is more
democratic, it remains important to think of reverse causality and correlation as well between the
two variables. If democracies are about equal citizenship, then perhaps democracy exerts an
effect on people’s beliefs about equitable economic growth. To begin addressing this idea I ran a
Pearson Correlation Test between the independent and dependent variable, yielding a result of
.0891 (results appear in Appendix Chapter 5 under Table 5.6). This indicates that the two
variables are not correlated and therefore multi-collinearity is not an issue in the model.
As far as the possibility of a relationship of reverse causality, I view this in similar
regards to my discussion on reverse causality between confidence in the courts and belief country
is democratic in chapter 4. As previously mentioned, democracy is an idea predicated on many
factors, however, all of those factors are political in nature, not economic. Ranging from Dahl’s
(1972) eight requirements of democracy, to Huntington’s (1991) more simplistic definition of
democracy, all the way to Moller and Skaaning’s (2013) four types of democracy (minimalists,
electoral, polyarchy, and liberal) the democracy literature in political science makes clear that
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“type” of economic system is not part of this political definition of “what democracy is”. No
where in the political science literature is it claimed that “capitalism” is a requirement of
democracy, nor is it ever claimed that “equitable distribution of economic resources” is a
requirement of democracy. Democracy, in all of their views, however, is about political equality
(the rule of law, universal suffrage, universal opportunity to run for office, etc.).
In this line of thought, democracy is a procedural guarantee for political equality, not a
substantive guarantee for political equality and most certainly not a substantive guarantee for
economic equality. This being the case, theoretically it does not make sense that if people’s
belief their country is democratic increases, that their belief that equitable economic growth is
possible increases. This is, again, because democracy does not provide any guarantees or
requirements of equitable economic growth taking place. However, as Tilly states, since
democracies are about equality of citizenship, it does stand to reason that if people see their
country is not distributing economic resources in an equitable fashion, that they will then believe
citizenship and representation is not equal, and therefore their view of democracy in the country
will decline. I believe Tilly and others are correct at the aggregate level, and that my results
confirm their findings at the individual level as well.
Implications & Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that equitable economic growth measured on the individual
level is a positive and significant variable in the democracy literature in addition to the aggregate
level literature. Furthermore, I have taken the findings of the previous chapter’s work and
demonstrated that both of my theoretical independent variables remain significant and positive
once introduce into the same model. Additionally, I tested my argument across 60 cases over a
5-year period between 2010-2014. This chapter contributes to the literature on democracy by
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taking aggregate level theory and applying it to the individual level, it increases the number of
cases the theory is tested on, and tests that theory over time instead of simply testing it in a
“snap-shot” in time regression analysis.
When I review my findings in comparison to that of the literature on democracy and
democratization, we find that my results coincide with Beetham (1994) and Diamond’s (1990)
theories. Beetham suggests that economic development greatly aids in the sustainability of
democracy, and Diamond adds to this by saying that economic development can lead to
economic inclusion, and in some cases this inclusion has led to political inclusion and further
democratization. Tilly (2003) as well as Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek (2007) follow this line of
thought but add into their theories more directly the idea of equitable economic growth. Tilly
states that democracy is built on equality, and when citizens see unequal distribution of
economic growth this could threaten the democratic regime. When Reenock, Bernhard and
Sobek (2007) test this idea they find that in countries with regressive socio-economic distribution
(meaning unequal distribution of wealth) that the likelihood of democratic backsliding and
regime reversal increases. These works and results further support my findings that equitable
economic growth does in fact increase people’s views on how democratic their country is being
run. Even though my effect in this chapter’s model is small in magnitude, it is by no means an
outlier in comparison to the democracy literature. My findings are in line with this literature.
However, my work is not yet complete. My argument outlined in the methodology
chapter not only describes the above mentioned contributions, but also adds one final flaw to the
previous literature on democracy, that my interaction term in the following chapter illustrates
that previous research has suffered from omitted variable bias due to the causal nature between
confidence in the courts and people’s beliefs about equitable economic growth working together.
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In this chapter I have extended the literature, in the following chapter I add to the literature on
democracy. Additionally, I will pull three cases (Tunisia, Libya, and Thailand) from my data set
and demonstrate how my hypothesis affected regime change in each of these countries during the
period of my survey data. In chapter 6 I argue that as confidence in the courts increases, plus
people’s belief that equitable economic growth is possible increases, people’s belief their
government is undemocratic decreases; all else equal.
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Chapter 6: The Rule of Law & Equitable Growth Save Democracy?
Introduction
The previous chapter’s work illustrates the importance of my two main independent
variables in the democracy literature. While I stated that my interaction term in this chapter
represents an addition to the literature in political science due to the literatures’ failure to
recognize the causal mechanisms at work, in truth it rather reflects the process of writing and
research spanning thousands of years, by thousands of people, and all culminating to this current
dissertation. Without the research and writings of political scientists and theorists before me, I
would not be able to contribute to their works as I do here. I am inspired by those before me.
As such, the following literature review combines five separate pieces of work by 11
political scientists (previously discussed in different chapters throughout the dissertation) to
illustrate the “why” I have chosen the research path we see here. This literature review combines
the paramount works on the courts, equitable economic growth, and democracy. Following this I
restate my hypothesis, describe the data, cases, and time period, and discuss the causal
mechanisms behind my research. Afterward, I operationalize the variables of the model, present
my results and provide interpretations of those results. Next, I demonstrate the interactive effect
of my two main independent variables both graphically and in table format. Once this is done, I
pull three cases from my data (Libya, Thailand & Tunisia) to demonstrate how my theory works
in reality and describe the regime changes we saw in each of these countries during the period of
the survey data I use. After this, I examine potential alternative explanations for my results.
And finally, I end with the implications and conclusion to the chapter. At this point, I turn to the
literature that inspired the writing of my dissertation.
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Combining the Courts and Economics in the Democracy Literature
Dahl (1972) remains one of the most important writers in the democracy literature to
date. As such, it should come as no surprise that he was one of the first researchers that inspired
me to care and write about democracy. In his seminal work Polyarchy, Dahl (1972; pg.2)
provides three overarching criteria for democracy to exist in a country: (1) the public possesses
the ability to formulate preferences, (2) the public possesses the ability to signify those
preferences to each other as well as to the state via individual and collective-action, and (3) the
government weighs the preferences of the public equally and without discrimination of the
source of content. In my opinion, Dahl’s three criteria describe, without listing one-by-one,
almost all institutions we consider necessary for democracy to exist by today’s standards. His
argument is simple, as well as elegant. The citizens of a country must be able to think for
themselves, speak for themselves, and governments in a democracy must listen to and act on
those voices as equals.
Equality in a democracy is enshrined in the institution known as the rule of law.
Kopstein and Lichbach (2005) tell us that the rule of law must be implemented, whereby,
citizens can hold the state accountable and government officials are equal under the law the same
as every other citizen. As we say, democracy is to be a “country of laws, not people, and no
person is above the law.” This notion may go far back into history, but only in the recent era
have we as human beings actually begun to witness this (and still yet only to varying degrees,
sadly). Protecting the rule of law, and equality between all peoples in a country, remains one of
the most difficult and yet important institutions to implement today.
When an individual in a country threatens the rule of law, the very foundation of
democracy is at stake. Kapstein and Converse (2008) provide us with advice though, a remedy if
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you will. The best way to limit this threat, this democratic backsliding, is through constraints on
the executive, and the best way to limit executive power is through judicial independence. This
is because the courts are the arbiters of disputes between all peoples and institutions in a country.
So long as the courts are independent of executive-influence, an independent judiciary possesses
the ability to protect democratic governance by rejecting executive actions as unconstitutional.
This holds executives to the same ‘letter of the law’ as all other people, and thereby protects
democracy and equality for all. In short, an independent judiciary protects the political
development of a country.
When we consider the development of any country though, we are not only discussing
political development, but rather economic development as well. The three previous works
magnificently outline what democracy is and how best to protect the political equality inside of a
country.

None of them, however, address economic equality in a country. This means only

half of the development equation is being addressed. Tilly (2003) recognizes this and states that
since democracy is built on equality, that when citizens see unequal distribution of economic
growth, this could threaten a democratic regime. Equality is the bedrock of democracy today,
regardless of the fact that democracy in no way suggests economic equality, it stands to reason
that Tilly is correct. Once citizens of a country gain political equality, it remains likely that a lack
of economic equality will have an adverse effect on regime survivability.
Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek (2007) take this idea and test it. They find that in
countries where regressive socio-economic distribution takes place, there exists a higher
likelihood of democratic backsliding, as well as regime reversal. This means when the people of
a country see the unequal distribution of wealth, they question political equality in a country as
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well. Below in Table 6.1 is a summary of these works, followed by a brief connection of
causality as it relates to my argument.

Table 6.1: Combining the Courts and Economics in the Democracy Literature
Dahl (1972) - Three necessary conditions for
1. The public possesses the ability to
democracy
formulate preferences
2. The public possesses the ability to
signify those preferences to each other
as well as to the state via individualaction and collective-action
3. The government weighs the
preferences of the public equally and
without discrimination of the source
of content (pg. 2)
Kopstein and Lichbach (2005) – Democracy
broadened

Rule of law must be implemented whereby
citizens can hold the state accountable and
government officials are equal under the law
as every other citizen

Kapstein and Converse (2008) – Power of
institutions

The best way to limit democratic backsliding
is through constraints on the executive, and
the best way to limit executive power is
through judicial independence

Tilly (2003) – Economic equality

Democracy is built on equality, and when
citizens see unequal distribution of economic
growth, this threatens the democratic regime

Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek (2007) – Data
on backsliding and economic equality

Countries where regressive socio-economic
distribution takes place possess a higher
likelihood of democratic backsliding and
regime reversal

Dahl (1972) tells us that democracy is when people may think for themselves, speak for
themselves, and government listens and acts without discrimination. Kopstein and Lichbach
(2005) take from this that equality is the foundation of democracy, and that foundation is
enshrined in the rule of law and that no person is above the law, not even officials of
government. Kapstein and Converse (2008) say that if we are to protect that equality, the rule of
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law and democracy itself, that an independent judiciary must be functioning in order to keep
executive power in check. Tilly (2003) agrees, but furthers this by saying it only represents half
of the equation, and that economic inequality may too lead to regime instability. Reenock,
Bernhard and Sobek (2007) test Tilly’s idea and find that not only democratic backsliding takes
place in countries facing economic inequality, but that the likelihood of regime reversal also
increases.
Together this research inspires my dissertation. In order to combat the likelihood of
democratic backsliding, and provide a more comprehensive plan of development for any country,
I believe we must work on judicial independence and equitable economic growth together, and
not as separate independent variables. In the following section I restate my hypothesis and
discuss the data used to test my theory.
Hypothesis
In this chapter I argue:
H3: As confidence in the courts increases, and people’s belief that equitable economic growth is
possible increases, people’s belief their government is undemocratic decreases; all else equal.
As in the previous two chapters, I use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
analysis to test the relationship between these variables. The survey data for this chapter’s model
is the same data used for analysis in chapter 4, coming from the World Values Survey Wave 6
2010-2014 (Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M.
Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014). The survey data cover 60 countries (a
full list of the countries can be found in Appendix Chapter 6 under Figure 6.1). Below in Figure
6.1 is a map provided by World Values Survey (WVS) showing the geographic location of these
60 countries (Figure 6.1 is the same as Figures 3.3; 4.1; 5.1). My reasoning for using the same
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data and cases for each of my hypotheses/chapters is that it allows me the ability to compare and
contrast results throughout the dissertation.

Figure 6.1: Countries Included in Wave 6

Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E.
Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014.
Note: full list of countries found in Appendix Chapter 6 under Figure 6.1.

Causal Mechanisms to My Research
In chapter 3 I outlined the causal mechanisms to my research, I do so again here as a
refresher to the underlying argument and use the same figures from chapter 3, below in this
section. I argue that as confidence in the courts increases, and people's belief that equitable
economic growth is possible increases, people’s belief their government is undemocratic
decreases. While I focus strictly on individual level data in this research, the implications from
this research is the probability of aggregate level change, i.e. regime change (though I
acknowledge that this research focuses on several steps before that point). Governments are
made of groupings of people; therefore, it stands to theoretically reason, that people’s views on
government institutions and the state of the economy should and does shape what the actual
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government looks like. But what is it about these two variables that cause democratic
backsliding to decrease? Here I discuss the causal mechanisms behind judicial independence.
Judicial independence creates and protects the rule of law, which fosters accountability of
government officials to the citizenry as well as equality between the ruled and the rulers.
Accountability and equality are the causal mechanisms that foster decreases in the probability of
democratic backsliding. This is because as individuals see that government is working ‘for the
people,’ rather than politicians working ‘for themselves,’ citizens begin to have more supportive
feelings for the democratic government. Furthermore, as the population of the country begins to
see the rule of law implemented and that citizens are protected by the government from other
citizens as well as the government itself, people’s positive sentiments toward government will
further increase. Additionally, as equality among the population as well as between citizens and
political leaders increase, individuals will notice that government is no longer above the people,
but rather the people are part of a democratic government and are protected by it, and from it.
Finally, accountability and equality will demonstrate to the citizens that politicians are
responsible for their actions while in office and can face the same penalty for breaking the law as
any other citizen. An overall increase in judicial independence leads to increased accountability
and equality in a democratic country. This in turn increases citizens’ support for the democratic
regime, and thereby decreases the probability of democratic backsliding. On the other hand, if
other branches of government intervene in judicial affairs, and thereby decrease judicial
independence, the courts will not be effective at upholding the rule of law. This means that the
judicial branch will likely not be able to hold other government officials accountable for their
actions. As a byproduct of this, the equality between the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’ disappears and
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democratic backsliding begins. However, the question remains, what about equitable economic
growth in particular causes a reduced likelihood of democratic backsliding.
Equitable economic growth means individuals’ economic situations are improving across
socio-economic levels in a country. This means that the benefits of economic growth are not
centered on only elites, but rather all citizens across income levels receive some of the benefits
of economic growth. Equitable economic growth begins to create equality across the population
in the economic system insomuch that non-political and non-economic elites are also benefiting
from economic growth in the country. Although some segments of a population may benefit
more than others, as equitable economic growth increases, more and more segments of the
population become benefactors of the growth. Furthermore, as equitable economic growth
increases, this begins to spur positive sentiments for the current economic system in place. This
support for the economic system is the causal mechanism for why equitable economic growth
leads to a decreased probability of democratic backsliding.
As people’s belief that equitable economic growth is possible and increasing, this leads to
increased support for the government and its economic policies because the system is working
for a larger and larger portion of the population. If the government and economic system are
working for the people, meaning the population is benefiting from equitable economic growth,
the citizens have no incentive to want to change the system. Hence, this decreases the
probability of democratic backsliding.
In sum, increases in accountability and equality in the judicial and economic systems
created by judicial independence and equitable economic growth cause decreases in the
probability in democratic backsliding because the citizens in the country have no incentives to
change a political or economic system that is working in their interest. The people’s beliefs on
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judicial and economic institutions informs their beliefs on how democratic the country remains,
and that belief directly affects the probability of regime reversal, though I am not testing regime
reversal in this study. I am testing what variables affect citizens’ beliefs in the level of
democracy their country maintains, and furthermore, that the interactive effect of my two main
independent variables exert the strongest force of any variables controlled for here. This is my
contribution to the literature on democracy. Figure 6.2 demonstrates the relationship between
the two variables and their predicted effect on democratic backsliding.

Figure 6.2 How Judicial Independence and Equitable Economic Growth
Affect Democratic Backsliding

As shown in Figure 6.2, I argue that higher levels of equitable economic growth
combined with higher levels of judicial independence provide for the least likely possibility of
backsliding. Additionally, as you move either variable into the low-level category while holding
the remaining variable in the high-level category, we begin to witness an increased probability of
backsliding. Furthermore, when both variables have low levels, we observe the greatest
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likelihood of democratic backsliding. However, I must note that there remains a multitude of
possibilities in the combination of different levels between the two variables (i.e. a medium
levels of each variable will produce a smaller chance of backsliding than the variables both being
at low levels). I provide this simplistic version of my argument to illustrate the basic relationship
between my variables and democratic backsliding in an effort not to create an unnecessarily
complex diagram. At this point however, we can see from Figure 6.2 how my argument works;
that increases in judicial independence and equitable economic growth lead to a decreased
probability of democratic backsliding. However, I must also explain why the causal mechanism
behind my two independent variables are interactive rather than two separate effects.
I argue that judicial independence and equitable economic growth interact in a tit-for-tat
relationship, that as one increases it also applies pressure to the other to increase and vice versa.
I begin with judicial independence. As judicial independence increases, the accountability of
government officials, equality among citizens and between citizens, and equality between
politicians and citizens, all increase. As mentioned previously in this dissertation, this effect will
cause citizens to be supportive of the government and thereby decrease the probability of
democratic backsliding. Additionally, as individuals’ political equality increases, it provides the
availability and access to political institutions that one may use to protect their economic
interests without fear of retribution. This is caused by the judiciary being independent enough to
act as an unbiased arbiter in personal disputes dealing with economic issues.
Furthermore, the increase of equality in the political realm will lead/cause citizens to
apply pressure on the government for equality in the economic realm as well. I believe this
pressure on the government from citizens will manifest itself in the form of government
producing economic policies that create economic growth that is more equitable. These initial
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steps represent the beginning of the interactive effect of the variables. Figure 6.3 illustrates this
interaction and I begin discussing it in detail below the figure, starting with circle #1 in the lower
left-hand corner.

Figure 6.3: Explaining the Interactive Effect between Judicial Independence and
Equitable Economic Growth

In Figure 6.3 we see the two independent variables, judicial independence, and equitable
economic growth. Each vertical line represents a scale indicating levels of each variable ranging
from high at the top of the line, to low at the bottom of the line. I begin my explanation of the
interaction in the lower left-hand corner with circle #1. As we can see judicial independence
starts off low but then rises as the country begins to democratize. As circle #1 shows, the rise in
the level of judicial independence leads to a rise in equality between citizens as well as between
citizens and that state, and increased citizens’ access to political institutions. The increased
access to political institutions is a byproduct of the equality of citizens and leaders created by
democratization and judicial independence. Following the line and arrow to the right going from
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circle #1, we see that circle #2 expresses how increases in political equality leads to citizens
applying pressure on government to provide for an increased level of equality in the economic
realm as well. This pressure from the citizens, on a democratic government, leads to circle #3
where government enacts new economic policies to create more equality in the economic system
of the country. The new democratic government has the incentive to be responsive to the people
for two reasons: (1) a democratic government by nature is responsive to and representative of the
people, and (2) the new government will wish to remain in office as long as possible and thereby
wants to satisfy the people to gain popular support.
As new economic policies are put in place, we continue to the right on our figure to circle
#4, where we witness a rise in equitable economic growth in the country. As equitable economic
growth increases, individuals throughout the population are experiencing increases in their
personal economic situations. As such, citizens will want more political equality and further
increased access to political institutions that can protect their newfound economic interests,
meaning greater access to the courts. In the figure, this leads us now to the middle of the picture
and circle #5, which shows us that increases in economic equality leads to citizens applying
pressure on government to provide more political equality and more access to political
institutions. Once again, since a democratic government has the incentive to be responsive to its
citizens, we then follow our figure to the left and to circle #6 where we witness a rise in judicial
independence. From this rise in judicial independence, we then move further to the left to circle
#7 where we see that the increase in judicial independence creates a new rise in equality and
access to political institutions. At this point, the increases in political equality and access to
political institutions again lead to citizens pushing for more economic equality to match their
new level of political equality, and thereby the interactive cycle begins again.
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Theoretically, this cycle could continue until a fully functioning and purely independent
judiciary is realized and until a perfectly equitable economic system exists in a country (this
process would take many elections cycles). However, realistically this is not likely nor desirable
in many cases. A judiciary acts as an important check on other branches of government and
represents an important staple in keeping a democracy democratic. However, the possibility
exists that if a judiciary were to become too powerful, that the system of government would
switch from a democracy to a system whereby the judiciary holds most of the power of
government. As far as a purely equitable economic system, this would be symbolized by a true
socialist economy, where the distribution of wealth is evenly distributed throughout the
population. In situations such as this, citizens would not have the incentive for profit making and
increased growth because the system would provide for the needs of all.
Due to the two previously mentioned reasons, I believe theoretically this cycle between
judicial independence and equitable economic growth only rises so high before finding an
equilibrium that represents the best fit for citizens and government in a specific democratic
country. However, I do not believe that this point of equilibrium will be quickly met in new
democracies, nor that developed democracies have reached this point either. Looking at global
GINI Index scores indicates that economic inequality is still high even in developed democratic
economies (though this is outside of the scope of this research) meaning that there is still room
for this effect to take place.
In this section I have provided my causal mechanisms for why judicial independence and
equitable economic growth decrease the probability of democratic backsliding (accountability,
equality, and the creation of a positive sentiment among the population supporting the
government and economic system). Following this I mapped out the expected outcomes for my
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argument depending on different values of the independent variables. Afterward, I presented the
causal mechanisms for the interactive effect (political equality and access to political institutions
leading to pressure on the government for more economic equality, and vice versa).
While the research I present here uses quantitative analysis to provide support for these
effects, I additionally use the case studies of two Arab Spring countries (Libya and Tunisia;
regime change for both took place in 2011) as well as Thailand (which experienced a military
coup in 2014). In these cases, I demonstrate how citizens’ views on these variables directly
affected their views on the level of democracy and representation they had in their country.
Furthermore, we see how this change in views on the government manifested into regime change
and large people’s power movements (though as we will see only 1-regime change led to
democratization). In the following section I restate my hypothesis, operationalize my variables,
and present the results of the OLS regression.
Operationalizing Model Variables
In this chapter I continue using the same data set as in chapters 4 and 5. The
operationalization of my variables does not change from chapter to chapter. The distinction
between this model and my previous models is the introduction of the interaction term, not the
coding of data. I begin this section by providing the survey questions asked to respondents and
how each variable was coded by WVS. All questions and coding come directly from the survey
Codebook and Questionnaire (Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J.
Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014). Following this
outlining of variables, I also provide a table of summary for the coding/recoding used for my
model.
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My independent variable of people’s belief that wealth grows and there’s enough for
everyone is measured first by asking respondents: “Now I'd like you to tell me your views on
various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely
with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right;
and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.” The
statement coded as 1 = “people can only get rich at the expense of others”, and the statement
coded as 10 = “wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone.”
The independent variable of confidence in the courts is measured by asking respondents:
“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very
much confidence or none at all?” At this point the surveyor states, “the courts” and 1= “a great
deal” and 4= “none at all”. In order to show positive a relationship in my models I recoded the
direction of the variable to 4= “a great deal” and 1= “none at all”.
My dependent variable how democratic is your country is measured by asking: “And how
democratically is this country being governed today? Again, using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1
means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what
position would you choose?” This coding remains the same in my model as it is in the
codebook.
The five control variables for the model include: age, sex, education, interest in politics,
and confidence in the press (I additionally considered income and media consumption rates but
further discuss why these controls were thrown out of the model in the implications and
alternative explanation sections).
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Age is measured by asking “Can you tell me your year of birth, please? 19____ (write in
last two digits)This means you are ____ years old (write in age in two digits).”
Education is measured by asking: “What is the highest educational level that you have
attained?”, and is coded as “1.- No formal education 2.- Incomplete primary school 3.- Complete
primary school 4.- Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type 5.- Complete
secondary school: technical/ vocational type 6.- Incomplete secondary school: universitypreparatory type 7.- Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type 8.- Some
university-level education, without degree 9.- University - level education, with degree.”
Interest in politics is measured by asking respondents “How interested would you say
you are in politics? Are you (read out and code one answer): 1.- Very interested 2.- Somewhat
interested 3.- Not very interested 4.- Not at all interested.” The direction of this variable was
recoded to show a positive relationship within my model (1= “not at all interested”; 4= “very
interested”).
Sex is coded as 1=male and 2=female, based on surveyor’s observation (as asking a
person’s gender could be considered offensive or inappropriate in some cultures and countries).
Confidence in the press is measured by asking respondents: “I am going to name a
number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in
them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none
at all?” At this point the surveyor states, “the press” and 1= “a great deal” and 4= “none at all”.
(Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P.
Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014). In order to show a positive relationship in my
model I recoded the direction of the variable to 4= “a great deal” and 1= “none at all”.
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In Table 6.2 I provide a summarized version of the coding of each variable for this
research. Directly following this is Table 6.3 and the results of the OLS regression. The results
are based off of 75,533 observations from 60 countries between 2010 to 2014.
Table 6.2: Coding of Variables

How democratic is your country
(dependent variable)
People’s belief that wealth grows and there’s
enough for everyone
(independent variable)
Confidence in the courts
(independent variable)

Age
(control variable)
Sex
(control variable)
Education
(control variable)

Interest in politics
(control variable)

Confidence in the press
(control variable)

scale 1 to 10;
1 means that it is “not at all democratic”
10 means that it is “completely democratic”
coded as 1 = “people can only get rich at the
expense of others”, and the statement coded
as 10 = “wealth can grow so there’s enough
for everyone.”
4 is a great deal of confidence
3 quite a lot of confidence
2 not very much confidence
1 none at all
number of years
1=male
2=female
based on surveyor’s observation
1. No formal education
2. Incomplete primary school
3. Complete primary school
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/
vocational type
5. Complete secondary school: technical/
vocational type
6. Incomplete secondary school: universitypreparatory type
7. Complete secondary school: universitypreparatory type
8. Some university-level education, without
degree
9. University - level education, with degree
4. Very interested
3. Somewhat interested
2. Not very interested
1. Not at all interested
4. A great deal
3. Quite a lot
2. Not very much
1. None at all

Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E.
Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014.
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Note: confidence in courts, confidence in press, & interest in politics were recoded in the opposite directions to
illustrate positive relationships in my models.
Summary statistics and tabulations of each variable appear in Appendix Chapter 6 under Table 6.2.

Table 6.3: The Interactive Effect of Belief in Courts & Belief in Equitable Economic Growth on
How Democratic the Country is being Run
(OLS Regression Analysis)
Coefficients

p-values

People’s Belief about
Equitable Economic
Growth

.139***

.001

Confidence in Courts

.66***

.001

Interaction Term
(courts & economics)

-.028***

.001

Age

.005***

.001

Sex

.039**

.028

.004

.305

Interest in Politics

.084***

.001

Confidence in Press

.283***

.001

Constant

2.74***

.001

N

75,533

R-squared

.0669

Adjusted R-squared

.0668

Education

***=99%, **=95%,
*=90%
Results & Interpretation
As we can see in Table 6.3 the interaction term is statistically significant with a p-value
of .001, though the direction and coefficient cannot be directly interpreted as to how it affects our
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dependent variable. This provides support for the significance of the variables in H3: as
confidence in the courts increases, and people’s belief that equitable economic growth is
possible increases, people’s belief their government is undemocratic decreases; all else equal.
However, we still cannot tell if the direction of the effect in the model agrees with hypothesis.
This I shall address in the following section on the interactive effect.
Additionally, we see that the control variables remain at the same statistical significance
level as in previous chapters, and generally with the same coefficients, with exception of interest
in politics which gains a marginal increase in its effect on the dependent variable. The direction
of the control variables is also the same as in previous models. Seeing as there is relatively no
change in these controls, I simply reference the previous conversation in chapter 5 as to the
meanings and causal mechanisms behind their effects on the democracy scale. My reasoning
remains the same in this regard. That being said, I now turn my attention to the discussion of the
interactive effect of my two main independent variables.
The Interactive Effect
As previously stated, the results of Table 6.3 show that my two main independent
variables are significant: p-value=.001. However, the magnitude of the effect nor the direction
of the interaction can be interpreted just from looking at the coefficient or sign of the coefficient.
For this reason, I have constructed an interaction plot in the form of a contour plot. I did this by
calculating the interaction values for every combination of my independent variables (yielding
40 values for people’s belief that equitable economic growth is possible and confidence in the
courts). Below in Figure 6.4 my democracy variable is the z-variable, my economics variable is
the x-variable on the X-axis, and my courts variable is the y-variable on the Y-axis. In Figure
6.4 and Figure 6.5 there are 20-levels of shading (in Appendix Chapter 6 under Figure 6.4 are
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graphs using 10-levels to show contrast as well). The different colors indicate the predicted
values of beliefs about democracy depending on the different levels of an individual’s belief in
the courts and beliefs about equitable economic growth. In short, the graphs illustrate the
interactive effect between these two independent variables as you change either of their values,
and how they affect the dependent variable. This supports my hypothesis that the value of the
dependent variable is a function of the interaction between the two independent variables. I
begin with a discussion on Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4: Contour Plot of the Interaction Between Economics and Courts Variables on
Dependent Variable: Beliefs about Level of Democracy (version 1.0)

Note: Y-Axis/Courts = confidence in courts/independent variable.
X-Axis/Economics = people’s belief the equitable economic growth is possible/independent variable.
Z-Variable/Democracy Scale = belief country is run democratically/dependent variable.

As shown in Figure 6.4, people’s belief that equitable economic growth is possible
appears on the X-axis (listed as economics) while confidence in the courts appears on the Y-axis
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(listed as courts), and the color-shading indicates different levels on the belief country is
democratic which is listed as democracy on the scale. This graph illustrates 40-different/specific
effects on our democracy scale. I shall demonstrate support for my hypothesis by selecting
several of these points rather than going through each one.
The following variation is demonstrated via Figure 6.4 but is in table format just below
the paragraph in Table 6.4. If we begin at 2, 2 on the graph (2-x-axis, 2-y-axis) our initial value
on the democracy scale is 5.3. This means that if an individual has a #2 level of confidence in
the courts, and a #2 level belief that equitable economic growth is possible, those two levels
interact to predict the individual’s level of belief the country is run democratically is at the 5.3
level on the democracy scale. If we increase the courts variable by 1-unit, moving us to the point
3, 2 on the graph, we see the interactive effect changes the predicted democracy score to a 5.9 (a
net change of .6 from our starting point). However, if we begin again at point 2, 2 on the graph,
and increase 1-unit on the economic scale to plot 2, 3 on the graph, we only witness an increase
on the democracy scale to 5.4 (a net change of .1 from our starting point). Using this change in
1-unit on either axis while holding the other axis constant illustrates two things: (1) increasing
along either axis yields a positive gain in levels of democracy scale, thus confirming H3, and (2)
that the courts variable appears to have a stronger effect than the economics variable. This
supporting the idea that the courts variable is the moderating variable, and the economic variable
is the factor variable in the interaction term. The economic variable’s effect is a factor of the
moderator variable, the courts. The difference in change is that when you move 1-unit on the
courts scale while holding economics constant, in comparison to vice versa, the courts’ 1-unit
change exerts a .6 change in comparison to the economics’ exerting a .1 change. However, let’s
choose another point on the graph and see what happens.
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Table 6.4: Variations at Plot Point 2,2-Figure 6.4
Courts
Economics
2
2
2
3
3
2

Democracy
5.3
5.4
5.9

The following variation is demonstrated via Figure 6.4 but is in table format just below
the paragraph in Table 6.5. If we begin at 3, 6 on the graph (3-y-axis, 6-x-axis) we have a
starting democracy scale level of 6.17. If we then increase 1-unit on the economic scale while
holding courts constant, we see that at this point we witness very little change to the democracy
scale, and that only as we come closer to 8 on the economics scale does democracy rise to 6.28.
However, if we again start at 3, 6 on the graph but this time increase 1-unit on the courts scale
while holding economics constant, democracy rises to 6.6 (thus yielding a .45 change in
democracy level). Again, this illustrates that the courts variable appears to have a stronger effect
within the interaction, but it also supports the idea that the effects are interactive as to how these
two variables affect democracy.

Table 6.5: Variations at Plot Point 3,6-Figure 6.4
Courts
Economics
3
6
3
8
4
6

Democracy
6.17
6.28
6.6

Furthermore, if we simply begin at 1, 1 on the graph and hold the courts variable constant
at 1-unit, while increasing the economics variable to the max, we see a total affect change on
democracy from 4.78 to 5.74. These variations are demonstrated via Figure 6.4 but are in table
format just below the paragraph in Table 6.6. Repeating this same step but maxing-out courts
while holding economics constant at 1 yields a change in democracy from 4.78 to 6.49 (courts
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yielding 1.71 change from minimum to maximum while economics yields a .96 change from
minimum to maximum when we hold the other independent variable constant at 1).

Table 6.6: Variations at Plot Point 1,1-Figure 6.4
Courts
Economics
1
1
1
10
4
1

Democracy
4.78
5.74
6.49

If we choose a mixture of minimum-maximum points, the results further demonstrate the
variation of the effect of the interaction. These variations are demonstrated via Figure 6.4 but
are in table format just below the paragraph in Table 6.7. Beginning at point 4, 1 on the graph
(4-y-axis, 1-x-axis) this represents an individual that has maxed-out confidence in the courts, but
has no faith that equitable economic growth can take place. An individual at this point starts at
6.49 on the democracy scale. Holding courts constant at the max value of 4, and increasing the
economics variable from minimum to the maximum of 10, increases the democracy score to 6.7
(a change of .21 on the democracy scale). Starting this process at point 1, 10 on the graph (1-yaxis, 10-x-axis) we have a beginning predicted value of democracy at 5.74. Holding economics
constant at its maximum value, and then raising courts from its minimum value to its maximum
value of 4 gives us a predicted democracy score of 6.7 (an increase of .96 on the scale).

Table 6.7: Variations at Plot Points 4-1; 1-10-Figure 6.4
Courts
Economics
4
1
4
10
1
10
4
10

Democracy
6.49
6.7
5.74
6.7

If we perform this task one last time, starting at point 1, 1 on the graph and moving to 4,
10 on the graph, meaning from the minimums of both variables to the maximums of both
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variables (data shown in Table 6.8) we witness a change in democracy from 4.78 to 6.7 (a full
increase in levels of democracy by 1.92). Below Table 6.8 I introduce Figure 6.5 for a final
analysis of the interactive effect of my two independent variables. This is the same graph as
before except I switch the axis of each independent variable (a version of Figure 6.5 with 10levels appears in Appendix Chapter 6 under this figure).

Table: 6.8 Variations from Minimum to Maximum Plot Points; Reference Figure 6.4
Courts
Economics
Democracy
1
1
4.78
4
10
6.7
Figure 6.5: Contour Plot of Interaction Between Economic and Courts Variables on Dependent
Variable: Beliefs about Level of Democracy (version 2.0)

Note: X-Axis/Courts = confidence in courts/independent variable.
Y-Axis/Economics = people’s belief equitable economic growth is possible/independent variable.
Z-Variable/Democracy Scale = belief country is run democratically/dependent variable.

I introduce Figure 6.5 for one very important reason, I am a comparativist. I am part of
not only a sub-field of political science, but part of a specific methodology as well. We like to
compare things. Looking at this figure with the axis of each independent variable switched in
comparison to Figure 6.4, it becomes more obvious that the effect of the courts’ variable is
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stronger than the effect economics’ variable (the difference in the color spectrums on each axis).
This further supports the previous plotting exercise that I just went though, that my interaction
term is real, significant, in a positive direction as predicted, and the courts variable is the stronger
influence on the predicted value of democracy.
In sum, the above regression analysis, tables, graphs, and figures, provide support for my
main theoretically argument of this dissertation:
H3: As confidence in the courts increases, and people’s belief that equitable economic growth is
possible increases, people’s belief their government is undemocratic decreases; all else equal.
In the following section I choose the cases of Libya, Thailand, & Tunisia from my data
set to illustrate further support for my argument.
My Theory in Reality: Libya, Thailand & Tunisia
The countries of Libya, Thailand and Tunisia represent interesting and relevant cases in
regard to my dissertation argument. All three cases experienced mass people’s power
movements in the time frame of my dataset; 2010-2014. In 2010 the Arab Spring began in
Tunisia, and by January of 2011 the regime was toppled by this movement and democratization
began. In Libya, mass protests began in 2011 and by October of that same year those protests
turned into full civil war which included the death of the leader of the country, Muammar
Gaddafi. In 2013, mass protests began in Thailand that culminated in a military coup in May of
2014 that overthrew the democratic government.
I choose to run my model on these three cases from my dataset not only because they
represent interesting cases of the Arab Spring and people’s power movements in Asia, but also
for methodological reasons. Each case represents distinctly different points of transition in
regime collapse. While all three countries experience regime collapse/overthrow, in the time of
the survey study Thailand was pre-regime collapse, Libya was post-collapse and in a state of
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civil unrest/conflict, and Tunisia was post-collapse and in transition to democracy.
Theoretically, these represent great variation in the dependent variable (levels of perceived
democracy) for testing my theory at different stages of political development in countries.
In this section I take these three cases from my dataset and apply my hypothesis and
interaction term to see how the data pick up on the reality inside the countries. All variables and
regression analysis are exactly the same as my previous model in this chapter. I take each
country one at a time and apply my regression to the data from that country alone. At this point I
begin with Libya.
Libya, My Model at Work in the World
The background to Libya’s story in the Arab Spring begins with the military coup of
1969 and Muammar Gaddafi’s rise to power in the country. While initially quite popular for
overthrowing the monarchy, Gaddafi’s titles and power evolved over the decades to become the
dictator of an increasingly authoritarian regime (Burnell, Rakner, Randall, 2017). Even before
the Arab Spring began in late 2010, the United Nations began documenting cases of human
rights violations in Libya and a debate started whether intervention was appropriate (a potential
byproduct of the 2005 UN General Assembly’s new concept of the Responsibility to Protect).
However, it was not until after the 2008 global recession when economic conditions began
worsening around the world, the price of oil eventually dropping (significant to Libya
specifically because of oil being a major part of the economy), and the beginnings of the Arab
Spring in Tunisia and neighboring Egypt, that the situation in Libya escalates to result in
international intervention (Burnell, Rakner, Randall 2017).
Once major protests began in Tunisia and Egypt, and economic conditions continued to
worsen in Libya, Libyans began protesting. Just as in other Arab Spring cases, people in Libya

118

were protesting not only against the government’s inability to cope with worsening economic
conditions, but also with the long legacy of Gaddafi’s increasingly violent and authoritarian rule
(Burnell, Rakner, Randall 2017). Gaddafi reacted to these protests by sending the police and
military to violently repress the people’s power movement. This repression escalated to the point
where in March of 2011 the Security Council of the United Nations approved international
intervention and strategic airstrikes began soon thereafter. By October of 2011 Muammar
Gaddafi was killed and the regime was overthrown. This event was met with great promise for
the future of a free Libya. However, even though elections did take place in 2012, deep seeded
societal-cleavages sown by Gaddafi proved exceedingly difficult to remedy via democratic
election (Burnell, Rakner, Randall 2017). Conflict began almost immediately after in 2012
between different militia groups, Gaddafi-loyalists, and the internationally backed government of
the country (eventually the Islamic State entered the conflict as well). By 2014, the country was
in a state of civil war.
This conflict is still ongoing, sadly. The internationally backed government is still
fighting for complete control over the sovereign territory within Libya’s borders. With this
background in mind, Libya is the first of my case studies that I try to apply my model to, in order
to explain people’s views on levels of perceived democracy. My hypothesis remains the same
here as before: as confidence in the courts increases, and people’s belief that equitable economic
growth is possible increases, people’s belief their government is undemocratic decreases; all
else equal. The data for Libya comes from WVS Wave 6, as it is a subset of the dataset, for the
regression model N=1,720.
When I apply my model to the data, I find no significant results with my interaction term
of confidence in the courts and belief on equitable economic growth affecting democracy (see
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Appendix Chapter 6 for full regression results followed directly by all descriptive statistics for
variables contained in country-dataset). Looking at each of these two main variables alone,
confidence in the courts is in the correct direction to support my argument, though not
statistically significant. The equitable economic growth variable is, however, statistically
significant on its own with a p-value=.001. Although, the economic variable is in the opposite
direction to my theory. The data show that as people’s belief that equitable economic growth is
possible increases, their belief that their country is democratic decreases. Again, this finding
runs contrary to my argument, and poses an interesting theoretical question: if the people of
Libya believe equitable economic growth is possible, why would that lead to negative views
about their country’s level of democracy?

In the following paragraph I address the effects of

my two main variables in direct relation to “events on the ground” in Libya to provide an
explanation for what the data show. Afterward, I look at more methodological reasons as
potential explanations for my findings.
When looking at on the ground events in Libya, the period of the survey happening while
civil conflict is taking place at the same time, could be a major factor in not finding statistical
significance for my interaction term. There is likely too much “noise” in the data to be able to
test theories at this point in time in Libya. A civil war is the mark of a failed state. People’s
opinions about government institutions and economic values would be far different in this
situation than in times of peace. Concentrating on the confidence in the courts variable, the most
likely explanation for not having statistical significance in my model is because the courts at this
moment were not functioning at all. Ghaddafi and his regime had already fallen, and no
government had risen to take its place and solidify power and a new court system. Hence, it
remains theoretically reasonable to believe that for the citizens of Libya, the courts or confidence
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in them was not a relevant factor for their belief in democracy. Simply put, a legitimate
countrywide/government court system did not exist due to the fact that the country was in a state
of civil war.
When concentrating on the equitable economic growth variable, on its own it is
significant though in the opposite direction: as Libyan’s belief that equitable economic growth is
possible increases, their belief that their country is democratic decreases. Here I ask: if the
people of Libya believe equitable economic growth is possible and the variable is statistically
significant, why would that lead to negative views about their country’s level of democracy? It
could very well be that the collapse of power in the country created an opportunity for wealth
redistribution from different militia-factions’ leaders. While these militia-factions that controlled
different regions were not democratic forms of government, equitable economic distribution of
goods could have increased in this time period due to the looting of Ghaddafi’s palaces and other
government installations. This would imply that Libyans experienced more equitable economic
redistribution of goods (in comparison to that of under the Ghaddafi regime) but in a nondemocratic way. Hence, the economic variable is statistically significant in the model, and the
direction indicates that democratic governance had nothing to do with this economic
redistribution. While this explanation, as well as the explanation for the collapse of the court
system, are theoretically reasonable and likely, in the following paragraph I concentrate on
methodological reasons for potential explanations for my results in Libya.
the reason I find no significance in my interaction term due to (meaning 1/3 of all
Libyans surveyed believe the government is completely non-democratic)findFurthermore, this
survey was conducted during a civil war. It stands to reason that Libyan’s individual responses
may have be affected due to a fear-factor. While different militia forces fought for power, the
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Libyan people were left not knowing who would next control the country. This could have had a
direct effect on their responses in the surveys out of fear of reprisal for specific answers. If this
were the case, it would call into question the validity of the survey’s quality, which would have
direct implications for running any model based on this data.
While the case of Libya is theoretically interesting to test my hypothesis, due to the
reality on the ground at the time of the survey, the country is likely not suited to test my
hypothesis quantitatively based on survey data collected during a civil war. In the following
section I pull the case of Thailand from my dataset to apply the same analysis to the situation
there and see how my argument holds up.
Thailand, My Model at Work in the World
As previously stated, Thailand’s people’s power movement began in 2013. Although not
directly tied to the Arab Spring movements, the mass protests were predicated along the same
lines of social discontent with government (worsening economic conditions due to the 2008
global recession and a government’s inability to cope with rising economic inequality due to that
recession). Political gridlock culminated in late 2013 with mass protests demanding the
resignation of a “perceived” corrupt government, which inevitably lead to parliament announcing
new snap-elections and the dissolving of parliament itself (Sombatpoonsiri 2017). However,
opposition to this decision (and supporters of the government that was resigning) began staging
their own mass protests, and in particular in December of 2013 staged a protest that turned
violent in an effort to block the electoral commission’s work on staging these new elections. A
major difference between this case and that of Libya, is that Thailand already had a
democratically elected government at the time of the people’s power movements
(Sombatpoonsiri 2017).
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Political unrest and mass protests continued for months, some peaceful and some violent,
with rival people’s power movements battling for power and the right to control government.
Elected officials were unable to create any resolution that would satisfy protesters or the
politicians that they supported. In May of 2014, the military staged its 13th coup in almost 100years, citing the government’s inability to act due to divisions and political unrest/gridlock,
corruption, and national security risks (Sombatpoonsiri 2017). The military immediately
implemented a state of emergency and dispersed protests from all political sides. The junta
stayed in power until March of 2019 when democratic elections returned (Prayut Chan-o-cha, the
leader of the military coup, was elected Prime Minister of the country).
Today, Thailand is experiencing the legacy of that election. Mass protests have returned
and are calling for the resignation of the government, and of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha,
as well as reforms to the power of the monarchy in the country. With this background in mind,
Thailand is the second case I pull from my dataset to see how my hypothesis works on an
individual-country analysis. My hypothesis remains the same here as before: as confidence in
the courts increases, and people’s belief that equitable economic growth is possible increases,
people’s belief their government is undemocratic decreases; all else equal. The data for
Thailand comes from WVS Wave 6, as it is a subset of the dataset; for the regression model
N=1,061.
When I apply my model to the data from Thailand, just as with Libya, I find no
significant results with my interaction term of confidence in the courts and belief on equitable
economic growth affecting democracy (see Appendix Chapter 6 for full regression results
followed directly by all descriptive statistics for variables contained in country-dataset). In fact,
out of all the variables in the model (courts, economics, age, sex, education, interest in politics,
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confidence in press) only education and confidence in press were statistically significant. When
I look at my two main variables separately (courts and economics) although they are not
statistically significant, they are in the right direction in the model in comparison to my theory.
In the following paragraphs I look at why these two variables may not be significant in terms of
actual events taking place during the survey period as well as potential methodological
explanations for my findings.
thinking of the case of Thailand, t. M (especially in terms of beliefs about courts and
economic grievances) and neither the courts variable nor the economics variable are significant
in the modelthe of ThailandIt may very well be that culturally speaking, citizens of Thailand
define democracy specifically based on electoral legitimacy, rather than degrees of the rule of
law or equitable economic growth. The fact that lese-majeste laws exist in the country (that the
royal family is above criticism and people can face 15-year prison sentences for criticizing the
monarchy) implies that the rule of law is not full institutionalized in the country. Inequality is
culturally constructed in Thailand and institutionalized. Additionally,, and criticism is looked
down upon. This further implies that the rule of law is not a major component of how citizens of
Thailand define democracy. Therefore, it stands theoretically reasonable to deduce that due to
cultural influences in Thailand, the courts variable would not be a significant influence on how
democratic the citizens view the government in the country. Furthermore, if we extend this
cultural understanding of our case to try and explain the economics variable not being
significant, we would say that the “definition” of democracy in Thailand is what Moller and
Skaaning (2013) label as a minimalists-democracy. Their definition applied to this case would
mean that the Thai people view regular elections taking place with uncertain outcomes to be the
core value by which they define democracy. Hence, equitable economic growth nor confidence
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in the courts would be components of the citizens’ definition. While I believe this is likely the
case in Thailand, cultural argument remain difficult to verify quantitively. In the following
paragraph I look specifically at the data to provide methodological explanations for the findings
with the courts and economics variables.
Looking at my data for Thailand, like Libya, I do find some methodological issues that
may explain my lack of results for my hypothesis. Looking at my two main independent
variables, I first focus on economics. I find that 55.35% of those surveyed answered an 8-10 on
the equitable economic growth scale, providing a mean of 7.58, which is uncharacteristically
high in comparison to the dataset as a whole. This is 1.35-units higher than the mean of the
entire the dataset. Furthermore, this indicates that there is little variation in the economicsindependent variable, which could be causing my lack of results. In regard to the confidence in
courts variable, the mean is also higher than that of the dataset. Thailand’s mean courts
value=3.06 versus the entire dataset mean courts value=2.57. Additionally, a total of 38.10% of
respondents answered 4 on the courts scale, indicating a heavy weight in that direction (4=max).
Just as with the economic variable, this lack of variation in the courts-independent variable may
very well be driving the lack or significance in the model. Furthermore, the mean value of
democracy levels is higher in Thailand than that of the entire dataset (6.79 for the former and
5.996 for the latter). Even during mass people’s power protests against government corruption
and gridlock, 40.44% of those surveyed answered an 8-10 for how democratic is their
government (a remarkably high rating by a remarkably high percentage of those surveyed during
such a time of crisis). Taking all three of these findingsfrom my data for Thailand together, it
appears the data themselves are heavily bias and weighted to the maximum-values for each of
my 3-theoretically important variables. In short, theoretically, there is not enough variation in
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the data to test my argument without running into methodological errors, and therefore that bias
in the data is driving my results.

That being said, the courts variable and the economics

variable are both directionally in line with my theory. It could be that with a larger sample, or a
sample that was not taken on the cusp of a military coup, I would find statistically significant
results and in the correct direction, in line with that of this model’s directions.
Regardless of the lack of results for Thailand and Libya, I believe both cases inevitably
possessed flawed data, as well as “real world” events influencing respondents to answer in ways
that in more peaceful times they would answer differently. Furthermore, my theory does not test
for the likelihood of civil unrest, but rather is a step before that, with level of democracy being
the variable of concern. It stands to reason that my dataset has arrived at these cases too far into
the process of regime change. This would mean, that once civil unrest has started, my theory no
longer is applicable to cases and other variables become more relevant (i.e. in these cases people
are not so much concerned about the quality of democracy so much as they are concerned about
personal security and stability). All of this being said, in the following section I try to apply my
theory to one last country-case in the same fashion that I have done here, to the country of
Tunisia.
Tunisia, My Model at Work in the World
In many ways Tunisia is the “gem” of the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring began in
Tunisia, and Tunisia was the only country in the movement to successfully democratize and
retain that democratization after overthrowing an authoritarian leader. Tunisia was similar to
Libya in regard to having a long-time authoritarian-leader, President Ben Ali ruled the country
for over 30-years. Additionally, Ben Ali ruled in a violent and repressive manner toward all
segments of the population that were outspoken against his government, regardless of their
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political ideology (Burnell, Rakner, Randall 2017). As the 2008 recession took its toll on the
world, Tunisia was hit incredibly hard with an overall unemployment rate in 2010 climbing to
13% (World Bank “Unemployment”-Tunisia). However, the unemployment rate amongst the
youth (15-24 years old) in 2010 had climbed to as high as 30% (Haouas, Sayre, and Yagoubi
2012). As was the case in Libya, economic recession coupled with political repression created
an atmosphere of widespread anti-government sentiment in the population of Tunisia.
In December of 2010 police in Tunisia harassed and eventually confiscated the fruit cart
of Mohamed Bouazizi. When Bouazizi went before the local government to complain of this
harassment, confiscation of his goods, and an overall lack of economic opportunity, government
officials refused to investigate his case (Saidin 2018). On 17 December of 2010, Mohamed
Bouazizi self-immolated in front of the government office in protest, he later died on 5 January
2011. These events directly lead to the mass mobilization that later became known as the Arab
Spring (Saidin 2018). By 14 January, protests had become so widespread in the country that
President Ben Ali resigned and went into exile outside of the country. By October of that year
elections took place to form a constitutional assembly with the job of creating a new democratic
constitution. In January of 2014, that constitution was adopted in a national referendum, and the
first democratic elections for office took place later that same year (Burnell, Rakner, Randall
2017). Since 2014, we have witnessed Tunisia have a peaceful transfer of power between a
president of one political party, to a president of a different political party, illustrating one of the
important components of democratic consolidation. With this background in mind, Tunisia
represents the third case from my dataset that I test my hypothesis on the individual-country
level.
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My hypothesis remains the same here as before: as confidence in the courts increases,
and people’s belief that equitable economic growth is possible increases, people’s belief their
government is undemocratic decreases; all else equal. The data for Tunisia comes from WVS
Wave 6, as it is a subset of the dataset; for the regression model N=978.
When I apply my model to the data from Tunisia, unlike Libya and Thailand, I find
statistically significant results. Below in Table 6.9 are my reported regression results (see
Appendix Chapter 6 Table 6.9 for the listing of all descriptive statistics for each variable in the
model). My interaction term is statistically significant with a p-value=.001. The only control
variable that was significant was education, which is in the positive direction and has a pvalue=.089. Meaning as education increases, individuals believe their government is being run
more democratically. At this point I turn directly to interpreting the interactive effect of my two
main independent variables.

Table 6.9: Tunisia Regression Analysis:
The Interactive Effect of Belief in Courts & Belief in Equitable Economic Growth on How
Democratic the Country is being Run
(OLS Regression Analysis)

Coefficients

p-values

People’s Belief about
Equitable Economic Growth

.142**

.012

Confidence in Courts

.574***

.001

Interaction Term
(courts & economics)

-.083***

.001

Age

.006

.280

Sex

-.177

.250

Education

.053*

.089
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Interest in Politics

-.024

.0768

Confidence in Press

.121

.201

2.483***

.001

Constant
N

978

R-squared

.0343

Adjusted R-squared

.0264

***=99%, **=95%, *=90%
In Figures 6.6 & 6.7 I followed the same method to create a contour plot to map out the
interactive effect of my two independent variables as I did for the full dataset model as
previously described in this chapter. Below in Figures 6.6;6.7 my democracy variable is the zvariable, my economics variable, and my courts variable switch back and forth on each x and yaxis for comparative analysis between the two figures. In Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 there are
20-levels of shading. The different colors indicate the predicted values of beliefs about
democracy depending on the different levels of an individual’s belief in the courts and beliefs
about equitable economic growth. In short, the graphs illustrate the interactive effect between
these two independent variables as you change either of their values, and how they affect the
dependent variable. This supports H3’s hypothesis that the value of the dependent variable is a
function of the interaction between the two independent variables. This being said, the results
are far more complicated than that of my previous model which found support. Below the
figures I explain my results.

Figure 6.6: Tunisia; Contour Plot of the Interaction Between Economic and Courts Variables on
Dependent Variable: Beliefs about Level of Democracy (version 1.0)
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Figure 6.7: Tunisia; Contour Plot of the Interaction Between Economic and Courts Variables on
Dependent Variable: Beliefs about Level of Democracy (version 2.0)

One of the most interesting takeaways from these graphs in my opinion is that the highest
level of confidence in the courts, mixed with the lowest level of belief in equitable economic
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growth, yield the strongest effect on the level of democracy. Interpreting this finding we would
say that an individual with a maxed-out level of confidence in the courts, and with almost no
belief that equitable economic growth is possible, has a predicted belief level of 4.87 that their
country is being run democratically. This means that individuals do not believe their country is
being run democratically, but rather they are getting close to the positive belief that it is. This
would imply that while people do have confidence in the courts, they have very little in the
economic system. This supports the idea that the courts variable is the moderator-variable and
the economics variable is the factor-variable within the interaction term. This means that the
effect of the economics variable is moderated by the effect of the courts variable. This is in line
with all other regressions in this dissertation as the courts variable is the stronger of the two as
far as influence. It is also worth noting that nowhere on this graph, however, does any
combination of the predicted values indicate a positive view that the country is being run
democratically in Tunisia. In the following paragraph I analyze this finding further.
Looking at my data I find a partial explanation for the limited effect the interaction term
has on the democracy variable. The mean-value of democracy is quite low in the Tunisia
dataset, a 3.9 out of 10 for those surveyed (the mean of the full dataset is 5.997, indicating that
people in Tunisia view their country less democratically than individuals in the dataset as a
whole). This overall low mean-value of democracy in the dataset could very well be the reason
why, even though my interaction term is significant, the effects of the interaction never place
individuals’ predicted beliefs of democracy in the positive-range of values. Additionally, I must
consider the mean-values of my two main independent variables. The economics variable mean
is a 5.9 out of 10, also not comparatively that high and partially explains why the overall effect
of the economics variable is quite small in comparison to that of the courts variable on the
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contour plot. The mean-score of the courts’ variable is 2.54, which is close to the mean of the
complete dataset for all 60 countries. This reinforces the idea of how the courts interacts, and
affects, both the economic variable and the democracy variable in the same way that the courts
variable does so in the full model of this study.
However, the major difference in the dataset for Tunisia in comparison to the dataset for
the entire study, is the mean-value of democracy. The fact that Tunisians, on average, have
lower views of democracy in comparison to those individuals in the full-dataset, accounts for the
decreased effect of the interaction term we witness in the model on Tunisia. While this model
does provide support for my hypothesis, it remains necessary to further investigate the major
difference of findings when looking specifically at the economics and courts variables when both
are placed at their maximums, as well as both placed at their minimum-values.
When we place both the courts variable and economics variable at their minimum-values,
we have the lowest predicted values of democracy. This is in line with the findings based on the
full dataset. However, when we place both variables at their maximums it also yields the lowest
predicted level of democracy amongst those surveyed. This is not in line with the findings based
on the full dataset and warrants further questioning.
I believe this result can be explained by accounting for elite perspectives within the
population of a developing country, Tunisia in this particular case. In this I mean that in almost
all developing countries, there are political and economic elites that the economic system and the
political system both work directly in their favor, in comparison to everyone else in the country.
It is likely that these individuals know that the country is not a democracy, but since the courts
work in their interest, they do have confidence in the courts (because political elites enjoy
increased access to political institutions). Furthermore, since the economic system works in their
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favor as well, they believe it can work in other people’s favor too (the idea of “if the economy
works for me it can work for everyone”). In this perspective, elites would have a high-value of
confidence in the court, and a high-value belief in the economic system working for everyone,
but they full well know the country is not functioning as a liberal democracy. Hence, this elite
perspective accounts for the findings of the model, that those individuals In Tunisia with
maximum-values of the courts and economics variables, have the lowest predicted levels of
democracy. In the following paragraph I analyze the difference of findings between Tunisia,
Libya, and Thailand.
In summary, I believe I found statistically significant results in Tunisia, in comparison to
Libya and Thailand, because Tunisia was already finished with civil unrest and was beginning
the transitional period toward democratization. This is a major difference between the three
cases in the real world, that likely is showing up in the data. The reason why the results for the
interactive effect in Tunisia does not match exactly that of the larger model of this dissertation is
because Tunisia was in the transitional period. The fact that my interaction term was
statistically significant provides support for my hypothesis in this case, although arguably only
75% support because of elite perspectives skewing the data when in the upper quadrant of the
graphs (the combined maxed-out values of the independent variables). However, the idea of the
elite perspectives in Tunisia, cultural effects in Thailand, and civil conflict in Libya, ultimately
all point to one major concern in the field of comparative politics, there are always individuallevel/country-specific variables that can and do affect how our general theories work in those
cases. This remains one of the most challenging aspects of creating generalizable theories in
political science today.
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In this section I have tested my hypothesis in three countries and found partial support, as
well as argued why I did not find support in two out of the three cases. In the following section I
return to the discussion on my argument as a whole, and to my findings regarding the full
dataset. In the next section I consider alternative explanations for my findings and address
methodological as well as theoretical concerns of the study at hand.
Alternative Explanations
In previous chapters I have addressed alternative explanations for all my specific
variables and models, those arguments stand here as they do there, as I believe they apply
through all models and chapters. In this section, I take a step back to look at larger alternative
explanations, the macro-level of potential issues with my findings, survey data, the use of
statistical analysis in political science, and interactions terms in general.
To begin with, global data is severely limited. While I have provided political science
literature that has similar findings at the aggregate-level as well as theorists who believe as I do,
we must address the accuracy of global-survey data in and of itself. Survey data can be difficult
to interpret in one specific country. If question wording is not carefully placed, surveyors can
“lead” their respondents to the responses they want to capture. This is true on a country-wide
survey study, and holds true on a global-survey study as well. Furthermore, it is difficult to
convey the meaning of one question to a population in one country with one language, and it
becomes increasingly more difficult to convey that same question-meaning to many countries
with many different languages. This begs the question, are all of the respondents in all 60
countries, really, answering the same question as we interpret, they are? This is a valid concern.
The World Values Survey has its roots from the 1981 European Values Survey. Political
scientist from the University of Michigan Ronald F. Inglehart is the director of the World Values
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Survey, and works with 100s of social scientists across the globe to meticulously craft these
surveys to attempt to capture the true meaning behind each question, in an effort to make global
quantitative analysis such as this dissertation possible. It is my belief that Inglehart and others
do a magnificent job at achieving this, although nothing is perfect and Wave 7 which is
expanded is due to come out soon (I address this in my conclusion and future research section).
In general, we are limited in our research by the data we have available, however again, I
believe this data is some of the most comprehensive and accurate data on a global-level that
exists today. Even though the measures of my variables may not be “perfectly” what I wish they
were (I initially and naively imagined finding a perfect variable for equitable economic growth) I
no less have to settle for the measures that I have in order to investigate my theory across the
world. Acknowledging the imperfections of my measures is not an acknowledgement of my
theory’s weakness, but rather an acknowledgment that it can be further supported with improved
data. Testing global theories using individual-level data with cross-country analysis remains an
issue for all researchers.
An additional critique/alternative explanation for my findings may be that my interaction
term truly is not special. That although my independent variables and interaction term
outperform all other variables in all models, we could simply create interaction terms with other
variables to outperform my current hypothesis. Mathematically this is absolutely correct and
possible. You could even create a 3-way interaction term to create a model/interactive-effect
that has a stronger influence than my two independent variables. However, regression analysis
does not work like this. The numbers can only follow the directions of the formulas, and our
results are only as good as our data is representative of the real world. To simply create an
interaction term between any random variables can potentially provide positive and statistically
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significant results, however, that does not mean in reality those results actually take place. It is
our theories and causal mechanisms that justify the use of interaction terms. Without either,
random interaction terms possess no real explanatory power. The numbers can only follow the
directions of the formulas, but our theories power our results.
With this in mind, I stand behind the results of my models, and the theories behind my
hypothesis. In the following section I review this chapter’s findings and discuss the implications
behind them.
Implications & Conclusion
In this chapter I argued that as confidence in the courts increases, and people’s belief that
equitable economic growth is possible increases, people’s belief their government is
undemocratic decreases; all else equal. I tested my argument across 60 cases over a 5-year
period between 2010-2014 and found statistically significant and positive results. This chapter
contributes to the literature on democracy by taking aggregate-level theory and applying it to the
individual-level, it increases the number of cases the theory is tested on, and tests that theory
over time instead of simply testing it in a “snap-shot” in time regression analysis. Furthermore, I
tested my hypothesis in 3-subsets of the data in the country-cases of Libya, Thailand, and
Tunisia. Although I did not find support for my argument in Libya and Thailand, I did find
support for it in Tunisia.
Additionally, I graphically mapped out on several contour-plots exactly how my two
independent variables interact to create different effects at 40 different values on the dependent
variable of levels of democracy in a country. This adds to the literature in a significant way by
illustrating that other studies, at the aggregate as well as individual-level, should take my
interaction term into account when investigating relationships between variables, and how they
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affect democracy. The findings of my research suggest that previous studies suffer from omitted
variable bias, and that by adding this interaction term researchers will be able to more accurately
portray the world in which we seek to understand.
In the final conclusion chapter, I address more implications for this study at a policy
level, the potential for real word change in a positive direction, as well as look forward to future
research in this area. At this point I turn to the conclusion chapter of this dissertation.
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Chapter 7: A Conclusion to this Dissertation
Introduction
In this chapter I begin by reviewing my findings in this dissertation and their implications
in the field of political science and comparative politics. Afterward, I revisit potential alternative
explanations and the main weaknesses in my analysis and research design. Following this I
layout policy suggestions at the country-level as it relates to countries across the globe
attempting political and economic developing. The next section provides policy suggestions at
the global-level as far as aiding developing countries further develop their political and economic
systems. Finally, I end with a discussion about my future work as it relates to studying the world
at large. At this point, I revisit my results.
A Review of My Findings & Implications
I began demonstrating my theory in chapter 4, where I showed how the confidence in the
courts’ variable was a significant variable at the individual-level for affecting people’s views on
democracy in their country. This was an important step as it established a footing so to speak for
my entire theory, as literature in this area focuses on the aggregate-country level. Chapter 5
expanded on this by introducing another aggregate-level theory, that of belief’s on equitable
economic growth affecting democracy, actually takes place at the individual-level as well. In
chapter 6 I presented my main contribution to the literature as I argued:
H3: As confidence in the courts increases, and people’s belief that equitable economic
growth is possible increases, people’s belief their government is undemocratic decreases; all
else equal.
I found positive and statistical significance for my theory. My findings add to the
literature in multiple ways:
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(1) it brings a more complete understanding of the relationship and interaction of
important variables that affect democracy,
(2) it brings forth the potential of omitted variable bias in previous research,
(3) it expands aggregate-level theory to the individual level,
(4) it tests the argument over 60 countries, and
(5) it tests the argument over time in a 5-year span from 2010-2014.
Additionally, I tested my argument on three subsets of the data with the countries of
Libya, Thailand, and Tunisia. Although I only found statistically significant results in the case of
Tunisia, I further argued why the “noise” in the data due to real world events going on at the time
of the surveys in those countries likely resulted in finding no significance. Turning directly to
the case of Tunisia, finding statistically significant results here further demonstrates that my
theory does not only hold true using individual-level data at the global level, but rather also holds
true using individual-level data at the country-level.
The major implication behind these significant results ties directly back to development
in countries. My research suggests that in order for individuals to view their country in a
positive and democratic way, that people must have faith in the courts, meaning those courts
must be independent and securing the rule of law that creates political equality. Additionally,
people must have faith that equitable economic growth in their country is possible, meaning that
economic equality must be able to take place and their standard of living must be able to
increase. If these two things are not happening in a country, then people’s belief in democracy
will decrease. This of course leads to the increased risk of citizens’ discontent with government
rising. And although my research does not focus on political unrest or regime change, my
findings suggest, as does the literature, that when people are not happy with government, the
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probability of regime change increases (or at the very least increased civil unrest; i.e. look at the
events of Belarus at the time of this writing). In the following section I discuss alternative
explanations for my results and potential flaws in my research design.
Alternative Explanations & Research Design
In chapters 4 and 5 I addressed issues of multi-collinearity, endogeneity, omitted variable
bias, and reverse causality within my models. In due diligence to make sure that these were not
issues, I ran several Pearson Correlation Tests as well as additional models including other
variables, where I demonstrated how these were not methodological issues affecting my models.
Furthermore, in each chapter I focused on the theoretical reasoning behind how democratization
works in the literature, and in reality, and why reverse causality is not an issue in relation to my
two main independent variables (please see chapters 4 and 5 Alternative Explanations for a more
in-depth revisit). These discussions are of paramount importance, as political science as a field
must demonstrate that our quantitative methods are sound and do not suffer from errors due to
model-specifications.
In chapter 6 I concentrated on more macro-methodological issues for alternative
explanations. I focused on question wording, linguistic differences between surveys given in 60
different countries, and the utility of interaction terms (please see chapter 6 Alternative
Explanations for a more in-depth revisit). In sum, the World Values Survey is one of the leading
global surveys in the world today, and my usage of an interaction term is guided by my theory
and causal mechanisms further supported in the democracy literature. However, my research
design is not without flaws, and it is here that I discuss how I wish to improve upon them in the
future.
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Following this dissertation, I want to expand and improve upon the research project that I
have begun to increase the potential for aiding developing areas. In the near term, World Values
Survey Wave 7 is being conducted for 2017-2021 (releasing data in July 2021). They are
expanding from 60 countries to 80 countries, at which point they will be surveying almost half of
the countries on the planet. This is very exciting for me as it allows for increased testing of my
theory over cases, as well as a new 5-year period to expand my research to.
Furthermore, I want to expand my argument to more case studies as I did for Libya,
Thailand, and Tunisia. Doing this will help me understand some of the country-level variables
outside of my models that may come up from time to time (such as culture in Thailand and civil
conflict in Libya). When thinking about helping developing countries, it is of paramount
importance to consider the specifics of local peoples and cultures. Doing this, also excites me to
no end as I could theoretically test my theory on the country-level using individual-level data for
all 200 countries in the world.
Additionally, I want to begin the collection of a “mirrored” aggregate-level dataset to
accompany my individual-level research. At first in my prospectus, my ambition was to do both
levels, but this proved to be more than was practical in a dissertation. Computing a variable for
equitable economic growth at the individual-level and the aggregate-level is increasingly
challenging though. For the individual-level analysis, I would create a more direct measure of
equitable economic growth and work with other researchers to see how best to capture my theory
in “question wording” and different languages around the world. I believe that question wording
of this variable in the World Values Survey could be specified further, and as such would
potentially yield a much larger influence on the dependent variable. However, I would need to
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operationalize my equitable economic growth variable in a different way in order to test this
theory.
When thinking of the aggregate-level, the first suggestion is GINI coefficients that look at
income inequality in a country, and that suggestion is absolutely correct and would help a lot.
However, anyone that has worked with data for developing countries will tell you a simple
though major issue with GINI, it simply does not exist for most developing countries over time.
This also implies that global institutions need to invest more heavily in data collection for
developing countries so that we can perform analysis to see what areas of the countries need the
most work, so more specified policy initiatives may be suggested for development.
However, even using the GINI index has its drawbacks. GINI shows the distribution of
wealth in a country and tells us how equal/unequal income in the country is for any given year.
This statistic alone does not tell us much about equitable economic growth, even if looked at
over time. For Instance, Timor-Leste in 2014 has a GINI score of 28.7 (World Bank, Gini
index). This means that in 2014, Timor-Leste was top amongst countries of the world as far as
having income equally distributed throughout the population (generally considered a good
characteristic of any country). However, their GDP per capita for 2014 is $1,232 per person ayear in the country (World Bank, GDP per capita).
These two statistics together provide us a far more accurate view of what equitable
economic growth looks like in the country. The implications are that poverty is high throughout
the country (low GDP per capita) and that poverty rates are more equally distributed throughout
the country (GINI score). In short, large amounts of people in Timor-Leste are equally poor. In
order to see this over time however, we would need more GINI data, which do not exist.
Theoretically, using GDP per cap divided by GINI, I could create a standardized measure of
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equitable economics in a country, that we could then compare to other countries around the
world. An additional option would be creating a composite score for countries by multiplying
GINI and GDP. However, in order to capture my equitable economic growth variable, I would
need more GINI data collected/created for every country, regardless of the new measure I would
create. If I were able to create such “mirrored” datasets for the individual-level and the
aggregate-level, for all developing countries across the globe, I would be able to tailor-fit policy
proposals to each specific country, based on my more general model. It is with this in mind that
I now turn to a discussion of potential policy initiatives for countries trying to develop politically
and economically.
Policy Implications at the Country-Level
Bringing the discussion back to development, I begin here with political development and
the development of an independent judiciary, which will increase the people’s confidence in the
courts. In order to increase citizens’ faith in the courts, the courts must be insulated from
political influence. This requires either longer term limits for judges or life appointments. Both
come with drawbacks and a decision on which is better should not be a “one-size fits all”
diagnoses. In some countries the best way to insulate judges will be via long term limits, in other
countries it will be via life appointments. Some of the main issues in deciding which it should be
are the selection processes of High Court Justices, the size and diversity of the population in the
country, the rate of change going on in the country, and whether or not justices can easily be
removed from office.
As far as the selection process, in order to insulate judges from political influence, this
means choosing justices that are not biased toward one political party/leader or another (an issue
faced in even developed democracies). The selection process should be multifaceted, with a
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checks and balance mechanism built in via needing approval from institutions that are never
controlled by only one political party in a country. In countries where processes like this are
possible, longer term limits/life terms would offer increased political insulation. In countries
where this is not characteristic of the process, shorter terms would guarantee the ability of the
High Courts to swing in different political directions, hence not allowing for long-term partycapture of the judiciary.
In regard to the size and diversity of the population and how this affects choosing the
length of terms, small countries with more homogenous populations, on average, experience less
change or at the very least slow change in their political climates. In cases like this, where true
representation of the population is far easier to match in government, longer/life terms will help
insulate from political influence. However, in countries with larger and more diverse
populations, change can sometimes happen quite quickly, and representation does not always
match every segment of the population. In cases like this, shorter terms lengths would be helpful
to allow the judiciary to move more freely between being able to represent new segments of the
populations as they gain more political representation (it remains important to remember this
discussion is taking place in the frame of newly democratizing countries).
Finally, the issue of how easily justices can be removed from office should also influence
how long-term limits are as well. If justices can easily be removed from office, this presents a
problem in itself, because any politician that does not like a judge’s ideological beliefs can
simply remove that justice. Therefore, the removal process should not be easy, ever. Thinking
in terms of medium to hard levels of difficulty to remove justices, if it is moderately difficult to
remove justices from the bench, then longer-term limits could help insulate political influence.
However, if the process is difficult to remove justices from the bench, then term-limits should be
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shorter. In these cases, justices will be well insulated from political bias, but they will also not
be allowed to “legislate from the bench” for the period of their life.
Theoretically, there are many more possibilities with almost 200 countries in the world, a
topic for a dissertation in and of itself. The point I demonstrate here is that countries need to pay
close attention to how they craft the independence of their judiciary so that the institution can
operate effectively at securing political equality and freedom across the population. Again
though, this is only the 1st piece of the puzzle for the development of a country.
Finding a path for equitable economic development, especially for developing countries,
has been demonstrated to be more difficult perhaps than even crafting an independent judiciary
(in this dissertation I have never claimed the path I put forward is easy, simply that it remains
one of the best options for the successful development of a country). Here I will be addressing
developing countries specifically, and leave equitable economic development for developed
countries, to another piece of research.
Post-materialism is the idea that individuals are able to take on different concerns other
than the three basic needs of human beings: food, clothing, and shelter. For developing countries
this is not the case. The findings from my results would imply that developing countries’
governments need to first address the issue of disparity of access to food, clothing, and shelter
within their population. Their citizens need, and I mean need in the very basic sense of the word
to imply their citizens’ lives depend on it, reliable access to sanitation, clean drinking water,
medical care, clothing, and affordable housing. One could argue that education, electricity, and
roads, need to be put in this list as well. However, and sadly in many developing countries, we
simply are not there yet. Remember developing countries’ governments have hard decisions to
make. Therefore, I begin with the first list but expand in a moment.
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In order for equitable economic prosperity to take place the citizens must have equal
access to resources that allows then a healthy life so that they can take part in the economy and
find prosperous work. Once the poorest segments of the populations have begun actively
participating in the economy, these new economic actors will then look to safeguard their
newfound economic-interests. Here is where my argument states that individuals seek those
safeguards via the courts. In the following section I turn to the policy implications of my
research at the global level to aid developing countries.
Policy Implications at the Global-Level
Developing countries cannot afford to implement all of the policy suggestions that I have
listed above, and their populations cannot afford to wait for a time when those governments can.
Sadly, and tragically, thousands of people are dying every year in developing countries due to
malnutrition and diseases that are curable and avoidable in developed countries. A precursor to
this discussion may very well be, do developed countries have any obligation at all to help
developing countries, be it post-colonial responsibilities or moral duty? I will go ahead and
answer that question for everyone, yes, they most certainly have a responsibility to help
developing countries. The reasonings, I leave for my future research, which I have no doubt I
will write about moving forward. Below I begin by discussing current global policies, and how
they do, or do not, relate to democracy, equitable economic growth, and independent judiciaries.
In the past 20 years there have been at least two major-global policy initiatives aimed at
helping developing countries in the world: The United Nations Millennium Goals and the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Both institutions take aim at reducing poverty, gender
equality, and overall inequality, as well as several other major issues in developing countries
related to their development. While both of these initiatives do focus on the equitable economic
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growth component of my argument, neither of these institutions aim to increase people’s political
equality. In short, these institutions do not directly support democratization as a priority for
increasing development in developing countries. Although the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948 has democracy listed as one of the basic human rights, not every country
in the world has signed that document, and the United Nations overall seems less concerned with
democracy as of late.
The implications from my findings on the courts, and how they interact with equitable
economic growth, indicate that an independent judiciary is needed in order to safeguard people’s
newfound economic interests. Without the development of political institutions that protect
people’s economic interests (political institutions like independent courts that are unbiased
arbiters of economic disputes and protect the people from government seizures of property and
assets) global policy initiatives that aim at increasing economic development alone run the risk
of increasing regime stability across all regime types. This means in countries where
authoritarianism is already prevalent, those authoritarian governments will become stronger and
have more resources with which to repress their citizens with (as previously shown in the
literature review on economic development, it increases regime stability in all regimes).
In summary, promoting equitable economic development in developing countries,
without any component of an independent judiciary as a check on authoritarian power, invites
the potential for democratic backsliding. Global policy initiatives like the Millennium Goals and
the Sustainable Development Goals should provide development assistance for independent
political institutions, in tandem with providing assistance for equitable economic development.
Only then will people’s newfound economic interests truly be protected. However, it remains
paramount to take these policy suggestions in the context of current global conditions. This
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context directly plays into the viability of additional economic policy suggestions moving
forward.
At the time of this writing, there are many major issues going on in the world today that
are directly affecting developing countries, even though developing countries had nothing to do
with starting them: trade wars between major powers (i.e. China and the US, EU and the US,
Brexit trade talks), Covid-19, a massive global recession, disinterest from the West/former
colonizer-countries, increased interest from China, and lack of resources for many United
Nations organizations that work directly with developing countries (i.e. the World Health
Organization). All of these issues are combining to cause decreases in aid to developing
countries, however, this need not be the case if developed countries would further focus their aid
packages.
To begin with, developed countries need to take research such as the work presented here
into consideration when investing in developing countries or sending aid. Aid and investments
that aim at increasing living standards as well as increasing economic output, should also focus
on good governance. In the past we often witnessed good governance initiatives focus strictly
on deregulation of the economy, the elimination of corruption, and the independence of central
banks. Judicial independence is be just as important if donor countries want to see stable
democracies in developing areas.
However, these investments and aid packages should not have “strings attacked” like the
Washington Consensus Era structural adjustment agreements that required rapid liberalization of
the political and economic systems at once (the implementation of which was only face-value
and the results were largely horrible because donors did not care so much about the actual
political liberalization as long as economic liberalization took place and they gained access to the
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developing countries’ markets). This process will take time, and setting up independent courts
should take precedent over rapid political development. Nor should these new investments and
aid packages have strings attacked like what China is doing at the moment with the 1-Belt 1Road Initiative.
An example case of China’s new lending policies would be that of Sri Lanka. China has
provided a 99-year loan repayment plan to Sri Lanka for the building of a major port in the
country. The potential for economic prosperity from this port is massive. However, China
insisted that all workers that build the port, be Chinese (so no Sri Lankans benefit directly from
the building process or work created from the infrastructure project). Additionally, and in a
horrible catch-22 in my opinion, the agreement states that if Sri Lanka does not pay back the loan
in 99-years that the entire port, and the land it rests on, becomes China. I phrase it this way
deliberately. China does not gain control of the port, the port and the land become part of
sovereign Chinese territory. China is playing the long game right now in global economics, and
this is an example of predatory lending at the highest level. The assumption is that no one in Sri
Lanka today will be alive in 99-years to care what happens, so therefore China believes they can
get away with having such catch-22’s (which they sadly are getting away with).
In reality, there are very few global actors that are helping developing countries in a
clearly positive way that are affecting political and economic development together (the
development of independent judiciaries and equitable economic growth over simply increases in
GDP and regime stability). Developed countries and international organizations can best aid the
development of developing areas by specifically investing in the same areas that I suggest the
countries themselves focus on first. Decreasing the large poverty rates in countries brings new
economic actors into the mix, and provides for a fuller/more comprehensive type of economic
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development in the country (an equitable one). This equitable economic growth that comes from
large-scale poverty reduction provides valuable resources to citizens that they will then use to
push for increased political development (independent judiciaries) and thus the effect of my
interaction term from this dissertation begins inside the countries themselves.
If developed countries do this type of development programs, at the very least they will
reap the economic benefits of having more consumers buy things from their own markets
(because we cannot be wholly idealist in this conclusion chapter, developed countries will
always want to make a profit). The idea here is that developed countries need to realize that they
can still profit, but at the same time truly help developing areas create a more prosperous
political and economic environment that will increase democracy and human rights across the
globe. In the following section, I address what the future holds for me as far as research
possibilities, as well as what the future holds for the world at large.
What does the future hold?
In the future, if I were able to create a “mirrored” dataset for the aggregate-level and the
individual-level, then I would no longer have to worry about the argument of ecological fallacy
and I could show that my theory holds true at both levels of analysis across the globe. My goals
after this dissertation is to:
1) create a full dataset of individual-level data including every country in the world in order
to run my model on the entire planet
2) use that dataset to run my model on every individual country on the entire planet
3) create a full dataset of aggregate-level data including every country in the world in order
to run my model on the entire planet
Having these types of data would allow me maximum generalizability in my theory, in
addition to many other theories could be tested via these datasets as well. In short, having such
datasets would aid the field of comparative politics and our ability to create and quantitatively
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test theories to increase our generalizability as a field. I do realize; however, this is quite a big
goal/dream.
I do have a dream though, and I end this dissertation by telling it. It relates to a statistic I
first reported in the introduction. Right now, Freedom House tells us that 46% of the countries
in the world are considered “Free”. Fantastic, this only means that 54% of the countries in the
world are considered either “Partly Free” or “Not Free”. In short, there is still much work to be
done. No democracy today is perfect. As the United States marks its 100th year anniversary of
women taking their right to vote for themselves, as civil unrest and violence manifests in our
country, we are surely reminded that there is much work to be done in every country.
For the 15th-year straight Freedom House has reported global-declines in civil liberties
and civil rights. China has increasingly made Democratic Hong Kong part of its authoritariancontinent with the introduction of their new Security Law this summer. In Belarus, President
Lukashenko has ‘stolen’ another election and continues to suppress pro-democracy protesters (no
democratic election for a president wins with 99% of the vote). Egypt, a promising star of the
Arab Spring, has seen the military leader of the coup be elected to the presidency twice now,
winning with 97% of the vote in the last election. Thailand, as previously mentioned, has a
former coup leader as the prime minister of a “democratically” elected government. Poland’s far
right Law and Justice Party continues to promote anti-LGBTQ sentiment in the population by
allowing localities in the country to declare themselves “LGBT-Free Ideology Zones”. The
Hungarian government has become increasingly hostile to media in the country. The European
Union, a beacon of Western democracy and cooperation at the international level, is on its 4thyear of dealing with Brexit. The list truly goes on and on. We all get the point. There is so
much work to be done in every country at this moment in the world.
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But some countries are doing far better than others, and my work is concerned with the
54% of the countries in the world that are partly-free or not free, and the 2/3 of the global
population that are underdeveloped in ways most people would not like to think about (and in
fact actively ignore). My dream is no less than helping the people of the world fulfill their full
potential, to live happy, free, and equal, no matter where they are today. This is indeed an
idealist’s dissertation, but everyone needs a dream, and mine is to help others across the world
achieve theirs.
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Appendices
Appendix Chapter 2
Table 2.1: Defining and Expanding Democracy

Schumpeter (1950) – Democracy defined

“Institutional arrangement for arriving at the
political decisions in which individuals
acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people’s vote”
(pg. 260)

Dahl (1972) - Three necessary conditions for
democracy

4. The public possesses the ability to
formulate preferences
5. The public possesses the ability to
signify those preferences to each other
as well as to the state via individualaction and collective-action
6. The government weighs the
preferences of the public equally and
without discrimination of the source
of content (pg. 2)

Dahl (1972) – Eight guarantees needed to
fulfill conditions for
democracy

9. Freedom to form and join
organizations
10. Freedom of expression
11. Right to vote
12. Universal eligibility for public office
13. Right of political leaders to compete
for support
14. Freedom of the press and alternative
information
15. Free and fair elections
16. Institutions for making government
policies must depend on votes and
other expressions of preferences (pg.
3)

Huntington (1991) – Democracy defined

Country is democratic if “its most powerful
collective decision-makers are selected
through fair, honest and periodic elections in
which candidates freely compete for votes,
and in which virtually all the adult population
is eligible to vote” (pg. 7-8)

Schmitter and Karl (1991) – Three additional
conditions

4. Democracy as a regime type that holds
government accountable for their
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actions by the public who elect the
governors
5. Popularly elected officials possess the
ability to function without unelected
officials impeding
6. There exists no overarching political
system that keeps the state from selfgoverning
Sen (1999) – Democracy broadened

A universal value, not restricted by region,
culture or type of civilization; that includes an
intrinsic importance of human life

Diamond (2003) – Democracy broadened

Must possess free and fair elections but must
also contain multiple political parties

Kopstein and Lichbach (2005) – Democracy
broadened

Rule of law must be implemented whereby
citizens can hold the state accountable and
government officials are equal under the law
as every other citizen

Payne and Nassar (2012) – Democracy
broadened

“A system of government in which the
majority rules but minority rights are
protected” (pg. 170)

Moller and Skaaning (2013) - Democracy
quantified

5. Minimalists -regular elections take
place with uncertain outcomes
6. Electoral - minimalist with a high
level of electoral integrity
7. Polyarchy – previous two plus
freedom of association and press
8. Liberal – previous three plus equality
before and under the law

Table 2.2: Democratization and Consolidation

Ishiyama (2012) – Democratization

Democratization is “the process by which the
rule of law, elections and leadership
accountability is established, and where civil
society develops” (pg. 30)

Diamond (1994) – Democratic consolidation
and determining consolidation

Consolidated democracy is when “democracy
becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate
among its citizens that it is very unlikely to
break down” and that “this normalization
requires the expansion of citizens’ access,
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development of democratic citizenship and
culture, broadening of leadership recruitment
and training, and other functions that civil
society performs” (pg. 15)
Beetham (1994) – Determining consolidation

Transfer of power test – when the first
democratically elected government loses in
the following election and gives power to the
new democratically elected government
Simple longevity test – when free and fair
elections continue to take place for an
elongated period of time (i.e. 20 years)
Democratization is always and everywhere a
continuing process

Table 2.3: Democratic Survival
Huntington (1991)

Lack of international wars (i.e. WWI/II)

Bunce (2003)

Rapid mass mobilization leads to rapid
democratic consolidation which increases the
chance of democratic survival

Svolik (2008)

Consolidated democracies possess a greater
survivability rate than transitional
democracies; increasing age of democracy
increases survivability.
Low economic development, presidential
systems, and countries with experiences in
military-authoritarian regimes possess a lower
likelihood of consolidation, and thereby the
chance for survival decreases.

Sing (2010)

Ineffective legislatures threaten democratic
survival

Gazibo (2005)

Foreign aid during economic crisis increases
survivability

Rustow (1970)

Politicians protecting democratic norms and
values, social and political structures (i.e.
conflict resolution procedures), favorable
economic conditions
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Mousseau (2000)

Market economy produces values and norms
that reinforce democratic norms and values

Table 2.4: Democratic Backsliding

Tieku (2009) – International organizations

African Union promotes democracy,
however, mixed record of success. Unable to
prevent/stop leaders from taking advantage of
executive offices and consolidating power in
themselves; some success in dealing with
coup-makers. Ability of international
organization to deal with authoritarianism
depends on the power the organization has
over member countries.

Huntington (1996) – Culture matters

Confucian and Islamic cultures around the
globe do not possess the norms of tolerance
and equality that the Christian cultures do,
and thereby Confucian and Islamic countries
are more likely to backslide

Lijphart (1991) – Strength of political
institutions

Too weak of legislature allows for executives
to consolidate power and slide away from
democracy; parliamentary systems better
protect against this because executive is tied
to legislature

Goldstone et al. (2010) – Power of institutions Demography, economic conditions, and
geography do not predict political instability,
rather strength and design of political
institutions
Kapstein and Converse (2008) – Power of
institutions

Ineffective constraints on executive power
leads to democratic backsliding

160

Appendix Chapter 3
Figure 3.1: How Judicial Independence and Equitable Economic Growth Affect Democratic Backsliding

Figure 3.2: Explaining the Interactive Effect between Judicial Independence and Equitable Economic
Growth
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Figure 3.3: Countries Included in Wave 6 of WVS Data

1. Algeria
5. Armenia
9. China
13. Ecuador
17. Germany
21. India
25. Jordan
29. Lebanon
33. Morocco

2. Azerbaijan
6. Brazil
10. Taiwan
14. Estonia
18. Ghana
22. Iraq
26. South Korea
30. Libya
34. Netherlands

37. Pakistan
41. Qatar
45. Singapore

38. Peru
42. Romania
46. Slovenia

49. Sweden

50. Taiwan

3. Argentina
7. Belarus
11. Colombia
15. Georgia
19. Haiti
23. Japan
27. Kuwait
31. Malaysia
35. New
Zealand
39. Philippines
43. Russia
47. South
Africa
51. Thailand

53. Tunisia

54. Turkey

55. Ukraine

57. Uruguay

58. Uzbekistan

59. Yemen

4. Australia
8. Chile
12. Cyprus
16. Palestine
20. Hong Kong
24. Kazakhstan
28. Kyrgyzstan
32. Mexico
36. Nigeria
40. Poland
44. Rwanda
48. Spain
52. Trinidad and
Tobago
56. United
States
60. Zimbabwe

Table 3.1: Coding of Variables by WVS

How democratic is your country
(dependent variable)

a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is
“not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is
“completely democratic”
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Confidence in the courts
(independent variable)
People’s belief that wealth grows and there’s
enough for everyone
(independent variable)
Age
(control variable)
Sex
(control variable)
Education
(control variable)

Interest in politics
(control variable)
Confidence in the press
(control variable)

1 is a great deal of confidence, 2 quite a lot of
confidence, 3 not very much confidence, or 4
none at all
coded as 1 = “people can only get rich at the
expense of others”, and the statement coded
as 10 = “wealth can grow so there’s enough
for everyone.”
number of years
coded as 1=male and 2=female; based on
surveyor’s observation
1.- No formal education 2.- Incomplete
primary school 3.- Complete primary school
4.- Incomplete secondary school: technical/
vocational type 5.- Complete secondary
school: technical/ vocational type 6.Incomplete secondary school: universitypreparatory type 7.- Complete secondary
school: university-preparatory type 8.- Some
university-level education, without degree 9.University - level education, with degree
1.- Very interested 2.- Somewhat interested
3.- Not very interested 4.- Not at all interested
1.- A great deal 2.- Quite a lot 3.- Not very
much 4.- None at all.”

Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P.
Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014.
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Appendix Chapter 4
Table 4.1: The Judiciary and Democracy: Concepts, Theories and Findings
Curtis (1977) – Purpose of judiciary
Interpreting laws, imposing proper penalties
to individuals who break those laws, securing
citizens civil rights and civil liberties, making
sure that citizens do not use their rights and
liberties to take away those of their fellow
citizens, and to settle disputes among citizens,
citizens and the state, and state institutions
against other state institutions
Ishiyama (2012) – Judicial independence

“the extent to which the judicial authorities
are shielded and independent from other
political actors” (pg. 203)

Shapiro (1981) – Functions of the courts

4) Conflict resolution
5) Social control
6) The making of laws

Payne and Nassar (2012) – Responsibilities of “ensuring that the laws are fair and that
courts
individuals’ rights are protected” and that the
rule of law is enforced and all are “treated
equally under the law” (pg. 175)
Ishiyama (2012) – Rule of law in new
democracies

3) Following the law signifies a clear
break from the authoritarian past and
demonstrates to the populace the
transition of regime and the
government’s dedication to democracy
4) It begins the development of
democratic political norms and values
that teach government officials that
‘the legal bounds of the political
system cannot be ignored’ for
individual, family, friend, or partisan
political gains (pg. 206)

Kapstein and Converse (2008) – Judiciary
and executive
interaction

The best way to limit democratic backsliding
is through constraints on the executive, and
the best way to limit executive power is
through judicial independence

Gibler and Randazzo (2012) – Stopping
backsliding

Newly formed courts increase chance of
regime change, but established independent
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judiciaries decrease the probability of
democratic backsliding

Figure 4.1: Countries Included in Wave 6

Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E.
Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014

1. Algeria
5. Armenia
9. China
13. Ecuador
17. Germany
21. India
25. Jordan
29. Lebanon
33. Morocco

2. Azerbaijan
6. Brazil
10. Taiwan
14. Estonia
18. Ghana
22. Iraq
26. South Korea
30. Libya
34. Netherlands

37. Pakistan
41. Qatar
45. Singapore

38. Peru
42. Romania
46. Slovenia

49. Sweden

50. Taiwan

3. Argentina
7. Belarus
11. Colombia
15. Georgia
19. Haiti
23. Japan
27. Kuwait
31. Malaysia
35. New
Zealand
39. Philippines
43. Russia
47. South
Africa
51. Thailand

53. Tunisia

54. Turkey

55. Ukraine

57. Uruguay

58. Uzbekistan

59. Yemen
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4. Australia
8. Chile
12. Cyprus
16. Palestine
20. Hong Kong
24. Kazakhstan
28. Kyrgyzstan
32. Mexico
36. Nigeria
40. Poland
44. Rwanda
48. Spain
52. Trinidad and
Tobago
56. United
States
60. Zimbabwe

Table 4.2: Coding of Variables

How democratic is your country
(dependent variable)
Confidence in the courts
(independent variable)

Age
(control variable)
Sex
(control variable)
Education
(control variable)

Interest in politics
(control variable)

Confidence in the press
(control variable)

scale 1 to 10;
1 means that it is “not at all democratic”
10 means that it is “completely democratic”
4 is a great deal of confidence
3 quite a lot of confidence
2 not very much confidence
1 none at all
number of years
1=male
2=female
based on surveyor’s observation
1. No formal education
2. Incomplete primary school
3. Complete primary school
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/
vocational type
5. Complete secondary school: technical/
vocational type
6. Incomplete secondary school: universitypreparatory type
7. Complete secondary school: universitypreparatory type
8. Some university-level education, without
degree
9. University - level education, with degree
4. Very interested
3. Somewhat interested
2. Not very interested
1. Not at all interested
4. A great deal
3. Quite a lot
2. Not very much
1. None at all

Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E.
Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014.
Note: confidence in courts, confidence in press, & interest in politics were recoded in the opposite directions to
illustrate positive relationships in my models.
Summary statistics and tabulations of each variable appear in Appendix Chapter 4 under Table 4.2.

Summary/Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Table 4.2
Note: The Income Scale variable is included here as it is relevant in my alternative explanations
section of chapter 4.
Variable: Confidence in courts
Variable |
Obs.
Mean

Std. Dev.
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Min

Max

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Courts
|
86,227 2.571167 .9471579
1
4

Courts | Freq.
Percent
Cum.
-----------------------------------------------1 | 12,997
15.07
15.07
2 | 26,103
30.27
45.35
3 | 32,007
37.12
82.46
4 | 15,120
17.54
100.00
-----------------------------------------------Total | 86,227
100.00

Variable: How democratic is your country
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Democracy | 82,553 5.997444 2.535919
1
10

Democracy|
Freq. Percent
Cum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Not at all democratic 1| 6,372
7.72
7.72
2 | 3,243
3.93
11.65
3 | 5,215
6.32
17.96
4 | 6,118
7.41
25.38
5 | 12,575
15.23
40.61
6 | 10,723
12.99
53.60
7 | 12,579
15.24
68.83
8 | 12,192
14.77
83.60
9 | 6,030
7.30
90.91
Completely democratic10 | 7,506
9.09
100.00
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Total | 82,553 100.00

Variable: Age
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Age | 89,382 41.93813 16.55229
16
102
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Age | Freq. Percent
Cum.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------16 |
37
0.04
0.04
17 |
56
0.06
0.10
18 |
2,062
2.31
2.41
19 |
1,999
2.24
4.65
20 |
2,252
2.52
7.17
21 |
1,981
2.22
9.38
22 |
2,147
2.40
11.79
23 |
2,309
2.58
14.37
24 |
2,215
2.48
16.85
25 |
2,383
2.67
19.51
26 |
2,112
2.36
21.88
27 |
2,069
2.31
24.19
28 |
2,064
2.31
26.50
29 |
1,911
2.14
28.64
30 |
2,362
2.64
31.28
31 |
1,886
2.11
33.39
32 |
1,983
2.22
35.61
33 |
1,787
2.00
37.61
34 |
1,660
1.86
39.47
35 |
2,092
2.34
41.81
36 |
1,815
2.03
43.84
37 |
1,633
1.83
45.66
38 |
1,804
2.02
47.68
39 |
1,606
1.80
49.48
40 |
2,125
2.38
51.86
41 |
1,532
1.71
53.57
42 |
1,821
2.04
55.61
43 |
1,604
1.79
57.40
44 |
1,511
1.69
59.09
45 |
1,854
2.07
61.17
46 |
1,524
1.71
62.87
47 |
1,494
1.67
64.54
48 |
1,438
1.61
66.15
49 |
1,414
1.58
67.73
50 |
1,805
2.02
69.75
51 |
1,373
1.54
71.29
52 |
1,463
1.64
72.93
53 |
1,231
1.38
74.30
54 |
1,288
1.44
75.74
55 |
1,486
1.66
77.41
56 |
1,220
1.36
78.77
57 |
1,147
1.28
80.06
58 |
1,213
1.36
81.41
59 |
967
1.08
82.49
168

60 |
1,404
1.57
84.07
61 |
993
1.11
85.18
62 |
1,157
1.29
86.47
63 |
1,008
1.13
87.60
64 |
898
1.00
88.60
65 |
1,023
1.14
89.75
66 |
822
0.92
90.67
67 |
675
0.76
91.42
68 |
723
0.81
92.23
69 |
602
0.67
92.90
70 |
839
0.94
93.84
71 |
560
0.63
94.47
72 |
647
0.72
95.19
73 |
597
0.67
95.86
74 |
511
0.57
96.43
75 |
488
0.55
96.98
76 |
432
0.48
97.46
77 |
363
0.41
97.87
78 |
297
0.33
98.20
79 |
257
0.29
98.49
80 |
262
0.29
98.78
81 |
232
0.26
99.04
82 |
173
0.19
99.23
83 |
164
0.18
99.42
84 |
153
0.17
99.59
85 |
137
0.15
99.74
86 |
48
0.05
99.80
87 |
42
0.05
99.84
88 |
33
0.04
99.88
89 |
40
0.04
99.93
90 |
16
0.02
99.94
91 |
11
0.01
99.96
92 |
11
0.01
99.97
93 |
12
0.01
99.98
94 |
5
0.01
99.99
95 |
4
0.00
99.99
97 |
2
0.00
99.99
98 |
3
0.00
100.00
99 |
2
0.00
100.00
102 |
1
0.00
100.00
-------------------------------------------------------------------------Total | 89,382 100.00

Variable: Sex
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Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sex | 89,474
1.522509 .4994959
1
2

Sex | Freq. Percent
Cum.
-------------------------------------------------------1 | 42,723
47.75
47.75
2 | 46,751
52.25
100.00
-------------------------------------------------------Total | 89,474
100.00

Variable: Education
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
------------------------------------------------------------------------------Education | 88,766 5.650294 2.421468
1
9

Highest educational level attained | Freq. Percent
Cum.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------No formal education-1 | 5,431
6.12
6.12
Incomplete primary school | 5,094
5.74
11.86
Complete primary school | 9,739
10.97
22.83
Incomplete secondary school: tech./voc.-prep | 6,712
7.56
30.39
Complete secondary school: tech./voc.-prep | 16,716
18.83
49.22
Incomplete secondary school: uni-prep | 7,137
8.04
57.26
Complete secondary school: uni-prep | 15,614
17.59
74.85
Some university, without degree- 8 | 6,737
7.59
82.44
University, with degree- 9 | 15,586
17.56
100.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total | 88,766
100.00

Variable: Interest in politics
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Int. in Pol. | 88,568 2.360119 .9761053
1
4

Int. in Pol. |
Freq. Percent
Cum.
-------------------------------------------------1|
20,661
23.33
23.33
2|
26,678
30.12
53.45
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3|
29,902
33.76
87.21
4|
11,327
12.79
100.00
-------------------------------------------------Total |
88,568 100.00

Variable: Confidence in press
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Press | 86,782 2.386059 .8743884
1
4

Press |
Freq. Percent
Cum.
-----------------------------------------------1 | 13,806
15.91
15.91
2 | 34,751
40.04
55.95
3 | 29,141
33.58
89.53
4 | 9,084
10.47
100.00
-----------------------------------------------Total | 86,782
100.00

Variable: Income scale
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Income |
86,311
4.825017
2.109361
1
10

Scale of incomes | Freq. Percent
Cum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Lower step-1 | 7,013
8.13
8.13
Second step | 6,390
7.40
15.53
Third step | 10,106
11.71
27.24
Fourth step
| 11,916
13.81
41.04
Fifth step
| 18,562
21.51
62.55
Sixth step
| 13,250
15.35
77.90
Seventh step | 10,370
12.01
89.92
Eighth step
| 5,825
6.75
96.66
Nineth Step | 1,613
1.87
98.53
Tenth step-10 | 1,266
1.47
100.00
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Total
| 86,311 100.00
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Table 4.3: People’s Confidence in Courts affecting Views on how Democratic the Country is
being Run (OLS Regression Analysis)
Standardized
Coefficients
p-values
Beta Coefficients
Confidence in
Courts
.501***
.001
.185
Age

.006***

.001

.037

Sex

.052***

.001

.01

Education

.01***

.001

.01

Interest in Politics

.084***

.001

.032

Confidence in Press

.283***

.001

.097

Constant

3.47***

.001

N

77,974

R-squared

.0609

Adjusted R-squared

.0608

***=99%, **=95%,
*=90%

Table 4.4: Effect of 1-Unit Rise in Confidence of Courts on Belief Country is being Run
Democratically
Variables
Beginning of
1-unit change in 2nd-unit change
3rd-unit change
coding scale
Confidence in
in Confidence in in Confidence in
Courts
Courts
Courts
Confidence in
courts
1→
2→
3→
4
OLS Coefficient
(.501)
Std. Err.
(.0101)

Belief country is
democratic

1

1.501
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2.002

2.503

Figure 4.2:

1-Unit Change in Confidence in Courts on Belief Country is
Democratic
Democracy Mean

Mean -1 Std.Dev.

Mean +1 Std.Dev.

12

Democracy Scale

10
8
6
4
2
0
1

2

3

4

Confidence in Courts

Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics on How Democratic is Your Country being Governed
Democracy Variable
Means Value
Standard Deviation Value
Scale 1-10
5.997
2.536

Table 4.6: 1-Unit Change in Confidence in Courts on Belief Country is Democratic
Confidence
in
Courts

Starting at -1
Starting at Mean
Starting at +1
Standard
Value of
Standard
Deviation of
Democracy
Deviation of
Democracy Mean
Democracy Mean

1

3.467

5.997

8.533

2

3.968

6.498

9.034

3

4.469

6.999

9.535

4

4.97

7.5

10.036
(democracy scale
maxes out at 10)

Note: This is the data/table format of Figure 4.2. Coefficient of Confidence in Courts=.501.
Democracy scale= 1-10.
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Pearson Correlation Tests
Variables: Democracy & Courts
(Obs.= 80,269)
| Democracy Courts
------------------------------------------Democracy | 1.0000
Courts
| 0.2213
1.0000

Variables: Education & Income
(Obs.= 85,676)
| Education Income
-------------------------------------------Education
| 1.0000
Income
| 0.2642
1.0000

Alternative Explanations Model: Decision to Drop Income (flips education direction)
Confidence in Courts

.465***

Age

.007***

Sex

.054**

Education

-.03***

Interest in Politics

.067***

Confidence in Press

.277***

Income

.165***

Constant

3.03***

N

75,945

R-squared

.0775

Adjusted R-squared

.0774

***=99%, **=95%, *=90%
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Alternative Explanations Model: Adding Media Consumption Control Variables
Confidence in Courts

.501***

Age

.003***

Sex

.084***

Education

-.01***

Interest in Politics

.047***

Confidence in Press

.278***

Newspaper Consumption

-.117***

TV News Consumption

-.046***

Radio News Consumption

-.04***

Internet News Consumption

-.03***

Constant

3.47***

N

73,959

R-squared

.0726

Adjusted R-squared

.0725

***=99%, **=95%, *=90%
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Appendix Chapter 5
Table 5.1: Economics Affecting Democracy: Summary of Theories and Findings
Ishiyama (2012)
Wealthier states in comparison to poorer and
developing states have a far easier road to
democracy
Beetham (1994)

Economic development greatly aids in the
sustainability of democracy, though we see
cases of rich countries not democratizing and
poor countries democratizing

Diamond (1990)

Economic development can lead to economic
inclusion, and in some cases this inclusion has
led to political inclusion and further
democratization

Epstein et al. (2006)

Increases in GDP/economic growth were
related to an increased probability in
becoming a democracy, and increases in
economic growth led to a decrease in
democratic backsliding

Bergesen (1992)

New/transitional democracies that are
economically developing are severally
susceptible to economic crisis that can greatly
increase the chance for democratic
backsliding

Svolik (2008)

New democracies that are considered
consolidated are still susceptible to
democratic backsliding during economic
recession/crisis

Maeda (2010)

New democracies that experience economic
hardships are at greater risk of military coups
and democratic leaders suspending democracy
in a country

Burke and Leigh (2010)

More rapid economic growth decreases the
likelihood of regime change toward
democratization in the short run

Kapstein and Converse (2008)

Most democratic transitions that have not
suffered setbacks happen in countries with per
capita income of $2,618 US dollars or more;
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in places where economic growth took place
and backsliding occurred the country had
relatively higher rates of infant mortality and
higher poverty rates
Tilly (2003)

Democracy is built on equality, and when
citizens see unequal distribution of economic
growth, this threatens the democratic regime

Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek (2007)

Countries where regressive socio-economic
distribution takes place possess a higher
likelihood of democratic backsliding and
regime reversal

Figure 5.1: Countries Included in Wave 6

Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E.
Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014

1. Algeria
5. Armenia
9. China
13. Ecuador
17. Germany
21. India
25. Jordan
29. Lebanon

2. Azerbaijan
6. Brazil
10. Taiwan
14. Estonia
18. Ghana
22. Iraq
26. South Korea
30. Libya
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3. Argentina
7. Belarus
11. Colombia
15. Georgia
19. Haiti
23. Japan
27. Kuwait
31. Malaysia

4. Australia
8. Chile
12. Cyprus
16. Palestine
20. Hong Kong
24. Kazakhstan
28. Kyrgyzstan
32. Mexico

33. Morocco

34. Netherlands

37. Pakistan
41. Qatar
45. Singapore

38. Peru
42. Romania
46. Slovenia

49. Sweden

50. Taiwan

35. New
Zealand
39. Philippines
43. Russia
47. South
Africa
51. Thailand

53. Tunisia

54. Turkey

55. Ukraine

57. Uruguay

58. Uzbekistan

59. Yemen

36. Nigeria
40. Poland
44. Rwanda
48. Spain
52. Trinidad and
Tobago
56. United
States
60. Zimbabwe

Table 5.2: Coding of Variables

How democratic is your country
(dependent variable)
People’s belief that wealth grows and there’s
enough for everyone
(independent variable)
Confidence in the courts
(independent variable)

Age
(control variable)
Sex
(control variable)
Education
(control variable)

Interest in politics
(control variable)

scale 1 to 10;
1 means that it is “not at all democratic”
10 means that it is “completely democratic”
coded as 1 = “people can only get rich at the
expense of others”, and the statement coded
as 10 = “wealth can grow so there’s enough
for everyone.”
4 is a great deal of confidence
3 quite a lot of confidence
2 not very much confidence
1 none at all
number of years
1=male
2=female
based on surveyor’s observation
1. No formal education
2. Incomplete primary school
3. Complete primary school
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/
vocational type
5. Complete secondary school: technical/
vocational type
6. Incomplete secondary school: universitypreparatory type
7. Complete secondary school: universitypreparatory type
8. Some university-level education, without
degree
9. University - level education, with degree
4. Very interested
3. Somewhat interested
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2. Not very interested
1. Not at all interested
4. A great deal
3. Quite a lot
2. Not very much
1. None at all

Confidence in the press
(control variable)

Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E.
Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014.
Note: confidence in courts, confidence in press, & interest in politics were recoded in the opposite directions to
illustrate positive relationships in my models.
Summary statistics and tabulations of each variable appear in Appendix Chapter 5 under Table 5.2.

Summary/Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Table 5.2
Note: The Income Scale variable is included here as it is relevant in my alternative explanations
section of chapter 5.

Variable: Equitable economic growth possible
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Economic Growth | 84,963 6.237645 2.78805
1
10

Economic Growth | Freq. Percent
Cum.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------People can only get rich at the expense of others - 1 | 8,008
9.43
9.43
2 | 2,971
3.50
12.92
3 | 4,865
5.73
18.65
4 | 5,001
5.89
24.53
5 | 12,778
15.04
39.57
6 | 8,742
10.29
49.86
7 | 10,706
12.60
62.46
8 | 10,717
12.61
75.08
9 | 7,350
8.65
83.73
Wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone- 10 | 13,825
16.27
100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total | 84,963
100.00

Variable: Confidence in courts
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Courts
|
86,227 2.571167 .9471579
1
4

Courts |

Freq.

Percent

Cum.
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-----------------------------------------------1 | 12,997
15.07
15.07
2 | 26,103
30.27
45.35
3 | 32,007
37.12
82.46
4 | 15,120
17.54
100.00
-----------------------------------------------Total | 86,227
100.00

Variable: How democratic is your country
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Democracy | 82,553 5.997444 2.535919
1
10

Democracy|
Freq. Percent
Cum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Not at all democratic 1| 6,372
7.72
7.72
2 | 3,243
3.93
11.65
3 | 5,215
6.32
17.96
4 | 6,118
7.41
25.38
5 | 12,575
15.23
40.61
6 | 10,723
12.99
53.60
7 | 12,579
15.24
68.83
8 | 12,192
14.77
83.60
9 | 6,030
7.30
90.91
Completely democratic10 | 7,506
9.09
100.00
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Total | 82,553 100.00

Variable: Age
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Age | 89,382 41.93813 16.55229
16
102

Age | Freq. Percent
Cum.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------16 |
37
0.04
0.04
17 |
56
0.06
0.10
18 |
2,062
2.31
2.41
19 |
1,999
2.24
4.65
20 |
2,252
2.52
7.17
21 |
1,981
2.22
9.38
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22 |
23 |
24 |
25 |
26 |
27 |
28 |
29 |
30 |
31 |
32 |
33 |
34 |
35 |
36 |
37 |
38 |
39 |
40 |
41 |
42 |
43 |
44 |
45 |
46 |
47 |
48 |
49 |
50 |
51 |
52 |
53 |
54 |
55 |
56 |
57 |
58 |
59 |
60 |
61 |
62 |
63 |
64 |
65 |
66 |
67 |

2,147
2,309
2,215
2,383
2,112
2,069
2,064
1,911
2,362
1,886
1,983
1,787
1,660
2,092
1,815
1,633
1,804
1,606
2,125
1,532
1,821
1,604
1,511
1,854
1,524
1,494
1,438
1,414
1,805
1,373
1,463
1,231
1,288
1,486
1,220
1,147
1,213
967
1,404
993
1,157
1,008
898
1,023
822
675

2.40
2.58
2.48
2.67
2.36
2.31
2.31
2.14
2.64
2.11
2.22
2.00
1.86
2.34
2.03
1.83
2.02
1.80
2.38
1.71
2.04
1.79
1.69
2.07
1.71
1.67
1.61
1.58
2.02
1.54
1.64
1.38
1.44
1.66
1.36
1.28
1.36
1.08
1.57
1.11
1.29
1.13
1.00
1.14
0.92
0.76

11.79
14.37
16.85
19.51
21.88
24.19
26.50
28.64
31.28
33.39
35.61
37.61
39.47
41.81
43.84
45.66
47.68
49.48
51.86
53.57
55.61
57.40
59.09
61.17
62.87
64.54
66.15
67.73
69.75
71.29
72.93
74.30
75.74
77.41
78.77
80.06
81.41
82.49
84.07
85.18
86.47
87.60
88.60
89.75
90.67
91.42
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68 |
723
0.81
92.23
69 |
602
0.67
92.90
70 |
839
0.94
93.84
71 |
560
0.63
94.47
72 |
647
0.72
95.19
73 |
597
0.67
95.86
74 |
511
0.57
96.43
75 |
488
0.55
96.98
76 |
432
0.48
97.46
77 |
363
0.41
97.87
78 |
297
0.33
98.20
79 |
257
0.29
98.49
80 |
262
0.29
98.78
81 |
232
0.26
99.04
82 |
173
0.19
99.23
83 |
164
0.18
99.42
84 |
153
0.17
99.59
85 |
137
0.15
99.74
86 |
48
0.05
99.80
87 |
42
0.05
99.84
88 |
33
0.04
99.88
89 |
40
0.04
99.93
90 |
16
0.02
99.94
91 |
11
0.01
99.96
92 |
11
0.01
99.97
93 |
12
0.01
99.98
94 |
5
0.01
99.99
95 |
4
0.00
99.99
97 |
2
0.00
99.99
98 |
3
0.00
100.00
99 |
2
0.00
100.00
102 |
1
0.00
100.00
-------------------------------------------------------------------------Total | 89,382 100.00

Variable: Sex
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sex | 89,474
1.522509 .4994959
1
2

Sex | Freq. Percent
Cum.
-------------------------------------------------------1 | 42,723
47.75
47.75
2 | 46,751
52.25
100.00
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-------------------------------------------------------Total | 89,474
100.00

Variable: Education
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
------------------------------------------------------------------------------Education | 88,766 5.650294 2.421468
1
9

Highest educational level attained | Freq. Percent
Cum.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------No formal education-1 | 5,431
6.12
6.12
Incomplete primary school | 5,094
5.74
11.86
Complete primary school | 9,739
10.97
22.83
Incomplete secondary school: tech./voc.-prep | 6,712
7.56
30.39
Complete secondary school: tech./voc.-prep | 16,716
18.83
49.22
Incomplete secondary school: uni-prep | 7,137
8.04
57.26
Complete secondary school: uni-prep | 15,614
17.59
74.85
Some university, without degree- 8 | 6,737
7.59
82.44
University, with degree- 9 | 15,586
17.56
100.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total | 88,766
100.00

Variable: Interest in politics
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Int. in Pol. | 88,568 2.360119 .9761053
1
4

Int. in Pol. |
Freq. Percent
Cum.
-------------------------------------------------1|
20,661
23.33
23.33
2|
26,678
30.12
53.45
3|
29,902
33.76
87.21
4|
11,327
12.79
100.00
-------------------------------------------------Total |
88,568 100.00

Variable: Confidence in press
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Press | 86,782 2.386059 .8743884
1
4
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Press |
Freq. Percent
Cum.
-----------------------------------------------1 | 13,806
15.91
15.91
2 | 34,751
40.04
55.95
3 | 29,141
33.58
89.53
4 | 9,084
10.47
100.00
-----------------------------------------------Total | 86,782
100.00

Variable: Income scale
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Income |
86,311
4.825017
2.109361
1
10

Scale of incomes | Freq. Percent
Cum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Lower step-1 | 7,013
8.13
8.13
Second step | 6,390
7.40
15.53
Third step | 10,106
11.71
27.24
Fourth step
| 11,916
13.81
41.04
Fifth step
| 18,562
21.51
62.55
Sixth step
| 13,250
15.35
77.90
Seventh step | 10,370
12.01
89.92
Eighth step
| 5,825
6.75
96.66
Nineth Step | 1,613
1.87
98.53
Tenth step-10 | 1,266
1.47
100.00
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Total
| 86,311 100.00
Table 5.3: People’s Belief about Equitable Economic Growth Affecting Views on How
Democratic the Country is being Run
(OLS Regression Analysis)
People’s Belief about
Equitable Economic Growth
.071***
Confidence in Courts

.486***

Age

.005***

Sex

.039**

Education

.004
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Interest in Politics

.082***

Confidence in Press

.283***

Constant

3.16***

N

75,533

R-squared

.0660

Adjusted R-squared

.0659

***=99%, **=95%, *=90%
Table 5.4: Effect of 1-Unit Rise in People’s Belief about Equitable Economic Growth on Belief Country is
Democratic

Variables
People’s
believe
about
equitable
economic
change

Beginning 1-unit 2ndunit
of Coding change change
Scale

1→

2→

3→

1

1.071

1.142

3rd

4th

5th

6th

7th

8th

9th

4→

5→

6→

7→

8→

9→

10

OLS
Coefficient
(.071)
Std. Err.
(.003)

Belief
country is
democratic

1.213 1.284 1.355 1.426 1.497 1.568 1.639
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Figure 5.2:

DEMOCRACHY SCALE

1-Unit Change in People's Beliefs in Equitable
Economic Growth on Belief Country is Democratic
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

PEOPLE'S BELIEFS IN EQUITABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH
Mean -1 Std. Dev

Democracy Mean

Mean +1 Std. Dev.

Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics on How Democratic is Your Country Being Governed
Democracy Variable
Means Value
Standard Deviation Value
Scale 1-10
5.997
2.536
Table 5.6: 1-Unit Change in People’s Beliefs in Equitable Economic Growth on Belief Country
is Democratic
Belief in
Mean -1 Democracy Mean +1
Equitable Std. Dev
Mean
Std. Dev.
Economic
Growth
1
3.467
5.997
8.533
2
3.538
6.068
8.604
3
3.609
6.139
8.675
4
3.68
6.21
8.746
5
3.751
6.281
8.817
6
3.822
6.352
8.888
7
3.893
6.423
8.959
8
3.964
6.494
9.03
9
4.035
6.565
9.101
10
4.106
6.639
9.172
Note: This is the data/table format of Figure 5.2. Coefficient of
People’s Beliefs on Equitable Economic Growth=.071.
Democracy scale= 1-10.
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Pearson Correlation Test.
Variables: How democratic is your country and Equitable Economic Growth is Possible
(Obs.= 79,359)
| Democracy Economic Growth
---------------------------------------------------------------Democracy
| 1.0000
Economic Growth | 0.0891
1.0000
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Appendix Chapter 6
Table 6.1: Combining the Courts and Economics in the Democracy Literature
Dahl (1972) - Three necessary conditions for
1. The public possesses the ability to
democracy
formulate preferences
2. The public possesses the ability to
signify those preferences to each other
as well as to the state via individualaction and collective-action
3. The government weighs the
preferences of the public equally and
without discrimination of the source
of content (pg. 2)
Kopstein and Lichbach (2005) – Democracy
broadened

Rule of law must be implemented whereby
citizens can hold the state accountable and
government officials are equal under the law
as every other citizen

Kapstein and Converse (2008) – Power of
institutions

The best way to limit democratic backsliding
is through constraints on the executive, and
the best way to limit executive power is
through judicial independence

Tilly (2003) – Economic equality

Democracy is built on equality, and when
citizens see unequal distribution of economic
growth, this threatens the democratic regime

Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek (2007) – Data
on backsliding and economic equality

Countries where regressive socio-economic
distribution takes place possess a higher
likelihood of democratic backsliding and
regime reversal
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Figure 6.1: Countries Included in Wave 6

Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E.
Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014.

Algeria
Armenia
China
Ecuador
Germany
India
Jordan
Lebanon
Morocco
Pakistan
Qatar
Singapore
Sweden

Azerbaijan
Brazil
Taiwan
Estonia
Ghana
Iraq
South Korea
Libya
Netherlands
Peru
Romania
Slovenia
Taiwan

Argentina
Belarus
Colombia
Georgia
Haiti
Japan
Kuwait
Malaysia
New Zealand
Philippines
Russia
South Africa
Thailand

Tunisia
Uruguay

Turkey
Uzbekistan

Ukraine
Yemen
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Australia
Chile
Cyprus
Palestine
Hong Kong
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Mexico
Nigeria
Poland
Rwanda
Spain
Trinidad and
Tobago
United States
Zimbabwe

Figure 6.2 How Judicial Independence and Equitable Economic Growth Affect Democratic
Backsliding

Figure 6.3: Explaining the Interactive Effect between Judicial Independence and Equitable
Economic Growth
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Table 6.2: Coding of Variables

How democratic is your country
(dependent variable)
People’s belief that wealth grows and there’s
enough for everyone
(independent variable)
Confidence in the courts
(independent variable)

Age
(control variable)
Sex
(control variable)
Education
(control variable)

Interest in politics
(control variable)

Confidence in the press
(control variable)

scale 1 to 10;
1 means that it is “not at all democratic”
10 means that it is “completely democratic”
coded as 1 = “people can only get rich at the
expense of others”, and the statement coded
as 10 = “wealth can grow so there’s enough
for everyone.”
4 is a great deal of confidence
3 quite a lot of confidence
2 not very much confidence
1 none at all
number of years
1=male
2=female
based on surveyor’s observation
1. No formal education
2. Incomplete primary school
3. Complete primary school
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/
vocational type
5. Complete secondary school: technical/
vocational type
6. Incomplete secondary school: universitypreparatory type
7. Complete secondary school: universitypreparatory type
8. Some university-level education, without
degree
9. University - level education, with degree
4. Very interested
3. Somewhat interested
2. Not very interested
1. Not at all interested
4. A great deal
3. Quite a lot
2. Not very much
1. None at all

Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E.
Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. 2014.
Note: confidence in courts, confidence in press, & interest in politics were recoded in the opposite directions to
illustrate positive relationships in my models.
Summary statistics and tabulations of each variable appear in Appendix Chapter 6 under Table 6.2.
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Summary/Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Table 6.2
Note: The Income Scale variable is included here as it is relevant in my alternative explanations
section of chapter 6
Variable: Equitable economic growth possible
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Economic Growth | 84,963 6.237645 2.78805
1
10

Economic Growth | Freq. Percent
Cum.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------People can only get rich at the expense of others - 1 | 8,008
9.43
9.43
2 | 2,971
3.50
12.92
3 | 4,865
5.73
18.65
4 | 5,001
5.89
24.53
5 | 12,778
15.04
39.57
6 | 8,742
10.29
49.86
7 | 10,706
12.60
62.46
8 | 10,717
12.61
75.08
9 | 7,350
8.65
83.73
Wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone- 10 | 13,825
16.27
100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total | 84,963
100.00

Variable: Confidence in courts
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Courts
|
86,227 2.571167 .9471579
1
4

Courts | Freq.
Percent
Cum.
-----------------------------------------------1 | 12,997
15.07
15.07
2 | 26,103
30.27
45.35
3 | 32,007
37.12
82.46
4 | 15,120
17.54
100.00
-----------------------------------------------Total | 86,227
100.00

Variable: How democratic is your country
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
----------------------------------------------------------------------------192

Democracy |

82,553

5.997444

2.535919

1

10

Democracy|
Freq. Percent
Cum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Not at all democratic 1| 6,372
7.72
7.72
2 | 3,243
3.93
11.65
3 | 5,215
6.32
17.96
4 | 6,118
7.41
25.38
5 | 12,575
15.23
40.61
6 | 10,723
12.99
53.60
7 | 12,579
15.24
68.83
8 | 12,192
14.77
83.60
9 | 6,030
7.30
90.91
Completely democratic10 | 7,506
9.09
100.00
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Total | 82,553 100.00

Variable: Age
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Age | 89,382 41.93813 16.55229
16
102

Age | Freq. Percent
Cum.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------16 |
37
0.04
0.04
17 |
56
0.06
0.10
18 |
2,062
2.31
2.41
19 |
1,999
2.24
4.65
20 |
2,252
2.52
7.17
21 |
1,981
2.22
9.38
22 |
2,147
2.40
11.79
23 |
2,309
2.58
14.37
24 |
2,215
2.48
16.85
25 |
2,383
2.67
19.51
26 |
2,112
2.36
21.88
27 |
2,069
2.31
24.19
28 |
2,064
2.31
26.50
29 |
1,911
2.14
28.64
30 |
2,362
2.64
31.28
31 |
1,886
2.11
33.39
32 |
1,983
2.22
35.61
33 |
1,787
2.00
37.61
34 |
1,660
1.86
39.47
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35 |
36 |
37 |
38 |
39 |
40 |
41 |
42 |
43 |
44 |
45 |
46 |
47 |
48 |
49 |
50 |
51 |
52 |
53 |
54 |
55 |
56 |
57 |
58 |
59 |
60 |
61 |
62 |
63 |
64 |
65 |
66 |
67 |
68 |
69 |
70 |
71 |
72 |
73 |
74 |
75 |
76 |
77 |
78 |
79 |
80 |

2,092
1,815
1,633
1,804
1,606
2,125
1,532
1,821
1,604
1,511
1,854
1,524
1,494
1,438
1,414
1,805
1,373
1,463
1,231
1,288
1,486
1,220
1,147
1,213
967
1,404
993
1,157
1,008
898
1,023
822
675
723
602
839
560
647
597
511
488
432
363
297
257
262

2.34
2.03
1.83
2.02
1.80
2.38
1.71
2.04
1.79
1.69
2.07
1.71
1.67
1.61
1.58
2.02
1.54
1.64
1.38
1.44
1.66
1.36
1.28
1.36
1.08
1.57
1.11
1.29
1.13
1.00
1.14
0.92
0.76
0.81
0.67
0.94
0.63
0.72
0.67
0.57
0.55
0.48
0.41
0.33
0.29
0.29

41.81
43.84
45.66
47.68
49.48
51.86
53.57
55.61
57.40
59.09
61.17
62.87
64.54
66.15
67.73
69.75
71.29
72.93
74.30
75.74
77.41
78.77
80.06
81.41
82.49
84.07
85.18
86.47
87.60
88.60
89.75
90.67
91.42
92.23
92.90
93.84
94.47
95.19
95.86
96.43
96.98
97.46
97.87
98.20
98.49
98.78
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81 |
232
0.26
99.04
82 |
173
0.19
99.23
83 |
164
0.18
99.42
84 |
153
0.17
99.59
85 |
137
0.15
99.74
86 |
48
0.05
99.80
87 |
42
0.05
99.84
88 |
33
0.04
99.88
89 |
40
0.04
99.93
90 |
16
0.02
99.94
91 |
11
0.01
99.96
92 |
11
0.01
99.97
93 |
12
0.01
99.98
94 |
5
0.01
99.99
95 |
4
0.00
99.99
97 |
2
0.00
99.99
98 |
3
0.00
100.00
99 |
2
0.00
100.00
102 |
1
0.00
100.00
-------------------------------------------------------------------------Total | 89,382 100.00

Variable: Sex
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sex | 89,474
1.522509 .4994959
1
2

Sex | Freq. Percent
Cum.
-------------------------------------------------------1 | 42,723
47.75
47.75
2 | 46,751
52.25
100.00
-------------------------------------------------------Total | 89,474
100.00

Variable: Education
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
------------------------------------------------------------------------------Education | 88,766 5.650294 2.421468
1
9

Highest educational level attained | Freq. Percent
Cum.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------No formal education-1 | 5,431
6.12
6.12
195

Incomplete primary school | 5,094
5.74
11.86
Complete primary school | 9,739
10.97
22.83
Incomplete secondary school: tech./voc.-prep | 6,712
7.56
30.39
Complete secondary school: tech./voc.-prep | 16,716
18.83
49.22
Incomplete secondary school: uni-prep | 7,137
8.04
57.26
Complete secondary school: uni-prep | 15,614
17.59
74.85
Some university, without degree- 8 | 6,737
7.59
82.44
University, with degree- 9 | 15,586
17.56
100.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total | 88,766
100.00

Variable: Interest in politics
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Int. in Pol. | 88,568 2.360119 .9761053
1
4

Int. in Pol. |
Freq. Percent
Cum.
-------------------------------------------------1|
20,661
23.33
23.33
2|
26,678
30.12
53.45
3|
29,902
33.76
87.21
4|
11,327
12.79
100.00
-------------------------------------------------Total |
88,568 100.00

Variable: Confidence in press
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Press | 86,782 2.386059 .8743884
1
4

Press |
Freq. Percent
Cum.
-----------------------------------------------1 | 13,806
15.91
15.91
2 | 34,751
40.04
55.95
3 | 29,141
33.58
89.53
4 | 9,084
10.47
100.00
-----------------------------------------------Total | 86,782
100.00

Variable: Income scale
Variable |
Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.
196

Min

Max

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Income |
86,311
4.825017
2.109361
1
10

Scale of incomes | Freq. Percent
Cum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Lower step-1 | 7,013
8.13
8.13
Second step | 6,390
7.40
15.53
Third step | 10,106
11.71
27.24
Fourth step
| 11,916
13.81
41.04
Fifth step
| 18,562
21.51
62.55
Sixth step
| 13,250
15.35
77.90
Seventh step | 10,370
12.01
89.92
Eighth step
| 5,825
6.75
96.66
Nineth Step | 1,613
1.87
98.53
Tenth step-10 | 1,266
1.47
100.00
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Total
| 86,311 100.00
Table 6.3: The Interactive Effect of Belief in Courts & Belief in Equitable Economic Growth on
How Democratic the Country is being Run
(OLS Regression Analysis)
Coefficients

p-values

People’s Belief about
Equitable Economic
Growth

.139***

.001

Confidence in Courts

.66***

.001

Interaction Term
(courts & economics)

-.028***

.001

Age

.005***

.001

Sex

.039**

.028

.004

.305

Interest in Politics

.084***

.001

Confidence in Press

.283***

.001

Constant

2.74***

.001

N

75,533

Education
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R-squared

.0669

Adjusted R-squared

.0668

***=99%, **=95%,
*=90%

Figure 6.4: Contour Plot of the Interaction Between Economics and Courts Variables on
Dependent Variable: Beliefs about Level of Democracy (version 1.0)

Note: Y-Axis/Courts = confidence in courts/independent variable.
X-Axis/Economics = people’s belief that wealth grows and there’s enough for everyone/independent variable.
Z-Variable/Democracy Scale = belief country is run democratic/dependent variable.
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Figure 6.4 with 10 levels

Table 6.4: Variations at Plot Point 2,2-Figure 6.4
Courts
Economics
2
2
2
3
3
2

Democracy
5.3
5.4
5.9

Table 6.5: Variations at Plot Point 3,6-Figure 6.4
Courts
Economics
3
6
3
8
4
6

Democracy
6.17
6.28
6.6

Table 6.6: Variations at Plot Point 1,1-Figure 6.4
Courts
Economics
1
1
1
10
4
1

Democracy
4.78
5.74
6.49

Table 6.7: Variations at Plot Points 4-1; 1-10-Figure 6.4
Courts
Economics
4
1
4
10
1
10

Democracy
6.49
6.7
5.74
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4

10

6.7

Table: 6.8 Variations from Minimum to Maximum Plot Points; Reference Figure 6.4
Courts
Economics
Democracy
1
1
4.78
4
10
6.7
Figure 6.5: Contour Plot of Interaction Between Economic and Courts Variables on Dependent
Variable: Beliefs about Level of Democracy (version 2.0)

Figure 6.5 with 10-levels
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Libya Regression Analysis:
The Interactive Effect of Belief in Courts & Belief in Equitable Economic Growth on How
Democratic the Country is being Run
(OLS Regression Analysis)
People’s Belief about
Equitable Economic Growth

-.195***

Confidence in Courts

-.238

Interaction Term
(courts & economics)

.037

Age

.006

Sex

.470

Education

-.044

Interest in Politics

.136**

Confidence in Press

.289***

Constant

4.572***

N

1,720

R-squared

.0222

Adjusted R-squared

.0176

***=99%, **=95%, *=90%

Libya: Descriptive Statistics for all variables in the above model.
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------Democracy | 2015 4.306203 3.163068
1
10
Economics |
1966 7.420142 3.012186
1
10
Courts
|
1987 2.776044 1.075531
1
4

Democracy | Freq. Percent
Cum.
----------------------------------------+--------------------------Not at all democratic 1 |
658
32.66
32.66
201

2|
142
7.05
39.70
3|
167
8.29
47.99
4|
138
6.85
54.84
5|
249
12.36
67.20
6|
124
6.15
73.35
7|
142
7.05
80.40
8|
100
4.96
85.36
9|
51
2.53
87.89
Complete Democracy 10 |
244
12.11
100.00
----------------------------------------+---------------------------Total | 2,015 100.00

Equitable Economic Growth
Wealth accumulation | Freq. Percent
Cum.
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------1|
178
9.05
9.05
2|
29
1.48
10.53
3|
53
2.70
13.22
4|
79
4.02
17.24
5|
221
11.24
28.48
6|
108
5.49
33.98
7|
130
6.61
40.59
8|
155
7.88
48.47
9|
156
7.93
56.41
10 |
857
43.59
100.00
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,966 100.00

Courts | Freq. Percent
Cum.
------------+----------------------------------1|
291
14.65
14.65
2|
548
27.58
42.22
3|
463
23.30
65.53
4|
685
34.47
100.00
------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,987
100.00

Age
Variable | Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------Age | 2131 38.41764 13.49607
18
78

202

Age | Freq. Percent
Cum.
--------------------------------------+----------------------------------18 |
26
1.22
1.22
19 |
45
2.11
3.33
20 |
74
3.47
6.80
21 |
65
3.05
9.85
22 |
75
3.52
13.37
23 |
57
2.67
16.05
24 |
67
3.14
19.19
25 |
62
2.91
22.10
26 |
37
1.74
23.84
27 |
50
2.35
26.18
28 |
57
2.67
28.86
29 |
45
2.11
30.97
30 |
57
2.67
33.65
31 |
49
2.30
35.95
32 |
51
2.39
38.34
33 |
49
2.30
40.64
34 |
46
2.16
42.80
35 |
52
2.44
45.24
36 |
62
2.91
48.15
37 |
46
2.16
50.31
38 |
55
2.58
52.89
39 |
51
2.39
55.28
40 |
56
2.63
57.91
41 |
58
2.72
60.63
42 |
55
2.58
63.21
43 |
46
2.16
65.37
44 |
49
2.30
67.67
45 |
58
2.72
70.39
46 |
46
2.16
72.55
47 |
51
2.39
74.94
48 |
41
1.92
76.87
49 |
38
1.78
78.65
50 |
47
2.21
80.85
51 |
43
2.02
82.87
52 |
36
1.69
84.56
53 |
26
1.22
85.78
54 |
30
1.41
87.19
55 |
40
1.88
89.07
56 |
18
0.84
89.91
57 |
11
0.52
90.43
58 |
18
0.84
91.27
59 |
13
0.61
91.88
60 |
22
1.03
92.91
61 |
14
0.66
93.57
203

62 |
16
0.75
94.32
63 |
14
0.66
94.98
64 |
16
0.75
95.73
65 |
17
0.80
96.53
66 |
6
0.28
96.81
67 |
10
0.47
97.28
68 |
5
0.23
97.51
69 |
6
0.28
97.79
70 |
13
0.61
98.40
71 |
5
0.23
98.64
72 |
6
0.28
98.92
73 |
5
0.23
99.16
74 |
4
0.19
99.34
75 |
6
0.28
99.62
76 |
4
0.19
99.81
77 |
2
0.09
99.91
78 |
2
0.09
100.00
--------------------------------------+----------------------------------Total | 2,131 100.00

Sex
Variable | Obs.
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------Sex | 2131 1.488972 .4999957
1
2

Sex | Freq. Percent
Cum.
--------------------+----------------------------------1 | 1,089
51.10
51.10
2 | 1,042
48.90
100.00
--------------------+----------------------------------Total | 2,131
100.00

Education
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------Education | 2116 5.683837 2.688166
1
9
Highest educational level attained |
Freq. Percent
Cum.
----------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------1|
145
6.85
6.85
2|
201
9.50
16.35
3|
202
9.55
25.90
204

4|
5|
6|
7|

197
329
102
207

9.31
15.55
4.82
9.78

35.21
50.76
55.58
65.36
8|
217
10.26
75.61
9|
516
24.39
100.00
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------Total |
2,116
100.00

Interest in Politics
Variable |
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------Interest in Pol. | 2070 2.65942 1.022911
1
4

cs |
Freq. Percent
Cum.
------------+----------------------------------1|
389
18.79
18.79
2|
388
18.74
37.54
3|
832
40.19
77.73
4|
461
22.27
100.00
------------+----------------------------------Total | 2,070
100.00

Confidence in Press
Variable |
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------Press
| 2000
1.9525 .8942279
1
4

Press |
Freq. Percent
Cum.
------------+----------------------------------1|
679
33.95
33.95
2|
907
45.35
79.30
3|
244
12.20
91.50
4|
170
8.50
100.00
------------+----------------------------------Total | 2,000
100.00
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Thailand Regression Analysis:
The Interactive Effect of Belief in Courts & Belief in Equitable Economic Growth on How
Democratic the Country is being Run
(OLS Regression Analysis)
People’s Belief about
Equitable Economic Growth

.119

Confidence in Courts

.261

Interaction Term
(courts & economics)

-.01

Age

-.01

Sex

-.2

Education

-.115***

Interest in Politics

-.057

Confidence in Press

.252***

Constant

6.16***

N

1,061

R-squared

.0458

Adjusted R-squared

.0385

***=99%, **=95%, *=90%

Thailand: Descriptive Statistics for all variables in the above model.
Variable |
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------Democracy | 1190 6.792437 2.245963
1
10
Economics|
1187 7.580455 2.266976
1
10
Courts
|
1139 3.055312 .9334232
1
4

How democratically is this country?
| Freq. Percent
Cum.
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------206

1|

35

2.94
2.94
2|
20
1.68
4.62
3|
43
3.61
8.24
4|
48
4.03
12.27
5|
185
15.55
27.82
6|
196
16.47
44.29
7|
183
15.38
59.66
8|
194
16.30
75.97
9|
107
8.99
84.96
10 |
179
15.04
100.00
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,190 100.00

Equitable Economic Growth
| Freq. Percent
Cum.
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------1|
22
1.85
1.85
2|
13
1.10
2.95
3|
22
1.85
4.80
4|
37
3.12
7.92
5|
150
12.64
20.56
6|
126
10.61
31.17
7|
160
13.48
44.65
8|
177
14.91
59.56
9|
106
8.93
68.49
10 |
374
31.51
100.00
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,187 100.00

Courts
Courts | Freq. Percent
Cum.
------------+----------------------------------1|
95
8.34
8.34
2|
181
15.89
24.23
3|
429
37.66
61.90
4|
434
38.10
100.00
------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,139
100.00

Age
Variable |
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------207

Age |

1195

45.16067

12.24858

18

85

Age
Age | Freq. Percent
Cum.
--------------------------------------+----------------------------------18 |
4
0.33
0.33
19 |
3
0.25
0.59
20 |
19
1.59
2.18
21 |
15
1.26
3.43
22 |
12
1.00
4.44
23 |
6
0.50
4.94
24 |
4
0.33
5.27
25 |
12
1.00
6.28
26 |
17
1.42
7.70
27 |
9
0.75
8.45
28 |
28
2.34
10.79
29 |
16
1.34
12.13
30 |
19
1.59
13.72
31 |
24
2.01
15.73
32 |
12
1.00
16.74
33 |
18
1.51
18.24
34 |
17
1.42
19.67
35 |
25
2.09
21.76
36 |
39
3.26
25.02
37 |
39
3.26
28.28
38 |
31
2.59
30.88
39 |
26
2.18
33.05
40 |
26
2.18
35.23
41 |
26
2.18
37.41
42 |
35
2.93
40.33
43 |
34
2.85
43.18
44 |
34
2.85
46.03
45 |
39
3.26
49.29
46 |
45
3.77
53.05
47 |
33
2.76
55.82
48 |
39
3.26
59.08
49 |
35
2.93
62.01
50 |
33
2.76
64.77
51 |
38
3.18
67.95
52 |
33
2.76
70.71
53 |
27
2.26
72.97
54 |
25
2.09
75.06
55 |
28
2.34
77.41
56 |
38
3.18
80.59
57 |
38
3.18
83.77
208

58 |
24
2.01
85.77
59 |
25
2.09
87.87
60 |
28
2.34
90.21
61 |
17
1.42
91.63
62 |
18
1.51
93.14
63 |
15
1.26
94.39
64 |
14
1.17
95.56
65 |
11
0.92
96.49
66 |
10
0.84
97.32
67 |
6
0.50
97.82
68 |
6
0.50
98.33
69 |
3
0.25
98.58
70 |
3
0.25
98.83
71 |
2
0.17
99.00
72 |
3
0.25
99.25
73 |
1
0.08
99.33
74 |
1
0.08
99.41
76 |
1
0.08
99.50
78 |
2
0.17
99.67
81 |
2
0.17
99.83
85 |
2
0.17
100.00
--------------------------------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,195 100.00

Sex
Variable |
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------Sex | 1166 1.476844 .4996778
1
2
Sex
Sex | Freq. Percent
Cum.
--------------------+----------------------------------1|
610
52.32
52.32
2|
556
47.68
100.00
--------------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,166
100.00

Education
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------Education | 1182
4.754653 2.419027
1
9

Education
209

Highest educational level attained | Freq. Percent
Cum.
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------------1|
18
1.52
1.52
2|
44
3.72
5.25
3|
586
49.58
54.82
4|
42
3.55
58.38
5|
125
10.58
68.95
6|
31
2.62
71.57
7|
117
9.90
81.47
8|
13
1.10
82.57
9|
206
17.43
100.00
----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------Total | 1,182 100.00

Interest in Politics
Variable |
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------Politics
| 1195 2.935565 .8367794
1
4

Interest in Politics
cs |
Freq. Percent
Cum.
------------+----------------------------------1|
82
6.86
6.86
2|
213
17.82
24.69
3|
600
50.21
74.90
4|
300
25.10
100.00
------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,195
100.00

Confidence in Press
Variable |
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------Press
| 1152 2.424479 .8176112
1
4

Press |
Freq. Percent
Cum.
------------+----------------------------------1|
136
11.81
11.81
2|
499
43.32
55.12
3|
409
35.50
90.63
4|
108
9.38
100.00
------------+----------------------------------210

Total |

1,152

100.00

Table 6.9: Tunisia Regression Analysis:
The Interactive Effect of Belief in Courts & Belief in Equitable Economic Growth on How
Democratic the Country is being Run
(OLS Regression Analysis)
Coefficients

p-values

People’s Belief about
Equitable Economic Growth

.142**

.012

Confidence in Courts

.574***

.001

Interaction Term
(courts & economics)

-.083***

.001

Age

.006

.280

Sex

-.177

.250

Education

.053*

.089

Interest in Politics

-.024

.0768

Confidence in Press

.121

.201

2.483***

.001

Constant
N

978

R-squared

.0343

Adjusted R-squared

.0264

***=99%, **=95%, *=90%

Tunisia Descriptive Statistics
Variable |
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------Democracy | 1103 3.929284 2.355147
1
10
Economics |
1106 5.939421 3.164987
1
10
Courts
|
1123 2.541407
1.0414
1
4
211

How democratically is this country?
| Freq. Percent
Cum.
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------1|
284
25.75
25.75
2|
69
6.26
32.00
3|
136
12.33
44.33
4|
130
11.79
56.12
5|
212
19.22
75.34
6|
102
9.25
84.59
7|
99
8.98
93.56
8|
42
3.81
97.37
9|
7
0.63
98.01
10 |
22
1.99
100.00
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,103 100.00

Equitable Economic Growth
| Freq. Percent
Cum.
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------1|
188
17.00
17.00
2|
34
3.07
20.07
3|
49
4.43
24.50
4|
53
4.79
29.29
5|
179
16.18
45.48
6|
106
9.58
55.06
7|
119
10.76
65.82
8|
80
7.23
73.06
9|
30
2.71
75.77
10 |
268
24.23
100.00
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,106 100.00

Confidence in Courts
Courts | Freq. Percent
Cum.
------------+----------------------------------1|
216
19.23
19.23
2|
336
29.92
49.15
3|
318
28.32
77.47
4|
253
22.53
100.00
------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,123
100.00
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Age
Variable |
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------Age |
1205 38.8166 16.20781
18
87

Age
Age | Freq. Percent
Cum.
--------------------------------------+----------------------------------18 |
59
4.90
4.90
19 |
39
3.24
8.13
20 |
32
2.66
10.79
21 |
31
2.57
13.36
22 |
29
2.41
15.77
23 |
50
4.15
19.92
24 |
39
3.24
23.15
25 |
39
3.24
26.39
26 |
47
3.90
30.29
27 |
34
2.82
33.11
28 |
34
2.82
35.93
29 |
25
2.07
38.01
30 |
36
2.99
41.00
31 |
25
2.07
43.07
32 |
17
1.41
44.48
33 |
23
1.91
46.39
34 |
18
1.49
47.88
35 |
33
2.74
50.62
36 |
29
2.41
53.03
37 |
20
1.66
54.69
38 |
24
1.99
56.68
39 |
11
0.91
57.59
40 |
22
1.83
59.42
41 |
11
0.91
60.33
42 |
25
2.07
62.41
43 |
20
1.66
64.07
44 |
31
2.57
66.64
45 |
23
1.91
68.55
46 |
17
1.41
69.96
47 |
14
1.16
71.12
48 |
14
1.16
72.28
49 |
16
1.33
73.61
50 |
14
1.16
74.77
51 |
8
0.66
75.44
52 |
14
1.16
76.60
53 |
22
1.83
78.42
54 |
35
2.90
81.33
213

55 |
6
0.50
81.83
56 |
13
1.08
82.90
57 |
10
0.83
83.73
58 |
12
1.00
84.73
59 |
8
0.66
85.39
60 |
15
1.24
86.64
61 |
8
0.66
87.30
62 |
10
0.83
88.13
63 |
9
0.75
88.88
64 |
7
0.58
89.46
65 |
19
1.58
91.04
66 |
13
1.08
92.12
67 |
14
1.16
93.28
68 |
14
1.16
94.44
69 |
13
1.08
95.52
70 |
10
0.83
96.35
71 |
6
0.50
96.85
72 |
9
0.75
97.59
73 |
8
0.66
98.26
74 |
4
0.33
98.59
75 |
5
0.41
99.00
76 |
2
0.17
99.17
78 |
1
0.08
99.25
79 |
3
0.25
99.50
80 |
3
0.25
99.75
82 |
2
0.17
99.92
87 |
1
0.08
100.00
--------------------------------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,205 100.00

Sex
Variable |
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------Sex |
1205 1.473859 .4995235
1
2
Sex
Sex | Freq. Percent
Cum.
--------------------+----------------------------------1|
634
52.61
52.61
2|
571
47.39
100.00
--------------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,205
100.00
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Education
Variable |
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------Education | 1204 4.124585 2.70545
1
9

Education - Highest educational level attained |
Freq. Percent
Cum.
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------1|
266
22.09
22.09
2|
227
18.85
40.95
3|
109
9.05
50.00
4|
107
8.89
58.89
5|
41
3.41
62.29
6|
161
13.37
75.66
7|
128
10.63
86.30
8|
61
5.07
91.36
9|
104
8.64
100.00
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,204 100.00

Interest in Politics
Variable |
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------Politics
| 1180 2.209322 .9812913
1
4

Interest In Politics |
cs |
Freq. Percent
Cum.
------------+----------------------------------1|
364
30.85
30.85
2|
311
26.36
57.20
3|
399
33.81
91.02
4|
106
8.98
100.00
------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,180
100.00

Confidence in Press
Variable |
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------Press
| 1114 1.820467 .8467969
1
4
Press
215

| Freq. Percent
Cum.
------------+----------------------------------1|
465
41.74
41.74
2|
436
39.14
80.88
3|
161
14.45
95.33
4|
52
4.67
100.00
------------+----------------------------------Total | 1,114
100.00

Figure 6.6: Tunisia; Contour Plot of the Interaction Between Economic and Courts Variables on
Dependent Variable: Beliefs about Level of Democracy (version 1.0)
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